Features:

Soviet Newspaper Coverage of McCarthyism, by Frank Spence

Rhetoric Against Pagans in St. Augustine’s City of God, by Olivia L. Jensen
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Dear Readers,

It is with great pride that I present to you the 2018 Vanderbilt Historical Review. Since its founding, the Review has had two goals: to promote the study of our historical past, and to present our readers with historical work that is as interesting as it is informative. Achieving a balance between these two goals is a challenge, and we are confident that this year’s issue meets it. This year’s Review has fourteen outstanding articles covering diverse subjects that span millennia and the globe. From Christianization in fourth-century Rome to progressivism in nineteenth-century Milwaukee, we hope that you find this year’s articles fascinating, thought-provoking, and even inspiring. Above all, we hope they demonstrate the value and imperative need to critically consider our past and its relevance to our present.

I would like to extend my thanks to the many individuals who make this publication possible: the authors, the ever-supportive staff and faculty at Vanderbilt Student Media and the Vanderbilt History Department, and of course, the Review staff members who dedicate their time to the journal throughout the year. When I arrived at Vanderbilt, the Vanderbilt Historical Review did not exist. Participating in its journey from an idea to an established undergraduate publication has been a rewarding part of my experience at Vanderbilt, and I am excited to see what the future holds for the Review.

Best,

Caroline Fleischhauer
Editor in Chief
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“O, DESOLATING WAR!”

The Commemorative Poetry and Politics of Margaretha Faugeres, 1790s New York

The purpose of this paper is to explore the life and writings of revolutionary poet Margaretha Faugeres (1771-1801). As a child, her life was radically altered by the events of the American Revolution. As an adult, Faugeres used the memory of destruction in the American and French Revolutions to express her political convictions concerning democracy, slavery, and women's intellectual capabilities. Although she has received relatively little academic attention, Faugeres’ writings nonetheless are valuable to understanding the role of personal experience in the development of female political consciousness during the American Revolution. Through an exploration of Faugeres’ commemorative poetry, this paper will examine her blending of revolutionary history and contemporary politics.

By Anna M. Lehrman
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Recalling her family’s experiences during the Revolutionary War, American poet Margaretha Bleecker Faugeres wrote, “The clamorous thunders of War frightened them from their peaceful dwelling, and the blasted hand of Desolation dispersed them as a flock in the desert.” In 1777, the Bleecker family was forced to flee from its home in the New York countryside. Running from British troops, the flight ended with the death of Abella, Margaretha’s infant sister. Overwhelmed by the tragedy, Margaretha’s mother, Ann Eliza, suffered a mental collapse from which she never fully recovered. Four years later, British forces held Margaretha’s father captive for six days, a period of unspeakable terror for the Bleecker women. Following his safe return and the war’s end, the reunited family journeyed to New York City in search of comfort from familiar sites and faces. Instead, the Bleeckers encountered a devastated city and news of the deaths of dear friends. Margaretha Faugeres would later describe her mother’s shock at seeing her native city “moldering fast beneath the relentless hand of Time and War.” Losing all hope, Ann Eliza suffered a final mental collapse and died.

The Revolutionary War left Margaretha’s family forever altered. From childhood, the costs of war and revolution were interwoven with the very fabric of her life. As an adult, Margaretha Faugeres would attempt to make sense of the memory and meaning of revolutions in her poetry. Using a history which was both deeply intimate and decidedly national, Faugeres found a political voice in a very personal memory of the past.

While research on Faugeres herself is sparse, historians have thoroughly analyzed the broader context in which she lived. Of importance to her story is the rise of fierce political partisanship during the 1790s. As Federalists and Democratic-Republicans emerged with differing views of the nation’s future, political parties and their supporters increasingly turned to the past to legitimize their visions for the nation’s future. Accordingly, Faugeres was one of many voices expressing her hopes for the nation’s political future through the memory of the past. Concurrently, this decade saw the expansion of opportunities for women to express themselves politically. Historian Rosemarie Zagarri, for instance, has argued that political partisanship created a more favorable environment for female activity in the press and the public sphere. Understood in this context, Faugeres’ writings are just one example of an expanding body of women’s political literature. Similarly, literary scholar Sharon M. Harris, the only academic to have significantly assessed Margaretha Faugeres’ writings, casts her as a chief representative of late eighteenth-century activist women. Harris argues that women like Faugeres adopted the writing of histories, as it allowed them to discuss contemporary political events while projecting a facade of objectivity and civic virtue to concerned readers.
“O, Desolating War!”

However, in this article, I will argue that Faugeres’ poetry should be understood as essentially personal. In writing about the revolutionary past, Faugeres used her personal memories of the American Revolution to comment on contemporary political issues. Historians have failed to fully explore the role of personal experience in the development of female political consciousness during the American Revolution. In an attempt to recover this missing perspective, this article will examine the political convictions of Margaretta Faugeres in relation to her personal experience with the destruction caused by the American Revolution.

From 1790 to 1798, Margaretta Faugeres wrote six commemorative poems celebrating the spirit of revolution in both America and France. In her works, Faugeres used powerful events of the past to express her hopes for the political future, including advocating for greater democracy, an end to slavery, and increased educational opportunities for women. She did this by emphasizing the aspect of revolutions she understood most: their destructiveness. However, her poetry also looked forward in hope, finding in the wreckage of revolutions the chance to reimagine the future political state of the American nation. This article examines Faugeres’ poem on the French Revolution, titled “On seeing a print, exhibiting a View of the Ruins of the Bastille,” followed by a more detailed analysis of her most famous poem on the American Revolution, “The Hudson.”

