Imperialism, and the cultural hegemony that so often accompanies imperial imposition, have established themselves as some of the historian’s most poignant motifs. In this essay, Christian Talley examines a curious form of such imposition: when a member of the native populace, swayed by conceptions of modernity and religion, becomes a frank advocate of Western intervention into his own culture. His case study is Yun Chi-ho, a nineteenth-century Korean international student at Vanderbilt. While Yun believed his case for Western intervention into Korea, which he laid out in his Vanderbilt diaries, to be a sound one, his rigorous adherence to his ideals ultimately destroyed his reputation among his countrymen.

This essay received the 2016 Paul K. Conkin Award for Best Paper in U.S. History at Vanderbilt University.

By Christian Talley ’16
Vanderbilt University

On October 23rd, 1891, Vanderbilt University’s theology students and their professors met at the Inter-Seminary Missionary Alliance, a regional conference on missionary activity. Among them was Yun Chi-ho, a twenty-six year old Korean national, a devout Method-
Yun Chi-ho at Vanderbilt

Yun's experience that day was a microcosm of his broader three years of study at Vanderbilt, an experience wracked by isolation and apparent contradiction. In his writings, at times Yun could be a fierce critic of the Korean people but at others delicately attuned to their hopes and prospects. Despite criticizing Reverend Beach, Yun remained convinced that Christianizing Korea would uplift the nation. Despite fighting for the dignity of his people, Yun remained a staunch elitist who spoke negatively of 'coolies' whom he thought were poor representatives of the Asian race. And despite coming to the United States to observe the wonders of industrialization and Christianity, Yun found himself affronted by the blatant racism of the Jim Crow South.

In contrast to previous historians who have tried to demonstrate when and why an ideological 'shift' occurred from Yun's patriotism to Yun's collaboration, I argue that this is a false dichotomy. Caprio was on the right track in arguing that Yun's support for Japan was consistent with his desire for Korean development. But I extend the analysis much deeper, showing that even Yun's early philosophy beckoned for international intervention in Korea. Examining Yun's Vanderbilt diaries (written from 1888 to 1891) demonstrates Yun's deep admiration for Western empires, his hope that external forces might 'civilize' his fellow Koreans, his abiding faith in the power of 'Christianizing' Korea, and his general paternalism and elitism. Rather than undergoing a mysterious shift, I argue that Yun's support of Japanese colonialism was actually consistent with the views he had cultivated for decades—and particularly during his days at Vanderbilt. Yun was ultimately a pragmatist. Rather than diverging from prior patriotism by supporting Japan, Yun's early philosophy anticipated, and in fact hoped for, external modernizing forces to intervene and remake the 'backwards' Korean nation.

KOREA: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The question dominating the psyche of the Korean elite at the turn of the century was how they might lurch their nation into modernity. Yun himself believed a sojourn in America might impart valuable lessons that he could import to Korea. It seemed to Yun that time was of the essence. Indeed, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Korea faced a rapid deterioration of its international prestige and security. It began to succumb to the external forces of imperialism but also to the internal forces of corruption and isolationism. In 1866, France conducted a minor punitive mission against Korea for its persecution of French Catholic missionaries. In June of 1871, the United States attempted to 'open' the Hermit King-
dom as it had done previously with Japan in 1853. On June 1st, Korean soldiers suddenly attacked an American surveying party sailing up the Yomha River. The Koreans opened fire when the Americans reached Sondolmok, a highly symbolic river bend demarking passage into Korea’s interior. Though the Americans suffered no casualties, they retreated and organized a counterattack on June 10th. A heavily armed American landing party overwhelmed Kwangsong fort. The Marines, while killing over 250 Koreans, suffered only three killed and nine wounded. Though the Koreans “fought like tigers,” they were miserably outgunned. One Korean cannon captured after the fighting, the Americans learned, had been cast in 1313.

The American expedition in 1871 proved to be the first in a long line of setbacks for Korea. In 1876, Korea and Japan signed the unequal Treaty of Ganghwa Island, guaranteeing Japan extraterritoriality and favorable trade provisions. The Korean nation, faced poverty, a low life expectancy, famine, poor sanitation, epidemics, an animal and wind-based transportation system for people and goods, a village-centered market system, a lack of a national economy and currency, and, foremost, an inability to defend itself against the technically superior weapons and better trained armies of Europe and Japan.

