Europe in 1750 was in many ways at the height of its glory days. The Palace of Versailles, outside Paris, stood as a monument to the wealth and power of the monarchy, and cities like Paris and London were experiencing extreme physical and economic growth. The European drive for global colonial development was also characteristic of the Eighteenth Century, with almost every European power expanding their holdings in the New World as well as exploring areas of the Far East. After all, with so much extravagance and development raising costs in Europe, competition for territory and economic monopoly in new, exploitable lands became an essential facet of the eighteenth century world. France, in particular, stood as the height of Continental glamour, wealth, and power, unaware that later decades would completely topple its powerful monarchy. A great deal of their power came from the strong strategic alliances she built to stabilize her place within the large and complicated European balance of power. Despite France’s domestic prosperity, though, her colonies struggled to maintain their hold over the areas long-claimed for France. Facing increased competition with the British in the New World, France sought alliances with powerful native tribes in order to bolster her control of New France.

Traditional spheres of historical study, particularly those focused on the early modern world, have examined in great detail the independent aspects of European history. But this approach often fails to capture the complexity of the eighteenth century world. Many events experienced by the continent are too large to be confined to any one region, and often their effects are felt in distant locations. For this reason, historical events are often examined in regional vacuums. However, transnational comparisons of events often lead to a more dynamic analysis of any given event. Very broadly, this essay discusses French foreign policy in the mid-eighteenth century. The comparative methodology, juxtaposing French treatment of two traditionally marginalized or undervalued groups, provides greater insight into the cohesiveness of French foreign policy not necessarily apparent when using traditional, regional historical context.

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The Underdog Strategy

The context of the French and British rivalry for territory in Colonial America, which culminated with the French and Indian War, has been a subject of much study. Likewise, a great deal of study has been devoted to eighteenth-century diplomatic strategy in Europe, where the Great Powers, including Britain, France, and Austria, created a series of alliances and ultimately worked to maintain a delicate balance of power that informed the continent's policies. Yet, despite the fact that many of these European actors were also the colonizers of the New World, comparatively little attention has been given to the transatlantic consistencies of these great powers' diplomatic policies.

Contrary to what this relative lack of transatlantic analysis may suggest, French foreign policy across spheres of influence is in fact notably consistent during the eighteenth century. Surrounded by rival European powers, the course that France charted in her colonies mirrored the way she approached the constant geopolitical struggle on the Continent. When it came to their rivalry with Great Britain, the French had the propensity to enlist smaller, seemingly more vulnerable forces to directly challenge the British either alongside or in place of France herself. Interestingly, though, despite the fierce rivalry between the French and the British, the French never acted with the goal of entirely eliminating their major rival. The extent to which the French became invested in war suggests an alternate goal: to preserve the long-standing balance of power between the two nations wherever they came into conflict.

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY IMPERIALISM

French and British action in the New World is intrinsically linked to larger historical themes of the time period and, as such, an understanding of the context of the Seven Years' War and the tensions that created it is essential. The eighteenth century was undeniably a period of progress and, between the rise of the Enlightenment movement and the wash of democratic revolutions across the Western World, is widely considered to have fostered the birth of modernity. The eighteenth century can also be defined by grand imperial movements on the part of Europe's biggest economic and diplomatic powers: Britain and France. Across hemispheres, these two powers continually and emphatically competed for land and economic monopoly with increasing fervor. While the seventeenth century saw a huge colonial expansion and the struggle for dominance over other European competitors in these new territories, the subsequent century featured Britain and France expanded their longstanding rivalry on an increasingly global level.

