The 1990s were a decade of dramatic change in the global political order and intensifying globalization. Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the Soviet Union, proposed the notion of “an emerging new world order,” in which peaceful coexistence would be the dominant theme of world affairs. U.S. presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton praised this notion and claimed that the United States would still play a leading role in the “new world order.” However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the post-Cold War international system was no longer bipolar. Indeed, the last decade of the twentieth century marked the beginning of new national and international dynamics. China strove to promote multi-polarization of the world order in order to confront hegemonism and power politics. In addition, as the only communist nation in Latin America, Cuba began to implement market-oriented social and economic reforms designed to alleviate economic scarcity on the island. Meanwhile, China and Cuba restored diplomatic relations—becoming “fast friends, good comrades, and intimate brothers”—and eagerly facilitated economic, technological, and cultural cooperation between the two nations. Global socialist networks set the stage for establishing Sino-Cuban bilateral relations and promoted future economic ties. In this article, I will propose an alternative to the conventional neoliberal perspective on globalization, instead examining globalization through the lens of socialist internationalism. I will illustrate the trajectory of Sino-Cuban relations in the 1990s and assess their role in building what I term “socialism with Cuban characteristics.” I argue that Cuba’s hybrid economic system of both capitalism and socialism is not the outcome of infiltration by U.S. capitalist ideology, but the outcome of lessons from China’s reform policy, commonly referred to as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

In the first part of the article, I will briefly trace the history of Sino-Cuban relations in the early period of the Cuban Revolution (1959-1965) and during the Sino-Soviet split (1965-1989). I will explain how the Sino-Soviet split contributed to the deterioration of Sino-Cuban relations by analyzing the triangular relationship between Beijing, Havana, and Moscow. In the second part of the article, I will compare China’s economic performance under the Reform and Opening Up policy with that of the USSR and Russian Federation. The rapid economic growth in China as well as the sharp economic decline and political unrest in Russia in the 1990s indicated that the Chinese model was more favorable than the Russian form for Cuba’s economic reforms within the socialist framework. In the third part, I will focus on diplomatic relations between China and Cuba in the 1990s and demonstrate how solid political ties laid the foundation for economic cooperation and cultural exchange. The primary sources for this article mainly consist of official accounts of the Communist Party of China (CCP), including news reports from China’s official newspapers, memoirs of former diplomats and party officials, and documents on the website of the Chinese Embassy in Cuba. Consequently, this article’s argument regarding Sino-Cuban relations will focus on official Chinese perspectives. I will also use secondary literature, mainly economic analysis reports, to trace the economic development of China, Russia, and Cuba in this period.
SINO-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE COLD WAR

During the 1960s, China and Cuba shifted from being the closest of friends to the worst of enemies within just a few years of the Sino-Soviet split. It is true that the Soviet Union played a significant role in the deterioration of Sino-Cuban relations, but the relationship, either official or personal, between China and Cuba during the early period of the Cuban Revolution was far more intimate and complicated than has previously been portrayed. China and Cuba’s fast reconciliation in the 1990s cannot be fully explained without tracing their connections in the first half of the 1960s when they were defined by a relationship that would later be referred to as “friends, comrades, and brothers.” Indeed, before Fidel Castro officially declared the Cuban Revolution to be socialist, China already influenced the Revolution via unofficial relations between the CCP’s Xinhua News Agency (XHNA) and the Communist Party of Cuba (PSP). At the time, China perceived the Cuban Revolution as drifting from nationalism toward socialism. Yao Zhen, the head of XHNA’s delegation in Havana, recalled his meeting with Raúl Castro in July 1959 and stated that the Castro brothers aimed to establish a close relationship with the PRC, not the Republic of China (Taiwan), and even expected the CCP to send an envoy to Cuba. That was the first time the Cuban leaders openly showed their interest in the world communist network, yet their intentions were still ambivalent. In response, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai quickly appointed a delegate to Cuba and intensified XHNA’s central connection with its Havana branch to track the dynamics of the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement, which was separate from the PSP at the time. Both Mao and Zhou could not fully determine Fidel’s true intentions, but they expected the Revolution to move forward in a socialist direction.