Moreover, public resentment mounted against Korea’s ruling regime and especially against King Gojong. Gojong, for his part, attempted reforms to modernize Korea. Gojong very consciously looked to the United States as an example of modernity—“the United States during the Gilded Age looked irresistibly attractive” as a national model. He sent a delegation to America in 1883 that “brought back glowing reports” of America’s transportation, trade, universities, hospitals, free enterprise, and federalism.

Gojong, unfortunately, remained powerless to enact sweeping reforms. In 1884, a group of radical Korean progressives attempted a coup d’état known as the Gapsin Revolution. The coup managed to depose Gojong for three days. Yet China swiftly quashed the revolt and re-installed the King. The coup gave China the pretense for a decade of “direct intervention in Korea’s foreign and domestic affairs.” The Chinese general Yuan Shikai “sat at King Gojong’s side, preventing him from doing anything that might interfere with China’s control over Korea.” General Yuan continuously obstructed Korean reforms. He did not allow Gojong “to dispatch ambassadors to foreign countries,” allowed the British to seize Geomun Island, organized Korean tribute payments to Japan, blocked the construction of a telegraph line, and cancelled reforms of the Korean currency.

It was the Gapsin Revolution, in turn, that temporarily forced Yun Chi-ho out of Korea. While Yun played only a minor role, he was friendly with several of the coup’s radical leaders. Rather than face potential retribution, he decided to study abroad and to allow the domestic situation to cool. He thought it unwise to return while “the government remains our enemy.” While studying at the Anglo-Chinese College in Shanghai, he met the College’s founder, Young John Allen. Allen, a well-known Methodist missionary from the United States, was impressed with Yun’s intellect and encouraged him to continue his studies in America. Allen helped Yun secure admission to Vanderbilt, at the time still a Methodist institution, as a student in Vanderbilt’s Department of Theology.

A KOREAN IN NASHVILLE
When he first arrived in Nashville, Yun wrote that he sought to study its “civilization, philanthropy, and religion” as a model for Korea’s later development. Yun would discover that these presumptions did not always match the realities of Southern life. Very quickly, Yun encountered basic barriers to his integration into Southern society that complicated his conception of American modernity. Despite Yun’s surprise at the regressive aspects of life in Nashville, he downplayed these concerns in his diaries, seeking to understand how Nashville itself was still in the process of cultivating modernity.

The most complex issue Yun encountered was that of race: Yun did not understand the South’s intense racism against blacks. His friend Jordan, an Armenian and fellow interna-
Yun Chi-ho at Vanderbilt

tional student, explained to him that “the prejudice against the colored race is very strong in the South”—an interesting revelation to Yun. Yun saw racism as contradictory with basic values of religion and civil society. Though Asians clearly held a privileged position among non-whites, Yun himself bore the brunt of racial insensitivity on multiple occasions. On the advent of the summer break in 1890, a fellow Vanderbilt student advised him that the dormitories did not serve food during the summer. If he wanted to stay in Nashville, he would have to “go then to your town brethren… the Chinese laundermen.” Yun, painfully recalling his elite status in native Korea, “kept silent.” Yet the “undisguised insult made [him] perfectly wretched all the morning.” On another occasion, when Yun had gotten top marks on an exam, a Vanderbilt professor remarked that his performance was proof after all that the “heathen is worth educating.”

Yun's experience of racism is further complicated by the fact that his own views of race are regressive by contemporary standards. He was, for example, a frank advocate of exclusion. He disdained the “ignorant rabble” of “coolies” China had sent to the United States to labor, for he considered them poor and unsophisticated representatives of Asia. He believed that through exclusion, the United States would admit only the best and most qualified Asians, thus increasing Americans' respect for Asia. In a particularly charged comment, Yun also cited the sexual intermingling of ‘coolies’ with black women in Memphis as deplorable, for it lowered white opinions on, and the “social standing” of, the “Chinaman.” "No wonder he is so despised,” wrote Yun.

Yun's stance on miscegenation is particularly revealing in understanding his racial views. His words might appear immediately suspect, as an affirmation of anti-black racism. In truth, Yun's view was more nuanced and was deeply linked to his ideas about modernizing Korea. We must consider two caveats when evaluating Yun's remarks on race and nation. First, Yun's priority was not to reinforce or erode the black/white racial hierarchy, but rather to present the best possible image of ‘Asianness’ to white Americans. Yun was concerned less with miscegenation because of the fact that it was with blacks, but rather, he was concerned because he felt it could potentially tarnish Asians' reputation with whites. Asians, in Yun's view, needed to be on their 'best behavior' when judged by white society. It seemed to him that miscegenation went against this goal as it lowered white opinion of Asian immigrants. In contrast to these ‘coolies,’ Yun considered himself a vanguard representative of Asian legitimacy—a man of letters strongly contradicting the ‘coolie’ stereotype. Yun's social "performance" at Vanderbilt thus sought to show that he was "the social equal to whites," and that elite Asians, by extension, deserved respect.