One such imperial conflict—and perhaps the most important of the century in terms of longstanding influence and economic growth—was the struggle for control of the New World. Of course, New World colonialism was not new; France and Britain had both begun to establish colonies in North America in the seventeenth century, with Dutch and Spanish colonies predating even those. However, the mid-eighteenth century brought continued conflict between Britain and France as they attempted to define the borders between the British colonies along the eastern coast of the continent and New France farther to the north and west. The result of this decades-long struggle is well known and carried with it massive ramifications for the French: the British won control of most of the disputed territories, rendering France an increasingly marginalized European force in the New World with territories only to the far west beyond the Mississippi. Why, then, after decades of colonization by both Britain and France, were the British able to remain so dominant in the region and ultimately win the French and Indian War? The answer lies in the combination of a number of differences in colonial strategy.

FRENCH COLONIAL CULTURE

As suggested by their eventual preeminence in the New World, not to mention across the globe, the British approach to colonization in North America was more successful than those of their European rivals. The key aspect of Britain's successful colonialism was its very physical, tangible approach to its North American colonies. The British approach emphasized creating concrete, lasting communities throughout their colonial holdings. This goal was abjectly clear from the early days of the British colonization project in the mid-eighteenth century; the British began implementing policies...
The French, on the other hand, were faced with a more desolate colonization process. New France was comprised of much less hospitable land to the northwest of the British colonies, like Canada and the Great Lakes. While French land did extend into fertile lands in the south, large scale agricultural production was much less viable in much of New France. Instead, French colonists worked largely as fur trappers, exporting their goods back to France through Quebec and New Orleans.\(^4\) Most importantly, the British had densely settled their land on the eastern seaboard of the New World. On the other hand, while the French retained influence over a great deal of land, French settlements were small and far from each other.\(^5\) The shortage of stable French communities encouraged colonists to consistently interact with Native American communities. By closely involving themselves with Native American tribes on a personal as well as economic level, many French established lasting ties to the communities and grew to understand the people which with they worked very well.\(^6\) Nonetheless, the lack of sufficiently spreading and growing French communities to rival Britain’s colonies became a substantial disadvantage for the French in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

**WHY NORTH AMERICA?**

Throughout the eighteenth century, France persisted in its attempts to grow its colonial holdings in the region by both holding physical territory and developing stable communities. Given France’s comparatively weak position in North America, this policy goal created confusion among contemporaries, who, to use Voltaire’s famous quote, imagined Canada and the Northwest Territories—called the *pays d’en haut*—to be solely “a few acres of snow.”\(^7\) Compared to French islands in the Caribbean like Haiti and France’s holdings along the Mississippi, including the developing city of New Orleans, the northern parts of North America were largely inhospitable to agriculture and colonists alike.\(^8\) Yet, many French policymakers did consider France’s northern territories to be strategically significant in the grand scheme of the nation’s fight against Great British preeminence in the New World. Yet, even if French officials could agree that there was a strategic advantage to maintaining the *pays d’en haut* and the Ohio Valley, they did not necessarily agree on the appropriate way to protect their North American holdings, which had direct effects on French preparedness for escalating tensions in the region.

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**“Hegemony in the New World, [the French Continentalist thinkers] argued, would come as the result of European-based military and diplomatic maneuvers.”**

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**THE CARIBBEAN LINK**

The *pays d’en haut* were, as Voltaire suggests, often a desolate place, and such a desolate place understandably created skepticism within France and even among colonial officials in the region surrounding the value of holding the territory at all. In the words of La Galissonnière, a French official in the colonies, “Canada, that sterile portion of the New World, and which, costing its possessors enormous expenses, gives them back only furs that they purchase far too dearly, was not a practical economic investment.”\(^9\) Colonialism in the eighteenth century was a fight for, above all, increased economic power to both fuel domestic prosperity and maintain a favorable place in the “balance of commerce” that influenced the European order.\(^10\) Often, the New World was the perfect solution for many European powers: the land was a source of new agricultural production and, in some regions, allowed for the growth and promulgation of slave labor. As La Galissonnière suggests, the bulk of French profit from its colonies came not from Canada but from the Caribbean, where the sugar trade made islands like Haiti essential to the economic system of the region.\(^11\) With such obvious economic incentive lacking in the *pays d’en haut*, maintaining a region that had little to no visible potential to contribute to this long-term goal became difficult to justify.