Using these poems as textual evidence, this article explores Margaretta Faugeres’ deeply personal accounts of the devastating power of revolutions. Furthermore, it explores the fundamental connection between these descriptions and Margaretta Faugeres’ argument for the construction of a new political reality. Adopting the framework of the historical narrative, Faugeres recounted the violent fall of the Bastille in this poem. During the eighteenth century, the Bastille served as a French armory and state prison. Largely viewed as a symbol of monarchical power, the fortress was stormed in 1789 by a mob of French commoners, in what is considered a watershed moment of the French Revolution. Extolling the event, Faugeres wrote, “Ah! see the Bastille’s iron walls thrown down, / That bulwark strong of Tyranny; / See her proud turrets smoke along the ground, / Crush’d by the giant arm of Liberty!”

In this description, the Bastille’s tyranny is portrayed as being overthrown by the unbridled power of the people. Faugeres depicts liberty as a crushing power that destroys many of the city’s major debates in her poetry, including the French and American Revolutions, slavery, and women’s education. The Revolutionary War had a contradictory effect on Faugeres’ life; while the American Revolution decimated the life Faugeres knew as a child, it also made possible the life and career she came to know in New York City.

Faugeres’ first poem on the French Revolution, titled “On seeing a print, exhibiting a View of the Ruins of the Bastille,” celebrated the historic fall of the Bastille. Like the American Revolution, the French Revolution held personal implications for Faugeres. In 1792, Margaretta fell in love with Peter Faugeres, a French physician. The couple married on Bastille Day, signaling a devotion to the cause of the French Revolution that would persist throughout Margaretta’s life. Beyond her personal connection to the cause, the French Revolution was also important to Margaretta because it was a subject of considerable debate in the New York press. As noted by historians Alfred Young and Simon Newman, the French Revolution was controversial in the United States. To the Federalists, the destabilizing power of the French Revolution, as exemplified by the execution of King Louis XVI and the subsequent Reign of Terror, was an illustration of the dangers of democracy. On the other hand, Democratic-Republicans believed the French Revolution’s call to liberty and equality was worth emulating, despite its more bloody events. Opinions on the legitimacy of the French Revolution in 1790s America were intimately connected to concerns over the future of American politics.

Margaretta inserted herself into this debate when she submitted her poem “On seeing a print, exhibiting a View of the Ruins of the Bastille” for publication in the New York Magazine in 1792.

THE RUINS OF BASTILLE: FAUGERES AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Soon after the death of her mother, Margaretta and her father took up permanent residence in New York City. As a young adult in New York City, Margaretta saw and commented on the rebuilding of the ruined city and the rise of new political debates over the nation’s future. In 1791, the publishers of The New-York Magazine sent out a request for original works by female authors for their column “The American Muse.” Answering their call, Faugeres became a regular contributor to one of the longest-running periodicals of the late eighteenth century. New York City was a hotbed of political activity throughout the 1790s, and Faugeres addressed...
institutions of tyranny, leaving nothing of the past but smoke and rubble. Later in the poem, Faugeres again described liberty in destructive terms, this time as a flame. Praying for the future of Europe, she asked that liberty would “Extend its prolific rays, / Enveloping neighboring empires in the blaze.” In this picturesque analogy, Faugeres visualized the expansion of liberty into the monarchical nations of Europe as a fire spreading across the continent. Using the imagery of fire, Faugeres described liberty as both an annihilating and purifying force.

It is probable that Faugeres’ own violent experience of the Revolutionary War informed her understanding of liberty as a fierce power. Additionally, her life in a rebuilt New York City and her participation in a thriving political arena can explain the hopefulness with which she wrote of war’s desolation. Faugeres’ presentation of the violence of liberty is not written in an entirely negative manner. Rather, its decimation seems to create a blank slate upon which new, more democratic nations can be built. The obliteration of the Bastille and the picture of an overturned Europe are hopeful images of a better, freer future. Upon the smoldering blaze of the Bastille, the people rise ready to transmit their hard-won liberty to the world beyond. Her support of the French Revolution within the context of the 1790s reveals her advocacy for the expansion of democracy within the United States. Rather than portraying violence as an unfortunate side effect of the French Revolution, Faugeres displayed an acute confidence concerning the role of demolition in the achievement of liberty and equality.

O DESOLATING WAR!: FAUGERES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

A year later, the Swords brothers, two acclaimed New York publishers, published Faugeres’ seminal poem on the American Revolution, “The Hudson.” Within this poem, Faugeres journeyed from the themes of suffering and devastation to redemption and hope. Eighteen pages long, “The Hudson” follows the course of the Hudson river, and echoes Faugeres’ own journey from her childhood home in the Albany countryside to New York City. She describes moments of victory such as the capture of Ticonderoga and the Battle of Saratoga, as well as moments of great defeat. Large portions of the poem are dedicated to examining the costs of war, including a description of the murder of Jane McCrea and the burning of the town of Esopus, New York. The tension between the destructive and creative powers of war, as well as its connection to her own life, is felt throughout the poem.
Faugeres' images of the American Revolution are far from glorious, with many of her scenes depicting moments of trial and anguish. For example, in “The Hudson,” she tells the story of Jane Mc'Crea, who, on the way to meet her fiancé, was murdered by Indians under the command of Britain's General Burgoyne. The largely fictional story of Mc'Crea's death was popularized by the patriot press during the Revolution to villainize Britain's alliances with native Indians. The inherent sadness of this tale seems to be related to a loss of innocence, with the virgin bride being murdered at the savage's hands. Faugeres vividly described Jane's fiancé coming upon her ruined body, bending, “to kiss the clotted gore.” One cannot help but wonder at Margaretta's own psychological loss of innocence following her experiences during the American Revolution. In this story, Faugeres examined the dangers war presented to women in frontier regions, dangers that she and her mother had felt.