Second, while Yun did see the black condition as degraded, he believed that black communities, like his native Koreans, could be ‘improved’ through education and Christianity. He fit the black condition into his broader views about the power of modernity to ‘uplift’ and ‘civilize’—views that he simultaneously applied to Korea. Yun saw affirmation of his ‘uplift’ thesis advanced by Nashville's contemporary black leaders. In one instance, Yun attended a lecture by Dr. J.C. Price on "The Future of the Negro." In this lecture, Yun focused particularly on Dr. Price's comments about improvement:

The prejudice against the Negro is not due to the color but to the condition. Change poverty into wealth, vice into virtue, ignorance into intelligence—in short, change condition, the prejudice will disappear… The elevation of the condition—moral, mental and material—this and this only can settle the question.

Yun seemed particularly impressed with Dr. Price's comments, idealistic as they were, since they supported Yun's own feelings about Korea. Yun referred to Price as the “Black Demosthenes” and remarked that “he was eloquent. Dr. Price is a full blooded Negro. He is a living argument against the opinion that the Negro, unless mixed, has no mental powers.” Clearly, Yun saw a sympathetic parallel between oppressed Southern blacks and his own native Koreans in their struggle for development.

Thus, judged by modern standards, Yun held regressive racial views. He believed that strong, white, modern, Christian societies could uplift benighted blacks, Native Americans, and Indians. Yet he also simply did not endorse the extreme racism characteristic of the South at that time. In his writings, as on Dr. Price, he affirmed the human dignity of African-Americans. More broadly, Yun endorsed colonialism's supposed power to ‘improve’—with his insights often based on quite shallow readings of history—to validate his own views about modernizing Korea. While ultimately acts of wishful thinking, he proffered these examples as demonstrating that a nation must “be governed and protected and taught by a more enlightened and stronger people” to be truly ready for independence. This reflection, recorded in his Vanderbilt diary in 1889, was a telling one. Even these early remarks show Yun's incipient sympathy for empire and his willingness to downplay major concerns, including racism, in service of the search for modernity.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE WEST AS MODERNIZING FORCES

As Yun's comments on race show, the question dominating his mind during his time at Vanderbilt was how he might use his education to further the Korean cause. He spoke of "giving education to my people" and presented in many Nashville churches on the need for Western intervention in Korea. Indeed, his writings show an immense sensitivity to the poverty and ill-governance of the Korean nation. Yun found his countrymen in a pitiable state of ignorance; a fundamentally good people misled by an evil and incompetent government. Korean education remained deficient, the economy predominantly agricultural, the government corrupt and ineffective. In an entry from November of 1890, Yun wrote that “it is
Yun Chi-ho’s Family (1936)

Source: Anonymous (Wikimedia Commons)

true that the Koreans are superstitious and ignorant. It is true that there are many things about Korea which I cannot think of without blushing; and none, of which I may be proud.”

Elsewhere, he wrote that Korea was “a land just now spelling the A.B.C. of civilization.” In his sermons and lectures to Nashville churches, he praised and cautioned missionaries who did “not know what filthy places the so-called towns and cities of Korea are.” Yet it would be through their missionary work that Korea, in Yun’s view, could build the Christian foundation he considered necessary for success.

Another central obstacle to Korean modernization, in Yun’s opinion, was the Korean government. Yun expressed this opinion continuously in the many speeches and sermons he gave to Nashville’s churches. At one point, Yun commented:

Korea is the subject I hate most to talk about… Poor Korea! A far and rich country she is; but she is poor and despised by being under the government of an uncivilized people. Nor is there any prospect of her deliverance from the present condition, so long as the government neglect[s] the education of the people.

Yun considered Gojong’s councilors, the Korean officer corps, and the Chinese to be an “abominable gang of cutthroats.” He wrote that “the worst acts of the worst princes and worst judges in the worst period of English History are far superior” to the acts of the “Korean officers.” It was thus clear to Yun that the Korean government was the public’s greatest enemy. Yun’s solutions to these problems, in contrast, show a surprising elitism as well as a very clear foreshadowing of his later collaboration.