Regardless, the French did work passionately throughout the mid-eighteenth century to hold its northern territories as the British increasingly fought for influence in the region, as the value of North America lay in its strategic, rather than commercial, significance. The land itself may have been considered worthless, but the British did attempt to move further west from their land into the Ohio Valley. French-influenced territory that bordered the *pays d’en haut*. La Galissonnière makes it clear in his assessment of Canada that because there was no agricultural or other economic incentive for the British to look towards the *pays d’en haut*, he believed their interest in the territory must have been strategic.\(^12\) Indeed, French territory was optimally situated around the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, which flowed to New Orleans and the profitable Caribbean, and the Great Lakes, leading to the St. Lawrence river and the Atlantic. The Great Lakes region and the Ohio
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Valley were therefore the quickest and most efficient means of both transportation and communication between Canada and Louisiana. With the British having colonized the east coast and looking to move westward and the Spanish holding land along the Gulf of Mexico south into Latin America, France found itself caught between two major European rivals looking for imperial predominance. The French were convinced, then, that the British were attempting to expand westward not for economic or agricultural reasons, but as a means of blocking access to France's holdings in the south. To allow a foreign power like Great Britain to control the middle of the American territories would be detrimental to French cohesion and efficiency in the region.

The Eurocentric Strategy Option

Even with the strategic significance of the North American wilderness established, many in France encouraged the government to remain focused not on its conflicts in New France, but on its relationships with other continental European powers. To be sure, French holdings in North America were threatened by British claims to unsettled land, but 'Continentalist' thinkers within France remained convinced that New France was only a small piece of an international diplomatic policy created and maintained in Europe. Hegemony in the New World, they argued, would come as the result of European-based military and diplomatic maneuvers.

While there were certainly powerful advisors in France who advocated for a more hands-on approach in New France, understanding the influence of the Continentalists in France is key to understanding the French mentality towards the New World. For example, one of France's biggest rivals in European sphere was the Austrian Empire which, while lacking overseas colonies compared to France, Britain, Spain, or the Netherlands, held a great amount of land in continental Europe as well as an influential amount of diplomatic prowess. Austria and Spain maintained a strong alliance through their common Habsburg family ties. Britain and the Netherlands also had their own defensive alliance, while France had been allied with Prussia since 1741. Prussia, though, lacked colonies in the New World, meaning that France stood alone among the European powers of the New World. Even more threatening, their territory in the New World was increasingly surrounded by Spain and Britain. Continentalist thinkers therefore proposed that, to avoid losing their piece of the New World, the French should dismantle these alliances in Europe or, at least, create neutrality before their impending conflict with the British.

French proponents of a Eurocentric foreign policy made their case even as it pertained to North American territories. While the developing conflict itself was in the New World, the players that would actually decide the issues of sovereignty and boundaries at hand remained in the Old World. To abandon continental foreign policy in favor of focusing on the New World would, some argued, alienate the very powers that would help France maintain its power and sovereignty both in Europe and abroad. In particular, the Dutch, who were traditional allies of the British, could tip a Franco-British struggle in favor of the British, so currying their favor and attempting to ensure their neutrality in an impending military clash could save France's contested holdings.