Paralleling her description of the Bastille's fall, Faugeres returned to the themes of fire and ruin in “The Hudson.” She did this by describing the burning of the city of Esopus by the British in 1777. Bringing the poem to a climax, she wrote, “O Hudson! O Hudson! From thy frightened shore / Thou saw'st the bursting flame mount to the sky.” Speaking of the plight of the people, she wrote, “Here a distracted widow wrings her hands, / While grief too keen forbid her tears to flow: / There all aghast a wretched parent stands, / Viewing his beggared babies in speechless woe!” Painful similarities lie between these descriptions of helpless parents and wasting babies, and Faugeres' own experience of seeing her sister die in her mother's arms. Amidst this account, Faugeres asked the essential question of her poem. “Why did thy hand, O desolating War! / Thy bloody banner o'er our land unfurl?” With emotional language, Faugeres questioned the very nature of war and revolution. Having personally experienced the war, the search for meaning is understandable.

Following her accounts of the physical destruction of cities and peoples, Faugeres ended “The Hudson” with her vision for the American nation's future. The themes of devastation and creation, first addressed in her poetry on the French Revolution, appear in this text as well. In both poems, Faugeres imagined the destructive powers of revolution as offering peoples and nations the opportunity to create a new world. In “The Hudson,” the theme of new beginnings can be seen in her descriptions of the rebirth of commerce in New York and the “phoenix-like” reconstruction of New York City. The devastation of the war, in Faugeres' work, ushers in a period of physical improvement.

However, her emphasis on the new birth of the American nation was not limited to physical infrastructure. Following her discussion of the reborn New York City, Faugeres finished her poem by analyzing the moral and political transformation of American citizens. She wrote, “Led by the hand of Truth, may they [Americans] attain / The height for which have thousands figh'd in vain.” In these lines, Faugeres reasoned that the depths of the war's costs necessitated a higher calling for the American people. In the same way new cities were built upon former ruins, Faugeres argued that the American people needed to emerge from the revolution ready to create a new political order.

In her vision of this new American nation, Faugeres hoped for an end to slavery. She implored Americans to not retain “one slave beneath the cruel yoke” while they “boast themselves 'the virtuous free.'” Acknowledging the irony between the Revolution's call to liberty and the reality of slavery, Faugeres condemned slavery as a practice no longer in step with the ideals of the American nation. This was not the first time she had addressed the issue of slavery. In 1791, Faugeres wrote an essay titled “Fine Feelings Exemplified in the Conduct of a Negro Slave.” In this essay, Faugeres used a humanizing story of a slave named Mingo to undermine Thomas Jefferson's contrary assertion that African Americans lacked basic human emotions. In looking to the future, Faugeres imagined a nation free of slavery and the false arguments which supported the institution.
Faugeres also addressed the future of women, demanding that America be a land where “no despot's iron laws confin'd / Enjoying the vast freedom of the mind.”27 Faugeres affirmed the intellectual capacity of women and encouraged them to display their cognitive abilities. During the latter years of her life, she would further demonstrate her encouragement of female education by taking on teaching positions at girls’ schools. In the following lines, she wrote, “[m]ay thy fair daughters Wisdom's laws obey, and, ‘tis not in beauty they alone excel.”28 In her analysis, Faugeres emphasized the power of virtue and knowledge for women. This attitude toward female education was consistent with that of many prominent authors of the 1790s, namely Judith Sargent Murray. Following the Revolution, Murray and others called for the education of women by propagating the theory of Republican Motherhood.29 The central argument of this theory was that the future success of the American republic was dependent on an educated and virtuous citizenry. Furthermore, these authors reasoned that it was mothers who were responsible for the education and moralization of their children, and thus the instruction of these women was of utmost important to the state of the next generation.30 Tapping into this concern over the future, Faugeres advocated for the education of women as a necessary component of the new American nation.

Mirroring her poetry on the French Revolution, Faugeres engaged with the themes of ruin and reconstruction in “The Hudson.” In so doing, Faugeres justified her own political convictions as the natural outgrowth of the violent rebirth of the American nation. By linking the revolutionary past with the transformation of the American landscape and citizenry, Faugeres found meaning in the painful remembrance of the American Revolution.

“The Hudson” is perhaps the most poignant of Faugeres’ works. Even in the telling of a national story, Faugeres’ sense of place and emphasis on turmoil were deeply connected with her personal experience of the war. By ascribing meaning to the destructiveness of the American Revolution, Faugeres synthesized her own violent past with the social and political future she desired. It was the passion and the pain of war and revolution that for her provided the opportunity for a new nation. Engaging with popular debates over slavery and women’s education, Faugeres used the memory of the American Revolution’s cost as a tool for defining the nation’s future. “The Hudson” reveals the degree to which Faugeres’ engagement with a destructive past enabled her to voice her political convictions and fuse the journey of her own life before and after the American Revolution.

“By linking the revolutionary past with the transformation of the American landscape and citizenry, Faugeres found meaning in the painful remembrance of the American Revolution.”