In these solutions, Yun’s early writings demonstrate a remarkable deference to imperialism and the necessity of missionaries and Western Christianity in Asia. Yun’s philosophy stands in stark contrast to that of later Asians, for example Mao Zedong, who considered imperial and Christian intervention in Asia to have been poisonous. LiYun, simply put, admired empire. He considered England “the school master of India and all her subject countries,” as was America with “the Negro and the Indian.” For Yun, these two paternalistic and imperial relationships had promoted “the ultimate betterment of the whole race.” Yun’s writings in these examples were deliberate parallelisms to the situation in Korea. Yun, in fact, actively wished that a powerful empire might take possession of Korea to impose order and progress.

In an entry from May of 1890, Yun postulated five basic options Korea might follow to its modernization. These were a “peaceful self-reformation,” an “internal revolution,” “continuation in the present system,” the “Chinese Yoke,” or an international protectorate. Yun considered peaceful self-reformation impossible due to the “selfishness” and incompetence of Korea’s government councilors. Yun had already seen that internal revolution was impossible after his scrape with the Gapsin Revolutions. He considered the status quo a miserable option: “imbecility, oppression, cruelty, tyranny on the part of the government… ignorance, superstition, poverty, and misery on the part of the people.” Yun considered the Chinese Yoke, already in force, to be similarly terrible. It was the international protectorate (he speculated that it might be either Britain or Russia) that Yun found most pragmatic. Though it would require ceding Korean sovereignty, Yun considered it still the most preferable given that it would supplant Gojong and China’s existing incompetence. Yun even reasoned that ceding Korean sovereignty might pay off in the long-run. Yun wrote that “to me the question of Korean independence is of no concern. With a government like the present one, independence will bring no relief to the nation.” Even if Korea, under Gojong, could cast off the Chinese Yoke, it would be still mired in the poverty and ignorance Yun deplored. “On the other hand,” Yun wrote, with a better government—a government that will take patriotic and sympathetic interest in the welfare of the people even dependence [on a foreign power] is no real calamity… a healthy and prosperous nation may at any time recover its independence, but a people kept poor, ignorant and weak by a weak poor ignorant and outrageously selfish government—what good will were [sic] independence do to such a people?

Yun thus advanced an intriguing thesis. Even as early as 1889, decades before his cooperation with the Japanese, he argued that he would rather see Korea fall under an imperial protectorate than to see it retain its independence under its incompetent native government.

The passage is just one among the litany of Yun’s calls for imperial intervention. Yun elsewhere wrote that while a “strong and sweeping revolution” would be of “high service” to Korea, the “interference of foreign powers” would be the more pragmatic option. Yun commented that a fragmentation, or “Polandization,” of the Korean peninsula among foreign powers was a valid concern. Yet “everything considered, even such Polandization may be better, or at least not worse, than the stinking stagnation” of Korea’s present condition.
The key corollary to national improvement, in Yun’s eyes, was Christianity. Yun believed that Christianizing the world would make “public conscience more delicate” and “justice more strong.” In Yun’s view, national problems were nothing more than the aggregation of individual problems, which were rooted in personal morality: “International sins have their root and source in international hearts.” By improving these hearts through proselytizing, Yun firmly believed that Christianity could ameliorate much of the world’s evil.

Yun, who also read history during his studies at Vanderbilt, saw affirmations of the power of empire and Christianity all around him. Nashville itself provided an important case-study. In March of 1890, he wrote:

Nashville was first settled in 1780. This beautiful valley of the Cumberland was then the hunting ground of the Indians. What a wonderful transformation in a century! Palaces now occupy the places where wigwams once stood. Electric car and dummy lines branch out in all directions where, only a century ago, one might have found no roads but paths beaten by hunters’ feet. The river is spanned by magnificent iron bridges; and steam boats have supplanted canoes. Think again that this city, now noted for the number and excellence of its schools, colleges and universities, was a hundred years ago, inhabited by a race who had no characters to represent their thoughts. Their superstition, rude law, and cruel practices disgraced the land they unworthily possessed. Christianity, good government, and an enlightened people have turned a wild forest into the ‘Athens of the South.’

As with Dr. Price, Yun drew clear and hopeful parallels between “Indians” and his own Korean people. Though his reading of history is quite shallow (if not absurd, given the horrors of Indian Removal), Yun still saw it as an example of Christian ‘improvement’ legitimating the missionary cause. As Yun concluded, “There can be no doubt that the heathen world owes great debt to missionaries.”