The relationship between China and Cuba warmed up quickly once the two nations established official diplomatic ties in September 1960, and Fidel openly declared that he was a Marxist-Leninist in December 1961. China immediately provided Cuba with a substantial amount of economic aid and military support in the hope of strengthening Sino-Cuban relations. During Che Guevara’s official visit to China, the two governments signed their first economic and technical cooperation agreement, in which China would provide $60 million of interest-free loans to Cuba and buy a million tons of sugar annually. Later, in 1963, Zhou Enlai told the Cuban trade delegation that “the loan was just a form of aid. If you are unable to pay it off when it is due, you can postpone it.” China was even willing to purchase Cuban sugar at a price adjusted to the Soviet Union’s compensation rate, which was higher than world market prices. This was quite a remarkable gesture: the Chinese economy itself was struggling in the early 1960s. The amount of aid and sugar purchases outlined in the agreement could have further burdened China’s economy, making it evident of China’s determination to defend the communist brotherhood between China and Cuba.

Fidel Castro, ca. 1959.
Source: Library of Congress (Wikimedia Commons)

Domestically, the CCP promoted slogans such as “Cuba Sí, Yanquis No” to present an image of a united Communist front between China and Cuba. Cuba and China shared a similar national history of humiliation and oppression during the entire nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The CCP took advantage of the anti- western sentiment shared by most Chinese and Cuban people to strengthen the two nations’ socialist solidarity against western imperialism and colonialism. While Cuban freedom fighters, including Chinese Cubans and ‘coolies’ (Asian contract laborers), had devoted themselves to the War of Independence against Spain, Chinese revolutionaries had struggled to end the semi-feudal and semi-colonial society in China. Neither the Cuban Republic nor the Chinese Republic fully protected the rights of the people, except for the elites, and they failed to defend national sovereignty in the face of internal inequality and external foreign aggression. The U.S. heavily intervened in Cuba’s politics and economy through repeated military occupations in 1906, 1912, and 1917 and the enforcement of the 1901 Platt Amendment in the name of “preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.” The U.S. was also involved in the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950) by supplying a substantial amount of weaponry to the pro-U.S. Kuomintang. Through its continuous interference in China’s internal affairs after 1949, especially on the Taiwan issue, the U.S. further infuriated the CCP.
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As a result, the CCP was eager to exploit the shared memory of oppression and anti-American sentiments to facilitate Sino-Cuban relations. For example, in a film pictorial published by CCP's official film press, the editors harshly criticized the U.S. for plotting the Bay of Pigs invasion and numerous bombings and acts of sabotage on sugar estates, Cuban cities, and Havana Harbor.14 The film pictorial portrayed the capitalist U.S. as a vicious "robber, colonist, and terrorist," and praised Fidel Castro and the communist revolutionaries as "defenders of justice and the people."15 The sharp contrast between capitalism and communism was very common in Chinese propaganda in the 1960s when the CCP relied on an ideological polemic to enhance its legitimacy. By embracing the Cuban Revolution while rejecting Yankee capitalism, the CCP aimed to reinforce relationships between China and Cuba as "fast friends, good comrades, and intimate brothers."16

However, in the second half of the 1960s, Sino-Cuban relations deteriorated rapidly as Cuba sided with the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split. From 1960 to 1964, Cuba still attempted to remain neutral in the dispute because it not only valued its close relationship with the CCP in the international communist movement but also heavily depended upon Soviet oil imports and weapon supplies. In particular, Fidel Castro shared many more ideological similarities with Mao Zedong than with Soviet leaders. Fidel and Mao both emphasized people's consciousness and dedication to the revolution and relied largely on mass mobilization and mass organizations (e.g., Cuba's Zafra de los Diez Millones and China's Great Leap Forward) rather than on the Soviet model of the Five-Year Plan to achieve socialist development.17 The Great Leap Forward was a manifestation of Mao's radical leftist ideology and his utopian expectation to surpass the Soviet Union in the socialist competition. The campaign promoted excessively ambitious targets in agricultural and industrial production—to overtake Britain in steel production within five years and overtake the U.S. within fifteen years, and to achieve thousands of catties of grain production per person.18 Fidel's program, the Zafra de los Diez Millones ("ten million ton harvest") similarly mobilized the Cuban people to dedicate themselves to "battles for sugar" in the harvest.19 Like Mao's program, it led to disastrous economic and social outcomes for Cuba, and moreover further alienated Khrushchev and the Soviet specialists. Moreover, just like Mao, who disdained Khrushchev for being a weak leader and adopting a soft attitude towards the West, Fidel was also disappointed at Khrushchev's concession to the U.S. during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet Fidel still remained silent in Mao and Khrushchev's competition for leadership of world communism.