DESTRUCTION AND REBIRTH: FAUGERES’ REVOLUTION
Although historians have largely overlooked the life and literature of Margaretta Faugeres, the record of her life and writings presents a fresh perspective to understanding the human experience of revolutions, and the American Revolution specifically. As a child, the American Revolution exacted damage on Margaretta and those closest to her, drastically altering the course of her life. The theme of the Revolution's destructiveness would remain present throughout her works. Additionally, the rise of her own career alongside the creation of the American nation likely affected her writing. With hope, Margaretta Faugeres looked to the past and to the future, finding in ruin the ability to start anew. Using narratives and language that highlighted the devastating nature of the revolutionary past, Faugeres emphasized the need for greater democracy, an end to slavery, and the intellectual freedom of women in the creation of a new nation. Margaretta Faugeres’ revolution was one of loss and decimation, but also one of hope and rebirth.  

Anna M. Lehrman
“O, Desolating War!”

Endnotes


[13] Harris, Executing Race, 120.


Throughout World War I, doctors were conflicted regarding the diagnosis, pathology, and treatment of mental trauma. Physicians debated the causes of “shell shock”; some thought literal shell explosions caused mental trauma, while others attributed psychological trauma to repression or previous psychological weakness. Doctors also varied wildly in their estimates of how many soldiers were afflicted. Treatments during World War I were similarly various. Different doctors advocated for treatments that included hypnosis, rest, activity, or electroshocks. Many physicians considered shell shock a matter of will, believing that victims could decide to become well. Remarkably, during this early period of understanding of wartime psychological trauma, most doctors asserted that shell shock could be definitively cured. This paper reviews primary and archival sources that elucidate the conflicted nature of the medical profession, and call into question claims that the experience of World War I helped “progress” medical understanding of mental health.

World War I catalyzed advancements in military and medical fields; however, a thorough analysis indicates that historians should be wary of arguing that the First World War represented a period of progress in psychological understanding and care. Via an analysis of physician reports, as well as archival research from a London hospital, one can conclude that throughout the war, doctors remained fundamentally conflicted and confused in regard to diagnosis, pathology, and treatment of mental trauma. This confusion led to inconsistent treatment by doctors and insufficient compensations by the government for veterans’ care. Nevertheless, the war did help expand methods of addressing mental health issues and military psychological testing. In sum, investigation of the medical practices of the United States and United Kingdom illustrates that the gains from the First World War in the field of psychology were limited and contradictory.

Historians describe the First World War as a turning point for the military and society, on account of the marked departure from “gentlemanly” battle and the first use of new technologies such as tanks and poison gas in conflict. In the medical field, historians such as Paul Starr cite World War I as inaugurating advancements in surgery, ambulatory care, and hospital systems. Some medical historians also describe instances of progress in mental healthcare during World War I as doctors began to treat shell shock and write about this phenomenon. For example, Anthony Babington writes that World War I was a “turning point” in which the “stigma” surrounding the mentally ill was reduced by “greater understanding of the factors which had led to their condition.” Fiona Reid writes that a more “enlightened point of view” characterized debates about psychological issues after the experience of World War I. Reid also discusses how medical research during the war contributed to “progress in medical understanding.” However, further scrutiny indicates that there are reasons to question this conception of linear ‘progress’; much evidence suggests that advancements in the field of psychological health lagged.

A MULTIPlicity OF SYMPTOMS AND CAUSES
During World War I, the multitude of symptoms that could indicate psychological trauma overwhelmed and confused responding physicians. Doctor Harvey Cushing, a British surgeon, describes a broad array of general malaise which could be diagnosed as conflict-onset psychosis: “general
tremor, an anguished expression, and semiconscious.”
Thomas Salmon, an American physician studying shell
shock in British and French troops, noted a multiplicity of
possible symptoms:
Disturbances of psychic functions include delirium,
confusion, amnesia, hallucinations, terrifying battle
dreams, anxiety states... heart disorders, low blood
pressure, vomiting and diarrhea, enuresis, retention or
polyuria, dyspnoea, sweating. Disturbances of voluntary
muscular functions include paralyses, tics, tremors, gait
disturbances, contractures and convulsive movements.

This lengthy catalog still does not exhaust all of Salmon's
possible indicators, as his report listed several more
lines of symptoms. Opinions regarding the prevalence of
psychological trauma also varied widely, with estimates
ranging from reporting shell shock as rare and almost non-
existent, to impacting upwards of 42 percent of combatants.
Thus, each responding medical officer was armed with an
exhaustive array of possible symptoms and treatments, with
very different ideas about the frequency of neurosis, which
resulted in widely different treatments.

For the duration of the First World War, physicians debated
the causes of this mental trauma. Especially in the early years
of the war, most reports associated psychological problems
with literal bombardments, hence the term 'shell shock'. E.W.
Mott, a British psychiatrist active in 1914 and 1915, wrote
that the physical damage to the nervous system caused
by bombing resulted in psychological trauma. According
to Mott, the strength of some explosions caused physical
damage, while others caused psychological damage. Mott
thoroughly detailed the neurobiological basis for this literal
shell shock on a cellular level.

Similarly, Charles Myers studied shell shock in the early
years of the war by visiting field stations and examining
patients; he concurred that physical bombing caused shell
shock. Similarly to Mott, Myers wrote about the connection
between the “physical shock produced by the bursting of a
shell [..] high frequency vibrations” and an “invisibly fine
‘molecular’ commotion in the brain which, in turn, might
produce dissociation.” He also conjectured that poison
gas could be related to psychological trauma. Both of
these conclusions presumably resulted from an erroneous
assumption of causation between psychological trauma for
soldiers in the trenches and the presence of shelling and
poison gas. Gustave Roussy, who operated a neurological
center in France in 1916, also connected “the explosion of a
projectile close at hand” with the symptoms of shell shock.
Dr. Alfred Carver conducted experiments in which he
detonated explosives near animals that appeared to confirm
this theory. First-hand accounts also seemed to support
this conclusion. Cushing described shell shock as directly
related to “trench warfare and the frightful bombardments,”
a conclusion he reached after diagnosing a case of shell shock
in which a patient was exposed to “the near-by explosion of a
shell, which did not injure him, [but] has now... completely
changed [his] personality.” Thus, for physicians in the
early years of the war, a logical but flawed response credited
physical shelling with trauma.