Native American Alliances

Whether or not more French ministers and advisors valued connections on the Continent over those in the New World, colonial officials did pursue strong alliances with Algonquin-speaking tribes in the pays d'en haut and the Ohio Valley. The history of this relationship with Native Americans in the northern regions of the New World is a complex one. Over the course of their decades-long alliance, the French and Native American cultures blended and evolved together. Neither culture completely absorbed the other, yet mutually developed practices became intrinsic to both communities. Creating such culture was not easy or immediate; the cultural differences on subjects so important as land ownership and leadership complicated both groups' ability to maintain fluid integration of two very disparate cultures. The French sought, above all else, order and rationality in the Native American way of life, whereas the Native Americans aimed to “[knock] the order off balance, from asserting the personal, the human exception.” Gradually, the two sides were able to establish enough common goals and perspectives to allow for successful interaction. The French then began the delicate task of maintaining the allegiance of the Algonquin—many of whom the French feared would attempt to ally with either the British-allied Iroquois Confederacy or other tribes to the west—without offending the authority of their leaders. In 1671, the French did claim the Algonquin territory as a subject nation of France, but this declaration was largely symbolic; Native American tribes still retained a great deal of power over the French because of their influence over and knowledge of the land in which the French traded. What developed over the next century, then, was more akin to partnership than the conquering the French crown had anticipated in 1671.

Confronted with the economic incentive for heightened trade that the Europeans brought, though, Native American tribes—particularly the Algonquin and the Iroquois—quickly adjusted to the new realities of their world. Tribes began to migrate seasonally in order to harvest marketable resources as varied as furs and maple sugar. This practice created a new aspect of Native American society in which “trade both defined the political economy of Native people in the western interior and created a social world where trade, diplomacy, peace, and warfare were deeply intertwined.” While Native American tribes assuredly did not assimilate into European society, they did learn to play by Europe's rules in the interest of economic prosperity.
Trading partnerships quickly laid the groundwork for a new kind of relationship between Native tribes and the European colonizers. Over time, and with the battle for colonial territory intensifying, Native American tribes became a welcome military ally for both the French or British against the other. French strategy towards Native Americans is fairly simply summarized: they were the lesser of two evils, worth aiding to the benefit of the French, and then easily silenced after a French victory over the British. The French worked, then, to create and strengthen more alliances with Native Americans than their British counterparts by creating closer economic ties to various tribes. Of course, the British maintained a long-standing alliance with the Iroquois Confederacy in the East, a powerful network of tribes that were essential to British predominance in the region. Partly in fear of the influence the Iroquois Confederacy could have on potential Algonquin allies, the French worked closely with tribes in the pays d’en haut to create a network to rival the British and Iroquois to the east. Scholar Richard White calls this delicate alliance the Middle Ground: a “common conception of suitable ways of acting” by which both French and Indian actors were willing to adhere. The cornerstone of this Middle Ground was its diplomatic foundations; neither the French nor the Native Americans could use force to manipulate the other side and still retain their important relationship, so a standard of cooperation naturally developed.

WAR

This precarious balance was thrown into disarray in 1750, when traditional alliances were challenged as both empires vied for control of the Ohio River Valley, the key territorial connector between New France and the British colonies. Put very simply, the French felt, somewhat justifiably, that their Middle Ground was being threatened by British expansion of its territories and Native American alliances, and control of the Ohio Valley would create a larger buffer between the strategically important French lands and the British territories. In the late 1740s, some of France's Algonquin allies had begun to trade with the British, much to France's dismay. The French officials in the colonies, desperate to maintain control over their established trading relationships, responded with “dictation and subordination,” further offending and alienating their Algonquin allies. Trade with the British continued, and the French feared that the British would only continue to gain power in the French sphere of influence. After their harsher tactics for bringing the Native Americans back into the fold failed, the French did work to win back Native American favor by reforming parts of the fur trade, but their traditional alliances still remained more precarious than before. Fueled by France's continual fears of territorial and economic loss, tensions between the British and the French in the region intensified. By the early 1750s, both sides were convinced that the fight for the Ohio Valley would
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determine the outcome of their entire colonial struggle in the New World. \(^{30}\) It was under this pretension that the French ultimately took violent action against their rivals.