China sought to gain the favor of Cuba in the confrontation with the Soviets. The CCP still insisted on the principles of "class struggle" between the bourgeoisie and proletariat and stated that "peaceful coexistence" (the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or CPSU) would violate revolutionary principles and Marxism-Leninism.20 In 1962, an article in People's Daily applauded "the correct line of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations" against the U.S.'s imperialism and the "heroic Cuban people" for not committing the error of "capitalizationism," a term directly targeting the CPSU and its policy of "peaceful coexistence."21 Consequently, the early stage of the Sino-Soviet split did not negatively influence the Sino-Cuban relationship.

With the aggravation of Sino-Soviet polemics in the second half of the 1960s, the breakdown of Sino-Cuban relations became inevitable as Cuba could no longer maintain its neutrality. In 1964, after the fall of Khrushchev, both Fidel and Che Guevara visited China and attempted to ease the tension between China and the USSR, thinking that the removal of Khrushchev would immediately improve Sino-Soviet relations.22 However, the Cuban leaders underestimated the ideological divide between the CCP and the CPSU, which went far beyond the personal rivalry between Mao and Khrushchev. Moreover, even if its leaders had fully understood the fundamental causes of the Sino-Soviet split, Cuba, a rather new member in the socialist camp, would have had little impact on either side.

In response to Fidel's visit to the Chinese embassy and the Cuban delegation to Beijing, Chinese leadership refused to compromise on its ideological stance, and even accused Fidel of accepting "Soviet Revisionism."23 The aggressive attitudes of the CCP undermined Cuba's effort to negotiate and further pushed Cuba to the Soviet side. In 1966, Sino-Cuban relations deteriorated rapidly with China's unilateral termination of the sugar and rice trade, a crucial trade agreement between two nations, and Fidel Castro's humiliation of the CCP and Mao Zedong in public speeches.24 Subsequently, China and Cuba almost entirely cut diplomatic ties for the remainder of the Cold War era. The memory of "friends, comrades, and brothers" in the early 1960s was shattered by the Sino-Soviet split.25 Yet after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the communist brotherhood between China and Cuba would revive quickly in the 1990s and encounter new dynamics for restoring Sino-Cuban relations.

REFORM MODELS AND SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

In this section, I will first discuss political and economic outcomes of China's gradual economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Up policy and Russia's radical economic reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev's "perestroika" and Boris Yeltsin's "shock therapy" policies. I will then illustrate that the Chinese path of reform, "socialism with Chinese characteristics," was more applicable to Cuba's socialist transformation.

In the 1990s, China experienced spectacular economic development as a result of the Reform and Opening Up policy, which incorporated a certain degree of free market principles into the planned economy and opened the
domestic economy to foreign trade and investment. It is noteworthy that China's market-oriented reform was slow and cautious. It took more than two decades to fully develop the socialist market economic system after Deng officially proposed the policy in December 1978.26 Within enterprises, and divisions of power between central and local governments.32 From the perspective of the Chinese officials, Fidel's enthusiasm indicated that he highly appreciated lessons from China's Reform and Opening Up policy and was willing to implement his own market reforms soon.

“In stark contrast to China, Russia (the former Soviet Union) suffered devastating economic and political crises in the 1990s.”

the socialist market economy, China gradually allowed private ownership of small enterprises in the handicraft, retail, and food industries, whereas the state still controlled the strategic industries and heavy industries (i.e., the coal, iron, steel, and energy industries). Furthermore, in regard to liberalization of foreign trade, in the 1980s China established five Special Economic Zones (NEZs) and opened fourteen Coastal Development Areas.27 These NEZs and Coastal Development Areas served as experimental fields to test the compatibility of the socialist market mechanism and the global market and allowed the state to limit the scope of foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) within the selected areas. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by the 1990s, China was the second largest FDI recipient in the world after the United States, and the largest FDI recipient among developing countries.28 In addition, China had the largest share among major exporters in the world merchandise trade and nearly tripled its share in world exports in the 1990s.29 Thus, under the Reform and Opening Up policy, China achieved great success in domestic market reform as well as international trade.