In later years, doctors began to consider other psychological
causes. However, even in the final years of the war, doctors
acknowledged these mental foundations as contributing
causes but still identified physical shelling as a definitive
causative factor of shell shock. Myers, who initially perceived
physical shelling as the sole cause of shell shock, later
amended his earlier conclusions and wrote that “emotional
disturbance alone [can be] a sufficient cause.” By 1922,
the British War Office Committee of Inquiry noted that
psychological trauma “need not be taken as implying only
shock from subjection” to shellings. Significantly, neither
Myers nor the British governmental report refuted shelling
as a cause of shell shock; they only acknowledged that other
factors might also contribute to the phenomenon.

Physicians began to recognize psychological causes for shell
shock later in the war. In the field of mental health, as in other
capacities, the United States undoubtedly benefited from
entering the war in 1917. The United States military perceived
that it could learn from the mistakes of Britain and France
regarding shell shock treatment and sent representatives to
study British and French strategies. Therefore, at the request
of the United States Surgeon General, Dr. Thomas Salmon
visited the front in May 1917 to study treatment of shell
shock. Salmon concluded that shell shock represented
“essentially a problem in psychological medicine.”

However, even amongst physicians who recognized a
psychological rather than physical basis of shell shock, many
doctors still attributed post-traumatic stress symptomology
and recovery to previous psychosis, mental weakness, and
repression. The perception that shell shock victims were
actually guilty of cowardice waned as time progressed but still
remained substantial throughout the duration of the war. As
late as 1922, an article in the leading British medical journal
The Lancet acknowledged that very few shell shock victims
were feigning symptoms, but it did discuss the difficulty
of separating the minority of “maligners” and “cowards”
feigning shell shock from legitimate victims. Similarly,
Dr. William Brown, who wrote about his experience in a
neurological center, reported “catching” several malingerers
while treating shell shock patients, whom he “induced...to
confess” their cowardice. Likewise, a doctor of neurology
serving as a witness at the 1922 British War Office Committee
of Enquiry Into Shell-Shock testified that he was “not
prepared to draw a distinction between cowardice and 'shell
shock.’” Thus, while medical attitudes towards psychological
trauma did evolve away from blaming victims for cowardice,
this impulse remained strong and substantial within sections
of the medical community.
The body of research during and following the First World War largely supported a theory that previous psychological issues were a main causative factor of shell shock. Roussy concluded that war only amplified pre-existing conditions, and that shell shock victims “were in reality cases of…the insane….the war had only added colour to their madness.”

Brown concurred; he noted that for patients, “earlier mental worry” represented the main instrumental cause for their psychosis. In a 1919 article in The Times, British doctor W.H.R. Rivers published an article in The Lancet that ascribed shell shock to soldiers’ repressed emotions of stressful war experiences. In an extension of this repression theory, Brown and Mott conjectured that in diagnosing shell shock, Freud’s dream theories might be useful. Indeed, the wide array of theories of causation—previous psychosis, cowardice, mental weakness, and repression—further complicated diagnosis, which, as previously discussed, already involved a multiplicity of possible symptoms.

“The perception that shell shock victims were actually guilty of cowardice waned as time progressed but still remained substantial throughout the duration of the war.”

Knowles Stansfield agreed, disseminating and popularizing a viewpoint that blamed the victim rather than the war.

Likewise, many medical officers also related mental weakness to the causes of shell shock. One French medical officer wrote, “Functional disorders, in my opinion, can occur only in individuals whose emotional tone has relaxed.” Salmon similarly opined that victims “suffer from a disorder of will as well as function.” This perception that mental weakness contributed to shell shock affected conceptions about how to treat the disorder, leading some doctors to conclude that convincing the patient to recover should be a sufficient treatment. For example, Brown noted the importance of the patient’s “enthusiastic expectation of a rapid recovery.” Roussy affirmed that shell shock “must not be confused with common cowardice,” but he still equated hysteria with a lack of will; he commented that doctors must push patients to have the “power, energy or desire to recover,” because patients “lack[ed]” these traits and “[were] unable to attain by their own effort.” Yealland also proposed that willpower and suggestion could overcome neurosis. He reported advising a patient:

I shall leave you for five minutes and during that time I want you to think. Give your lazy brain some work to do. When I come back to you I shall expect to find a man with all his mental faculties intact. Do you understand?

He looked rather ashamed and said he was sorry.

Interestingly, Yealland found this strategy successful, noting that when he “returned to [the patient] in ten minutes, and found his mental condition changed; he was now sober and rational.” Thus, even among doctors who did not explicitly tie cowardice to shell shock, many medical professionals retained a focus on implicating the victim, either for previous psychosis or mental weakness.

Other physicians diverged, attributing mental trauma to psychological repression. In February 1918, W.H.R. Rivers published an article in The Lancet that ascribed shell shock to soldiers’ repressed emotions of stressful war experiences. In an extension of this repression theory, Brown and Mott conjectured that in diagnosing shell shock, Freud’s dream theories might be useful. Indeed, the wide array of theories of causation—previous psychosis, cowardice, mental weakness, and repression—further complicated diagnosis, which, as previously discussed, already involved a multiplicity of possible symptoms.