Following this assumption, Yun spent a great deal of his daily life promoting missionary activity within Nashville. He frequently lectured churches about the need for missionaries in Asia. He presented missionary activity in China as great success story where “thousands are yearly added to the Church of Christ.” Yun also attended several send-off ceremonies for missionaries who were imminently departing to foreign lands. Rather than refuting the agenda of ‘new imperialism,’ Yun was thus an enthusiastic supporter of the West’s attempt to spread European culture to the East.

While Yun clearly endorsed foreign intervention even in his early writings, his vision of intervention’s end goal was less developed than his critique of the Korean status quo. It is, after all, easier to critique an existing system than to theorize an alternative. Yet Yun did provide a basic overview of his vision. Ideally, Yun wanted Korean society and government reformed along the lines of Western classical liberalism. Yun, in his comments calling for an international protectorate, envisioned a “well-disciplined army,” a reformed officer corps likely based on merit rather than corrupt patronage, “freedom of the press” and of speech, and a strong education system. Clearly, Yun also envisioned the Korean peninsula...
as a foothold for Christianity. Yun, however, recognized that these were lofty goals given Korea's present condition. Bar- ring the liberal transformation of Korea, Yun singled out two critical priorities that he was desperate to see enacted. The first was the end of Chinese control, the 'Chinese Yoke,' in Korea. Given China's mismanagement, this was an under- standable position. Yun considered China's continued domi- nance to be the worst possible outcome for Korea.69 Second, Yun also hoped that Korea would be set on a path to indus- trial modernity. Perhaps the most successful example of such an 'opened' Asian nation, the society of which Yun said he was most “jealous,” was Japan.70

**SHIFTING TO COLLABORATION?**

Twenty years after Vanderbilt, Yun finally got the interna- tional intervention he had so long desired, from the power that he so admired. On August 29th, 1910, Japan and Korea concluded the Annexation Treaty of 1910.71 The treaty abol- ished Korea's internal government and brought the peninsula into the Japanese Empire. For the next decade, the Japanese military would directly administer Korea.72 It was during this turn in Korean history that Yun began to acquire his dark and controversial label as a Japanese collaborator.

Initially, it seemed more probable that Yun would turn against the Japanese, rather than support them. In 1911, Japa- nese authorities arrested Yun and hundreds of other Koreans on charges that they had plotted to kill the Japanese military governor.73 Yun almost certainly had no direct involvement in the assassination attempt.74 Yet he underwent “a four-year ordeal of arrest, torture, trial, and imprisonment,” and was released only as a goodwill measure on the anniversary of Emperor Taisho's coronation.75 Yun's trauma was only a small component of Japan's broader repression of Korea, even in the pre-war era. Under the martial government, the Japanese enforced strict censorship and denied freedom of speech and assembly. In 1919, Korean nationalists carried out a major protest against Japanese rule. (Incidentally, Syngman Rhee, then the provisional President of Korea, futilely petitioned Woodrow Wilson for self-determination.)76 Despite his brutal treatment at the hands of the Japanese, Yun strongly criti- cized the 1919 Korean protest in his writings and stood by Japanese control.77

What motivated Yun, despite his experience in prison, to re- main a supporter of Japanese annexation? As Caprio rightly argues, Yun's logic “trumped” his sense of patriotism.78 Yun held out hope that Japan would act as a kind of incubator for Korean development. Yun opined that “if independence were given to us, we [would not be] ready to be profited thereby.”79 Rather, the Koreans must “learn and wait,” and “learn how to use independence when they get it.”80 As Yun wrote, Japanese annexation had “opened up a field for the development of the Korean people never before dreamed of.”81

Yun's pro-Japanese advocacy, and especially his later public appearances at Japanese military ceremonies, earned him the “collaborator” label. The Japanese gladly used Yun—by wartime over seventy years old—to encourage Koreans to enlist in the Japanese military. In one notable episode, he led a Japanese military ceremony in chanting “banzai!” at a com- memoration of the Marco Polo Incident.82 Yun’s deference to Japan, taken to its logical conclusion, had produced an ugly military nationalism that saw progress in young Koreans tak- ing up arms for the Japanese Emperor, rather than in domes- tically modernizing Korea.