Among China's reform strategies, Fidel Castro was particularly interested in rural reforms in Sichuang, including the Household Responsibility System, rural markets, township enterprises, relations between collective and individual farms, and various land cultivation methods.30 As China's economy prior to 1978 was dominated by the agricultural sector, reform started from the countryside and first replaced the People's Commune (renmin gongshe) with the Household Responsibility System, granting more freedom to individual farms (though the land was still state-owned) and enabling peasants to sell surplus beyond state quota to the rural market. Cuba had a similar agriculture-dominated economic structure, but on a much smaller scale. Therefore, Cuba's reform program could prioritize rural reform and then implement urban reform in stages. In 1994 and 1997, Fidel had two long conversations with the party secretary of Shanghai about Shanghai's Pudong Development New Zone (pudong kai fa xin qu), which was a milestone of China's urban reform policy in the 1990s.31 According to the Chinese delegate presented in both meetings, Fidel was determined to become “an expert of Shanghai Studies [sic]” with regard to large construction projects, foreign investment, joint venture

In stark contrast to China, Russia (the former Soviet Union) suffered devastating economic and political crises in the 1990s. Its reforms were largely shaped by neoliberal forces that emphasized dominance of the free market over state intervention, reductions in government expenditure, deregulation of domestic and foreign trade, fast liberalization of prices, and mass privatization. The Soviet Union encountered great difficulties during the transition from a command economy to a market economy. Gorbachev's perestroika policy, which aimed to restructure the political and economic systems of the state, not only led to failed market reforms but also accelerated the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1991, USSR economic output decreased by more than 15 percent, signaling an impending economic collapse.33 Even after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the economy of the newly-formed Russian Federation didn't improve much under President Boris Yeltsin's “shock therapy” policy. By 1999, Russia's GDP had fallen by 40 percent while the nation still suffered from hyperinflation and corruption.34 The 1998 financial crisis further deteriorated the Russian economy and undermined Yeltsin's popularity. As a result, Russia's economic transition in the 1990s left the country in a state of enormous economic uncertainty and political turmoil.

In the 1990s, Cuba struggled under the double blow of the absence of Soviet aid and the U.S. economic embargo. By the second half of the 1980s, Fidel Castro had realized that the Soviets couldn't fulfill "previous military arrangements" and "existing commercial obligations" anymore as Gorbachev ordered a withdrawal of nearly three thousand troops from Cuba and began to cut economic aid.35 After the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Cuba lost its main trading partner and provider of subsidies including cheap oil, machinery, food, and other basic necessities.36 Worse still, highly volatile oil and sugar prices in the global market negatively influenced Cuba's economic performance. From 1989 to 1995, the average sugar price per ton dropped from $438.26 in 1989 to $270.76 in 1995, and Cuba's sugar export revenue dropped by nearly 77 percent.37 Cuba's previous overdependence on Soviet economic assistance rendered its economy extremely fragile in the competitive global market. It suffered negative real GDP growth ranging from -2.9 percent in 1990 to -14.9 percent in 1993, and only experienced an increase in GDP growth in 1994 as a result of

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the implementation of several economic reform measures. The life of the Cuban people during the Special Period (1989-2006) was also miserable, with shortages of food and basic necessities, breakdown of public transportation system, and proliferation of (and increasing inflation in) the black market.

In light of its own economic hardship and geopolitical reconfiguration of international relations, Fidel Castro turned to Cuba’s former communist brother China for help during the Special Period. In particular, it seemed that the Chinese model (gradualism and “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) was much more successful than Russia’s “shock therapy” in spite of structural differences between the two economies. China’s economic reform campaign focused more on local and national conditions and started with experiments within assigned regions, such as the NEZs, whereas the Soviet Union’s reform measures were largely influenced by western neoliberal economists and international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which may not have fully understood the Soviet Union’s complicated socioeconomic situation. Unlike the rapid price liberalization in the Soviet Union, China implemented the dual-track price system (shuang gui zhi) as a transition from the state-controlled price system to the market price system and held tight control over monetary policy in order to stabilize the domestic price level. Also, by the end of the twentieth century, the living standard in both rural and urban areas had improved significantly as the CCP focused on the concept of a “moderately well-off society” (xiaokang she hui); China’s GDP per capita had reached 800 dollars. In Russia, most working class and middle class people lost their savings because of hyperinflation and resented market reforms. Therefore, based on previous mistakes and the experiences of Russia and China, Cuban leaders should have adopted pragmatic policies that were suitable to the nation’s own economic and social circumstances rather than directly applying western neoliberal theories.