DIVERSE TREATMENTS

The treatments recommended by contemporaneous reports and physicians were also varied and often confused. Different doctors advocated for specific programs, which included physical treatments, psychological treatments, and sometimes both. Many doctors promoted physical interventions as forms of treatment. Salmon recommended hypnosis, as well as hydrotherapy and electrotherapy. Similarly, British doctor Lewis Yealland described a treatment of electroshocks for patients. Interestingly, Yealland focused on the physical location of symptoms, shocking patients on localized body parts to address these “involuntary movements” rather than their fundamental mental problems. While Yealland also focused on willpower as important for treatment, this shock-focused treatment plan indicates a confused conceptual understanding of shell shock as both related to the mind and also tied to the body; Yealland assumed that if a shell shock victim suffered from hand tremors, shocking his hand could cure shell shock. Roussy advocated for psychotherapy but acknowledged that some patients required “special treatment” such as hydrotherapy and electroshock. Mott suggested the physical treatment of hydrotherapy as a result of his conclusion that physical damage from shelling caused shell shock. Roussy also believed that isolation should be a key aspect of treatment, because he believed that psychological disorders could be transferable.

However, in another example of conflicting professional opinions regarding shell shock, Brown actively opposed isolation. Thus, treatments advocated by different doctors ranged from more mainstream ideas mentioned by many physicians, such as hypnosis and electroshock, to the bizarre, such as Roussy’s advocacy for an all-milk diet. This lack of consensus regarding treatment further added to confusion regarding shell shock treatment.

Some physicians also recommended psychological treatments. Rivers, the creator of the “repression” theory, suggested “re-education,” in which a doctor slowly helped patients...
a patient address his repressed memories. Brown also agreed that suppressed memories caused symptoms, but advocated for a treatment plan in which the patient re-lived the trauma while under hypnosis. Cushing agreed with the idea of hypnosis, describing a patient who “has absolutely no recollection of a previous existence, but when put in an hypnotic state he is his former self in every respect and perfectly clear on all events up to the moment of the explosion of the shell.” In yet another divergent treatment method, Roussy advised rest and a version of “psychotherapy,” in which a doctor essentially convinced a patient to no longer be ill. Conversely, as a result of his conclusion that mental weakness contributed to shell shock, Salmon suggested that shell shock victims’ treatment should not involve too much leisure time. Thus, as with shell shock etiology, doctors were divided regarding treatment for mental disorders.

Doctors documented this confusion in the medical community regarding shell shock. Roussy described the “whole subject of the psychical disorders of war” as “somewhat confused and uncertain.” Babinski noted in 1918, regarding the prevalence of hysteria, “opinions...do not agree.” Interestingly, despite recognizing these inconsistencies, all physicians reported remarkably high success rates. Roussy concluded that 98 to 99 percent of his patients recovered. However, he felt that most of his patients required prolonged leave and transfers away from the front. Brown ambitiously reported that his hypnosis treatment cured “every single one” of his patients. In his study, Salmon concluded that the sometimes-lengthy hospital stays for shell shock rendered “the outcome in the war neuroses... poor from a military point of view,” but still felt that recovery outcome “is good from a medical point of view.” Thus, remarkably, doctors did not agree regarding the causes or treatment of neurosis, but individually asserted that their various amorphous therapies for this ill-defined disease could definitely cure patients.

Several contemporaneous reports commented on administrative methods to address shell shock. Cushing noted in his diary that medical officers were often “undermanned.” Roussy likewise recommended caring for victims as expeditiously as possible at the front, instead of evacuating victims to larger hospitals. Salmon, the United States physician sent to study treatment on the Western Front, wrote that British doctors were unprepared in 1914 for the cases of shell shock, confirming the reports of Cushing. The inexpedient procedure of sending Allied shell shock victims to Britain overwhelmed British hospitals. Death rates in asylums increased during the war years. Salmon therefore recommended that the US should amend these procedures, and instead develop an intermediary treatment system. Salmon concluded that the US should develop an early treatment system, as “the French and the British experience shows the great desirability of instituting treatment of ‘shell shock’ cases as early as possible.” As a result of these reports, the Allies implemented a revised system of treatment and increased the resources allocated towards mental hospitals in Britain and the United States in the final years of the war. For example, responding to these reports, the United States trained a large number of doctors to respond to shell shock. As an indicative example of this increased awareness of mental health concerns, the military changed Myers’ title of “Specialist in Nerve Shock” to “Consulting Psychologist” in August 1916. The experience of World War I therefore expanded mental health treatment centers and changed treatment strategy.

Doctoral confusion regarding pathology and outcomes for shell shock victims can help explain the inadequate post-war treatment of shell shock victims. Government treatment of shell shock victims can perhaps be best understood through the pension system. A British report to the Minister of Pensions in 1918 recounted that only 5.9 percent of pensions were given for psychological injuries. Strict guidelines specified which injuries and amputations qualified for what compensation. These technicalities made receiving an army pension for any injury, let alone psychological trauma, a difficult process, leaving many veterans undercompensated. Additionally, men reported very poor conditions in government hospitals treating shell shock.
Traumatized American veterans fared better than their British counterparts. In the United States, a commission reported that by 1927 nearly 50 percent of veterans receiving hospital treatment through the Veterans Bureau had “neuropsychiatric disabilities.”73 While this was likely an overestimation, the methodology of the United States veterans’ compensation system did advantage United States shell-shock victims. Unlike the British system, which based compensation on specific bodily injuries, the War Compensation Act in 1924 authorized a bonus to veterans based on the length of their service.68 This system avoided bias towards physical injuries. Still, government treatment was often inadequate, as these bonuses were not payable until 1945.69 In sum, compensation for all veterans in both nations was largely insufficient, especially so for victims of shell shock. The confused understanding of shell shock and contradictory medical recommendations to governmental committees likely contributed to this inadequate treatment.70