The French started a series of minor attacks as early at 1751 after demanding the expulsion of British traders from the Ohio Valley territories in which they had traditionally had a trading monopoly. When the British failed to leave their trading posts, the French began to conduct a series of raids against their villages in cooperation with some Native American allies. \(^{31}\) These aggressions continued until 1753, with the French gradually claiming land in the Ohio Valley. However, it was not until 1753 that the British colonists began to politically react to the threat by the French by requesting and subsequently sending British troops into the territory to respond to French aggression. \(^{32}\) Thus began the French and Indian War, which would evolve into the international Seven Years' War.

THE JACOBITE ALLIANCE

The Europe of the eighteenth century was in a near-consistent state of war, giving France many opportunities to create and break alliances with various other actors. In particular, France's strategy in the New World bears striking similarities to its strategy regarding Britain during the War of Austrian Succession in the 1740s. The War of Austrian succession brought Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and Prussia together on the European stage, with the French facing off against the British.

Meanwhile, and seemingly insignificantly, the French created an alliance with the rebel Jacobite forces in Scotland in 1745. The Jacobite cause dates to 1688, when the Glorious Revolution overthrew King James II in favor of the Protestant, Hanoverian King William III. The Glorious Revolution is a well-known piece of British history, often presented—as the name suggests—as an important and positive change in the British monarchy. Lesser known is the resistance movement that followed 1688; Scottish supporters of the exiled King James II continued to plot the overthrow of the “foreign usurper.” \(^{33}\) In fact, James Stuart, son of the exiled King, attempted an overthrow of the British monarchy in 1715, with disastrous results; the conflict is largely seen as a pathetic domestic uprising rather than a legitimate invasion or civil war. Notably, the French provided aide in 1715 and were soundly defeated by British troops. \(^{34}\) Their abject failure understandably undermined the legitimacy of the Jacobite cause.

In the years following the uprising of 1715, the Jacobite network in Europe grew weaker and weaker. King James III fled to Rome under the protection of the Pope, and his followers found themselves dispersed across France and Italy with...
few means of communication that could allow for the planning of another rebellion.\textsuperscript{33} Those Jacobites who were able to maintain a life in larger cities like Paris integrated themselves in European society, but some argue that their social connections did not benefit their cause. Instead, while Scots often became leaders in Enlightenment thinking, they held little political power.\textsuperscript{34} Gradually, the Jacobite cause faded from the forefront of European affairs.

Eventually, though, plans for the Rising in 1745, often called The ’45, grew in popularity and a new generation of Jacobite supporters began the task of amassing political power in Europe. The ’45 stands apart from earlier Jacobite resistance due to its relative success and the serious threat its success could have posed to the British Monarchy. It seems ludicrous to imagine that a long-ousted King could feasibly challenge one of the most powerful Empires of the age and win. Yet, the Jacobites saw a strong start to their rebellion and were able to conquer all of Scotland and a great deal of Northern England before they were finally defeated. The British, distracted by their colonial pursuits, had failed to seriously consider the possibility of mutiny in their own backyards.\textsuperscript{35} It is in this context that the Jacobite movement garnered international interest in Europe and the French were once again persuaded to work with the Jacobite forces. With the Jacobites determined as ever to invade a distracted Britain, a French alliance with the Jacobites appeared a strategically sensible deal to make.

Given France’s prior history with Jacobite alliances and the general weakness of the Jacobite network in Europe, it took years to persuade the French to ally themselves with the Jacobites. After more than a year of communication and demurring, King Louis XV signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau with Prince Charles Edward Stuart in October of 1745, pledging support to the Jacobite cause.\textsuperscript{36} France’s hesitation regarding an alliance with the Jacobite forces was not without reason; they were a small, often disparate group of rebels looking to challenge a world power. Yet, France was ultimately willing to establish ties with them.

\textbf{TRANSATLANTIC POLICY CONNECTIONS}

French alliances with Native American tribes and with the Jacobites may appear unrelated at first glance. Traditional historical disciplines often examine the colonial world in a vacuum, despite the fact that the New World was controlled by the same powers that were in conflict in Europe. When a transnational lens is applied to colonial strategy, a number of consistencies in diplomatic philosophy emerge. Comparing French perspectives on different conflicts across the Atlantic creates a more thorough and overarching picture of French foreign policy strategy.