More importantly, China’s reform policy was largely controlled by members of the old nomenklatura (the system of personnel administration used by the CCP), and the success of Reform and Opening Up campaign, in return, strengthened political control of the state and the CCP. In contrast, Soviet economic reform was accompanied by political liberalization and led to more uncertainties. The CPSU not only lost to the proponents of democracy in the 1990 election but was even put on trial in 1991 after the failure of the August Coup. Fidel Castro aimed to alleviate Cuba’s miserable conditions in the Special Period by implementing economic reforms and reversing rigid ideologies to a certain degree, but he still adhered to socialist principles and ensured that economic reforms were undertaken within “the framework of the existing political order.” As Fidel claimed in 1995, “we will not lose control…We are not just struggling to save [socialism], we are struggling to improve it.” “Socialism with Cuban characteristics” therefore could be a better alternative to capitalism and help Cuba to save and improve its socialism without incurring ideological conflicts and political unrest. At the same time, China, as a forerunner of this model, was willing to share its rich experiences with communist Cuba in order to consolidate existing international communist ties and raise its international standing in the post-Cold War era. By recalling the nations’ old communist friendship and opening a new page in bilateral relations, Cuba would gain both political and economic support from this emerging superpower.

SINO-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE NEW ERA

Sino-Cuban relations in the 1990s were framed not by a neoliberal global market, but through the international socialist network. Their diplomatic relations as “friends, comrades, and brothers” in the 1960s prepared Beijing and Havana for reconciliation once the antagonism between Beijing and Moscow ended. The 1990s not only pushed Cuba to reverse its foreign relations and seek new trading partners but also marked a shift in China’s foreign policy strategy towards Latin America. Jiang Zemin, the President of the PRC, officially proclaimed that the “multipolarity” of the world was crucial for China to pursue its foreign policy of peace and development and to oppose power politics and hegemonism. In the process of multi-polarization, China aimed to promote solidarity and cooperation with developing (Third World) countries in order to counterbalance U.S. hegemony in a potential unipolar world. Cuba was the first Latin American country that established diplomatic relations with China in 1960, and the only communist nation in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, the restoration of Sino-Cuban relations was an important step for China to practice its multipolarization policy in Latin America and to strengthen ties within the international socialist network.

The political ties established in the 1990s laid the foundation for broader intergovernmental cooperation in economics, culture, technology, education, and healthcare in the twenty-first century, when the Sino-Cuban bilateral relationship entered a stage of comprehensive development. In the 1990s, both sides made frequent official visits to strengthen their diplomatic ties. According to the official website of the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, almost all of the top leaders of the CCP visited Cuba constantly throughout the 1990s, and Cuban leaders also paid frequent return visits. The continuous state visits demonstrate an increasingly close connection between China and Cuba. Phrases such as “good Cuban friends, comrades and brothers” and “Cuba and China heart to heart” appeared frequently in Chinese official reports and leaders’ talks. Moreover, the Chinese and Cuban governments also signed a series of bilateral agreements during these visits. In 1991, they signed their first intergovernment trade agreement. In 1992, the Chinese National Tourism Administration and Cuba’s Ministerio de Turismo signed a Trade Cooperation Agreement, opening a gateway for the fast-growing number of Chinese tourists in
In 1993, the two governments signed an Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation. In 1995, they extended the Agreement on Cultural, Educational, and Technological Cooperation, and signed an Agreement on Promotion and Protection of Investment.

As a result of these sound political relations, two comrades gradually became close trading partners. From 1990 to 1999, the two countries initiated a total of 153 projects in agriculture, light industry, food, chemical engineering, nuclear power, biotechnology, and other fields. In 2000, China’s International Technology Center and Cuba’s Center of Molecular Immunology established a joint venture, Biotech Pharma Company (Baitai Shengwu), a cooperative project utilizing the most advanced biotechnology of the time and marking the largest investment to date between China and Cuba. In addition, when Cuba suffered from severe shortages of gasoline and fuel oils due to the 1989 cuts in Soviet subsidies, China sent almost half a million bicycles to Cuba and helped Cuba build its own bicycle factory to deal with the urgent transportation problem. Chen Jiuchang, the former Chinese ambassador to Cuba, pointed out that Chinese bicycles had gradually changed the lifestyle in Cuba and served as “a Goodwill Ambassador [sic]” that enhanced the friendship between China and Cuba. While trade cooperation was not the ultimate goal, it was an essential economic means for China to expand its soft power influence in Cuba and strengthen the Sino-Cuban bilateral relation in a transforming international system, in which the Soviet Bloc had already collapsed into the capitalist Russian Federation.