“The MAUDSLEY AS A CASE STUDY
The Maudsley Hospital in Britain provides a salient case study of many of the aforementioned trends in mental health care during and after World War I. Doctor Henry Maudsley established the Maudsley Hospital for mental patients, which was then turned over to the Ministry of Pensions during the First World War for housing and treating soldiers suffering from shell shock.77 Edward Mapother served as the first Medical Superintendent, and aforementioned doctor Mott also worked at the hospital.78 The perspectives of the Maudsley clinicians on their experiences treating shell shock exhibit, in miniature, the problems experienced by the medical profession.

The experiences of the war did not clarify the Maudsley doctors’ diverse, racially-tinged, and scattered conceptions of psychology. In 1868, Maudsley wrote that “probably as high as one-fourth, possibly as high as three-fourths” of insane individuals were predisposed to insanity from heredity factors.79 He also described “insane deformities of the mind” as related to “moral imbecility.”80 The war did little to change the Maudsley doctors’ conceptions of mental health. By 1921, Mott still agreed with Maudsley that “the large majority of the insane are hereditarily disposed.”81 In 1927, Mapother wrote that after the war, mental illness had improved, but for perplexing reasons which do not indicate a progressive understanding of shell shock: “During post-war years damage done by mental disorders due to demonstrable physical causes has been reduced in two main ways, viz., by the great decrease of morbid alcoholism and by the modern treatment of neurophilis [syphilis].”82 After the wartime experience, Mapother echoed Maudsley’s original ideas. Mapother wrote, in 1931, that most psychological cases were due to “1) inheritance 2) deviation of adjustments due to physiological epochs and 3) mental experience.”83 As late as 1935, the Maudsley director echoed that the primary solution for “war neurosis” was simple: “employment.”84 The treatment of shell shock victims during World War I did not have an overwhelmingly progressive influence on the ideas of the doctors at the Maudsley Hospital.

While the Maudsley’s experience cannot be treated as universal, the case study of this influential hospital is informative, and adds to evidence that indicates that the World War I experience had limited modernizing effects on the medical community in the U.S. and the U.K. Progress regarding mental health during the First World War

Significantly, many physicians also focused their reports on preventative treatment measures. For most doctors, especially those who perceived mental weakness as a causative factor, preventing shell shock involved screening to ensure that the mentally unfit did not serve in the military. Salmon recommended, in what he characterized as the most significant portion of his report on British and French treatment systems, that the United States develop a system to exclude the psychologically incompetent from military service.71 Rivers, who blamed shell shock on repressed emotions, also addressed pre-screening for individuals prone to repression.72 J. Babinski, a French physician in the Medical Hospitals of Lyons, suggested that “an examination [be] made for any hysterical disorders” before entry into the armed services.73 This focus on preventative measures and military productivity helped advance the “mental hygiene” movement, in which doctors stressed the importance of preventative mental health measures in the population.74

For example, a 1921 report noted the prevalence of soldiers discharged for shell shock. It advocated for prevention and a focus on mental hygiene as methods to avoid this loss of soldiers.75 Thus, most physicians did concur that preventative measures such as screening could improve outcomes for both soldiers and the army. As a result, both the US and Britain developed a more comprehensive screening system for psychological issues, which they implemented during the Second World War.76

“... This focus on preventative measures and military productivity helped advance the ‘mental hygiene’ movement, in which doctors stressed the importance of preventative mental health measures in the population.”
was limited. Doctors began to recognize shell shock as a legitimate disorder with the possibility of a psychological component. Additionally, to address these patients, Britain and the United States developed a more specialized and systematized hospitalization and military screening system at the end of the war. However, diagnosis and treatment for shell shock victims was at best confused and inconsistent. Such confusion in opinion from the medical profession helps explain the limited and inadequate aid the United States and Britain offered shell-shocked veterans. While World War I represented some partial advancements in the field of mental health, on the whole, gains were illusory and restricted. The history of healthcare in the twentieth century often lends itself to a story of progress and steady development. The World War I mental healthcare experience warns that advancements are not always linear or constant, and historians should be wary of too easily endorsing the seductive narrative of “progress.”

Endnotes

[6] Ibid.
[26] Roussy, Shell Shock or the Psychoneurosis of War, 120.
[29] qtd. in Babinski, Hysteria or Pithiatism and Reflex Nervous Disorders in the Neurology of War, 29.
[32] Roussy, Shell Shock or the Psychoneurosis of War, 113 and 162.
[33] Lewis Ralph Yealland, Hysterical Disorders of Warfare
(London: Macmillan, 1918), 22.
[34] Yealland, Hysterical Disorders of Warfare, 22.
[37] Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British Army, 40-52.
[38] Yealland, Hysterical Disorders of Warfare, 192-193.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Roussy, Shell Shock or the Psychoneurosis of War, 163 and 169.
[41] Mott, War Neurosis and Shell Shock, 30
[42] Ibid., 167.
[44] Roussy, Shell Shock or the Psychoneurosis of War, 167.
[48] Roussy, Shell Shock or the Psychoneurosis of War, 163.
[49] Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British Army, 40.
[50] Ibid., 120.
[52] Roussy, Shell Shock or the Psychoneurosis of War, 171.
[53] Ibid., 174.
[55] Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British Army, 40.
[57] Roussy, Shell Shock or the Psychoneurosis of War, 164.
[58] Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British Army, 34.
[61] Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British Army, 58.
[64] Ibid in Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid. in Committee on Veterans’ Compensation for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD Compensation and Military Service (Washington, DC: National Academies, 2007), 42.
[69] Committee on Veterans’ Compensation for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD Compensation and Military Service, 42.
[71] Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British Army, 48.
[73] Babinski, Hysteria or Pitiatism and Reflex Nervous Disorders in the Neurology of War, 26
[78] Ibid., 22.