The term “proxy war,” while traditionally used in the context of the Cold War, aptly describes France’s actions in regards to their Algonquin allies. However, this strategy in the New World is not an isolated strategy even in terms of its eighteenth century policy; transcontinental comparisons between the French and Indian war and other lower-profile conflicts in the eighteenth century reveal that French strategy towards Native Americans parallels the approach taken towards other low-profile groups during the same century. Importantly, these comparisons show a lack of French motivation to completely eliminate their rival, Great Britain. Instead, French writings from the time show a concern for maintaining the European balance of power.

\textbf{CONSISTENCY IN STRATEGY TOWARDS ALLIANCE}

Letters sent between French policy makers regarding Native American alliance bear a similarity to those sent regarding the Jacobite forces when examined in the context of France’s goals for the alliances. Looking basically at official correspondence, the very language used in regards to Native American or Jacobite forces is similar. The French routinely referred to Native Americans as “sauvages,” or savages, the connotations of which carry derogatory implications about the French view of their allies.\textsuperscript{37} This, combined with the fact that La Jonquiere’s 1753 letter to the French ministry makes it clear that the Native Americans are being used as a proxy force to “drive the English from the [Ohio] river” and challenge the British in disputed territory, shows the inequality in the Franco-Native American relationship. The French were willing to partner with Native Americans, to their benefit, but the fact that the French referred to their allies as savages indicates that their alliance certainly was not one between equal parties.

Interestingly, the French took a similar perspective on the Jacobites. Wholly different in background from the Native Americans, the Jacobites were led by royalty and were largely European, often aristocratic men. Negotiations surrounding the Jacobite cause involved the King of France himself and the royal members of the House of Stuart. Yet, the French routinely referred to the Jacobites at “les Pretendants” and to Prince Charles Stuart as “le Pretender,” meaning “the Pretender.”\textsuperscript{38} While this term was widely used in Britain to undermine the Jacobite cause, the French also used this derogatory term to describe their treaty-bound allies. Such a term automatically enforces France’s acknowledgement that King James III and his son were not actually legitimate heirs to the British throne. The French were simply willing to use the Jacobite cause as a pretension for an invasion of Britain, this time not even seeing the need for direct military action.

Other comparisons between Franco-Native American alliances and the Jacobite treaty come through French treatment of Native Americans as a legitimate political actor. While Native American tribes were substantially more organized than the Jacobites, the French saw them as “sauvages,” a weaker power, easily manipulated by the French and with no chance of defeating the two major European forces with which they had allied; by no means did the French view the Algonquin...
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tribes as equal to European powers.\textsuperscript{41} With such a negative perception of Native Americans, the French had precedent, as many European countries did in colonized territories, to simply conquer the native people and take the land as their own. Yet, despite their diminutive view of native tribes, the French established formal alliances with Algonquin tribes, working with their chiefs and often negotiating terms of their economic interactions, as in the case of the fur trade negotiations before the Seven Years’ War.\textsuperscript{42} The French thereby demonstrated some political need for the Algonquin tribes as separate actors in the New World, rather than as complete subordinates. In Europe and in the New World, then, the French sought out and agreed to partner with forces they thought would be easily manipulated to French advantage.

By allowing the Native American tribes to maintain some degree of autonomy, the French were able to use their allies as proxy forces against the British. While the French conducted their own military raids against British trading villages in the Ohio Valley, they encouraged native villages to take matters into their own hands. Given the potentially incendiary nature of their actions, though, the French had little patience for what they perceived as Native American weakness against the increased British presence in the area.