Under the global neoliberal movement, it was impossible for China and Cuba to stay isolated and maintain rigid socialist ideologies. They had to implement a certain degree of market reform to create wealth and open the domestic economy to foreign trade and investment. Yet these market reforms do not necessarily mark the end of socialism since the nations and their communist parties still held tight control over the economy, including major state-owned enterprises, NEZs and Development Zones, flow of FDI, and legislation on foreign trade. State power and socialist hierarchy were regenerated in the semi-open market economy. By exporting the model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to Cuba, China could gain another trading partner in Latin America and consolidate political ties with one of the remaining communist regimes in the international socialist network.

CONCLUSION
Sino-Cuban relations in the post-Cold War era were built upon political ties as “fast friends, good comrades, and intimate brothers,” constructing a socialist alternative to neoliberal globalization. The 1990s were an important decade for China and Cuba to resolve past conflicts and promote prospects for cooperative international development projects in the twenty-first century. In the early period of the Cuban Revolution, China and Cuba formed a united communist front against U.S. imperialism. Based on a similar national memory of oppression and humiliation, the two nations equated capitalism with colonialism and imperialism to elevate the image of their communist parties as the guardian of the people and defender of national sovereignty. The ideological similarities shared by the two revolutionary leaders, Fidel Castro and Mao Zedong, also closed the distance between China and Cuba in the early 1960s. Admittedly, the Sino-Soviet split had once forced Cuba into a political and ideological dilemma and Cuba’s increasing pro-Soviet stance greatly undermined Sino-Cuban relations. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union provided China and Cuba with a great opportunity to restore their diplomatic relations in a new international situation.

Cuba’s economic reforms in the 1990s were closer to the Chinese model than that of the USSR and Russian Federation. China had experienced fast and stable economic growth under Deng’s Reform and Opening Up policy since 1978, while Russia suffered from financial crisis and political turbulence, such as the 1991 and 1993 coups. After witnessing the fall of communism in the Western Bloc, Fidel aimed to “save and improve” socialism in Cuba but not to overturn the existing political and social order. Thus, Fidel was largely interested in China’s gradual reform policy and hoped to gain experience from China to build up Cuba’s own reform model based on its social and economic realities. Capitalism was no longer the symbol of evil imperialism, but part of an essential cure to socialism. The establishment of Sino-Cuban bilateral relations in the 1990s paved the way for the construction of “socialism with Cuban characteristics.” Solid political ties between the two nations promoted full-scale economic and technological cooperation. Even with the changing international dynamic in the twenty-first century, diplomatic relations between China and Cuba are still based on the notion of “friends, comrades, and brothers.”
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Endnotes

[3] Ibid.
[13] The Cuban War of Independence refers to the Ten Years' War (1868-1878), the Little War (1879-1880), and the Spanish-American War. Chinese revolutionaries refer to those who participated in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, the Xinhai Revolution marked an end to the Qing imperial rule and established the Republic of China (ROC). In 1912, Sun Yat-sen also formed the Guomindang (GMD), China’s National People’s Party, which was later led by Chiang Kai-shek and was defeated by the CCP during the Chinese Civil War.
[15] Ibid.
[24] Ibid., 112. In his 1996 speech at the University of Havana, Fidel Castro blamed China's economic aggression in reduction of rice exports to Cuba and openly called Mao “a senile idiot.”
[27] Twenty Years of China's Reform and Opening Up, Central Party History Research Center (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Publisher, 1998), 114. The New Economic Zones in the 1990s include Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, and Hainan. Coastal Development Cities include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qindao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 139.
[36] Ibid.
[40] Guoguang Liu, “On the Development of Socialist Commodity Economy” (Guan Yu Fa Zhan She Hui Zhui Yi Shang Pin Jing Ji Wen Ti), Social Science in China, no.6 (1986).
[42] Ibid.
[43] Louis A. Perez, JR, Cuba between Reform and Revolution, 325.
[44] Ibid., 326.
[49] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[56] Louis A. Perez, JR, Cuba between Reform and Revolution, 326.