Yun's positions ultimately become grotesque when juxta- posed with our later knowledge of Japan's subjugation of Ko- rea, which included censorship, theft of historical artifacts and natural resources, forced labor and summary execution, and the impressment of Korean women into sex slavery. Yet where, in this narrative, was Yun's “about face?” Where was his “turning point?” In light of Yun's early diaries, I conclude that the historical search for inversion is misdirected. Yun's continued support for Japan showed a remarkable amount of intellectual consistency over time, a position congruent with the views of race and empire he had cultivated since the 1880s. After all, two decades before Japan had annexed Korea, and five decades before Yun's wartime collaboration, he had written that weaker races must “be governed and protected and taught by a more enlightened and stronger people.”83

Yun's support for the Japanese colonization of Korea, in light of the Vanderbilt diaries, hardly entails the intellectual inver- sion the historiography suggests. Even early in his life, Yun was actively seeking the intervention of an imperialist power in his belief that only external forces could reverse Korea's 'backwardness.' Yun did not spend the 1880s and 1890s as a Korean patriot and then suddenly renounce his ideals in the 1910s or 1930s as an anti-patriotic supporter of Japan. Rather, as his diaries show, he had constructed a coherent, genuine, pro-imperial ideology on pragmatic grounds that saw patriotism and collaboration as fully compatible. Work- ing with a modern imperial power to 'improve' Korea was, to Yun, actually an affirmation of Korean nationalism.

Yun's downfall came from the fact that the power colonizing Korea, Imperial Japan, proved to be a monstrous occupier. Intervening history after Yun's death in 1945 proved that Ja- pan's actions in colonizing East Asia were as brutal as they were rapacious and unproductive. Yet Yun, at least in his own mind, was not ‘caving’ to Japanese authority in his collabora- tion. The activities and sympathies we now call ‘collabora- tion’ were consistent with the viewpoints he had developed at Vanderbilt over forty years before. In this sense, we can read Yun as a misguided and relentless pragmatist, willing to sac- rifice some of his tenets in service of what he thought was the greater mission. Yun's tragic gamble, as he himself described it, was that “in this world of alloys, a man of mixed moral character succeeds better than one of purer morality.”84
Endnotes

[1] Yun Chi-ho, *Yun Chi Ho's Diary 1890-1892, Volume II* (Seoul: National History Compilation Committee, 1974), entry from October 23, 1891, 223. NB: Yun spells “Koreans” as “Coreans.” I have modernized the spelling throughout this paper.


[4] Ibid., 223.


[6] Ibid., paragraph 51. Caprio theorizes that had Japan won the war, the Japanese would have honored Yun as a significant ally of the colonial administration.

[7] Ibid., paragraph 1. A 2004 South Korean government commissioned named Yun as one of 3,090 known collaborators.

[8] Ibid., paragraph 18.

[9] Ibid., paragraph 3.


[15] Ibid., 1346.

[16] Ibid., 1355.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., 1349.


[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., 805.


[24] Ibid.


[31] Ibid.


[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., entry from February 6, 1890, 15.

[36] Ibid., entry from April 1, 1890, 39.


[38] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from February 23, 1890, 23.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Urban, 310.


[42] Ibid., 145-146.

[43] Ibid.


[47] Ibid., entry from December 14, 1890, 132-133.

[48] Ibid., entry from March 24, 1890, 37.


[51] Ibid.


[54] Ibid.

[55] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 18, 1890, 57-60.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.


[59] Ibid.

[60] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 18, 1890, 57-60.


[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid., entry from December 23, 1889, 415.

[64] Ibid.


[66] Ibid., entry from January 26, 1890, 11.

[67] Ibid., entry from March 2, 1890, 27.

[68] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from May 18, 1890, 57-60.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., entry from April 4, 1890, 40-41.


[73] Caprio, paragraph 15.

[74] Urban, 327-328. Urban points out that of the 105 Koreans ar-
rested in the Japanese investigation, only six were ever convicted. The incident caused an international uproar over Japan's use of torture to extract ‘confessions’ from Yun and the others. Urban hypothesizes that the Japanese specifically targeted Yun because of Yun's previous activities in the Korean independence movement in the 1890s.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Hyung Woong Hong, American Foreign Policy Toward Korea, 1945-1950 (Oklahoma State University, unpublished dissertation, 2007), 53-54.
[77] Caprio, paragraph 23.
[78] Ibid., paragraph 22.
[81] Yun, *Diary Volume XI*, entry from June 8, 1938.
[82] Caprio, paragraph 39.
[84] Yun, *Diary Vol. II*, entry from February 27, 1890, 25.m, 160.