In a 1753 letter to Paris reporting on the state of affairs in New France as France attempted to maintain and grow their hold in the Ohio Valley, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, a high-ranking diplomatic official in New France, talks about his plan to “drive the English from the [Ohio] river and punish the Savages who let them win.”\textsuperscript{43} La Jonquiere references the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, after which the British began a more active trading relationship with Native Americans in the Ohio Valley, but denies that the treaty allowed the British any claims to sovereignty in the area.\textsuperscript{44} From the French perspective, though, Native American cooperation with the British encouraged British settlement in their territory and was unacceptable from an Algonquin tribe meant to be their longstanding ally.

La Jonquiere goes on to discuss an upcoming meeting between the French and the Native Americans in which tribes would be given “their orders and instructions.”\textsuperscript{45} He makes it clear that there will be no discussion of strategy, but that the Native Americans will receive their orders from the French and be expected to act accordingly; he likewise exhibits no doubt about whether the Native Americans would agree to follow French orders, despite their earlier “failures,” or, more likely, apathy towards the growing French paranoia.\textsuperscript{46} From the perspective of the French officials, then, the Native Americans are subordinate soldiers, rather than strategic allies, regardless of their official autonomy from French command.

Importantly, the French did not change their orders to their Native American allies after commanding that they drive the British from the Ohio River. They instead remained content to allow their Native American allies to conduct raids against British traders, and it was in fact the British that escalated the conflict, starting the official French and Indian War.\textsuperscript{47} French letters from Duquesne to the French Ministry suggest that they simply wanted to expel the British from the Ohio Valley and, by extent, prevent them from moving into the strategically valuable pays d’en haut.\textsuperscript{48} In this sense, the French were simply looking to maintain a balance they had long maintained in the New World, and they were relying on their Native American allies to do so.

This strategy towards their possessions in the New World mirrors French strategy in Europe surrounding the Jacobite rebellion. France never sent troops to Britain to support the Jacobite forces, and political correspondence from the time suggests that this decision derived from the same concern for maintaining a balance of power rather than gaining true advantage over the British. The French had signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau in October of 1745, and some French soldiers had already volunteered to assist the Jacobite cause in Scotland. At the same time, the War of Austrian Succession raged on and France and Britain remained locked in conflict. Just weeks after the treaty was signed, though, the French gained an upper hand over Britain in Flanders. Letters between ministers suggest that the French abandoned their plans to invade after their victory in Flanders.\textsuperscript{49} With the British checked but not outright defeated, the French were content to continue the status quo and maintain the delicate balance of imperial power that so characterized the eighteenth century, just as they would in the New World ten years later.

Comparative examination of both conflicts allows for the construction of some common thread in French foreign policy towards smaller political forces during the eighteenth century. Where both Native American tribes and the Jacobite rebels were concerned, the French decided to manipulate their smaller allies into proxy aggressors against the British whenever they felt that their strategic position was weakened. In the case of the Jacobites, they withdrew their support when they once again felt they had the upper hand; they never completely followed through on their challenge. In the case of the Native Americans, the French attempted to use a proxy force to maintain an extension of the same traditional alliance when they felt it had become too precarious. The language of the French communication on both subjects suggests that their support for either cause was only a means of maintaining the delicate balance they had with the British throughout the century.
Endnotes

[1] Two terms are used throughout this paper to identify different iterations of the same conflict. The Seven Years’ War refers to the international conflict between powers once it reached the European stage, while the French and Indian War refers to the specific piece of that war fought between the French and British with their respective Native American allies in the New World.


[3] Ibid.


[6] For more details on the French and Native American alliance, see Section Four.


[10] Ibid.


[12] Ibid.


[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., 124.


[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., 295.

[23] Ibid.


[27] Ibid., 52.

[28] Ibid., 206-207.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., 223.

[31] Ibid., 233-234.

[32] Ibid., 234-235.


[39] “Resumé des dépêches de Marquis de la Jonquière au Ministre.”


[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.


[48] Lettre de M. Duquesne au Ministre, 20 Août 1753