Rachael E. Jones
This article reevaluates the origins of the 1983 American invasion of Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury. Adopting a transnational framework, this article argues that Britain was a major advocate of the invasion. Through intelligence provision, diplomatic pressure, and indirect agents, London linked its interests with the American initiative and played a significant role in bringing Washington to war. The study of American foreign policy through a transnational perspective, as this article suggests, is constructive for a multifaceted historical analysis.

By Leon Lam
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This article focuses on the role the U.K. played in Operation Urgent Fury, the United States' 1983 invasion of Grenada. Instead of being a disinterested and unimportant bystander, Britain was active and indeed pivotal in assisting the American initiative. As Washington did not station any personnel in the Caribbean island state from 1981 onwards, intelligence reports from the British Commonwealth nation of Barbados conveyed key information to President Reagan and his Cabinet about the developing situation in Grenada. Through political maneuvering in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), London managed to rally the support of Anglophone Caribbean islands for the U.S. operation. Instructions from the British government also prompted Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General of Grenada, to ask openly for American intervention in local politics. A careful assessment of British actions creates a more complete picture of the 1983 war and highlights the importance of using a transnational framework when analyzing American foreign policy. A study of the invasion from this perspective indicates that decisions made in Washington often result from multiple domestic and foreign factors.
This article is divided into five parts. The first part provides an overview of the existing literature. The second part compares the differing interests Washington and London had in Grenada. While the Reagan administration adopted a manichean worldview and feared Soviet and Cuban infiltration into the Caribbean Basin, the Thatcher Cabinet was more interested in preserving the London-led regional order. The third part focuses on Reagan’s policy towards Grenada and the broader Caribbean region before the death of Maurice Bishop, the Prime Minister of Grenada, in October of 1983. Despite the lack of American personnel in Grenada, Washington received intelligence materials from British consular staff in Barbados. The arrival of British reports beginning in March 1983 coincided with Reagan’s preparation for direct action on Grenada. The fourth part traces the meetings of OECS before the deployment of troops. With help from London, Washington successfully won support from various Caribbean states, most importantly Jamaica, for the military operation. The fifth part examines the actions and motivations of Sir Paul Scoon, the controversial Governor-General of Grenada during the time of American occupation. Despite perceptions of him as a puppet of Washington, he was a cautious and steadfast defender of British interests in the nation. His long-held suspicion of the leftist New Jewel Movement reflected sentiments shared by both Washington and London, and his eventual invitation to the U.S. reflected the policy of Britain. The article concludes with observations on the value of transnational study of American foreign policy.

This article benefits from recently declassified materials and newer scholarly research. As most of the writings on Grenada were the product of the 1980s and 1990s, the scholarship at that time did not have access to British and American primary sources. This study provides a more complete picture by extracting relevant information from declassified documents available in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, the National Archives of Britain, and to a lesser extent, the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), a series curated by the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian. More recent publications, especially Scoon’s memoir and preliminary writings on Britain’s actions during the invasion, are also important sources for this article. Due to the limited scope of the declassified materials, especially on the British side, a cross-reading of autobiographies of Caribbean political leaders at the time offers important insight into their interactions with London prior to the American invasion.

**AN AMERICAN WAR?**
As the last “hot war” with clear Cold War elements, the American invasion of Grenada has received considerable scholarly attention. While these studies have provided a solid foundation for understanding the invasion, most have been written from the American perspective with little regard to other actors. Although accounts vary, existing works assume that other nations played only minor roles vis-à-vis that of the United States. Most of the scholarship portrays other stakeholders like Britain and various Caribbean states as
British Influence In Operation Urgent Fury

“A Marine displays a seized Soviet RPG-2 rocket launcher and Bren light machine gun, after arriving with Battalion Landing Team A during Operation Urgent Fury.”
(November 2, 1983)
Source: JOI Peter D. Sundberg, U.S. Defense Imagery photo
VIRIN: DN-SN-84-11947 (Wikimedia Commons)

either too powerless to speak, or willing to object to Reagan’s plan. This study outlines the complexity of the preparation process and emphasizes the activeness of Britain in that process.

Some researchers link the Grenada operation to the Beirut bombing days before. They argue that after a suicide attack in the Lebanese capital killed 241 U.S. peacekeepers, Reagan started a new war to divert public attention away from the powerful image of policy failure in the Middle East. By shifting the attention of journalists and the public from Beirut to Grenada, the president turned a total foreign policy disaster into a bright victory; he highlighted the success in the Caribbean and the broader struggle against communism. Others even describe the conflict as an easy victory designed to boost his re-election campaign. In an eye-catching article titled “Grenada as Theatre,” Eldon Kenworthy argues that the Grenada operation was Reagan’s “sole foreign policy success” by 1984. The President, seeking a bright and presentable foreign policy achievement, utilized the anticipated popularity gain from the invasion for the upcoming election. From this perspective, Operation Urgent Fury had vital political value for President Reagan.

Another perspective focuses on the relationship between the Grenadian war and Reagan’s Central American foreign policy. This school of thought highlights the regional implications of the Grenada operation, especially for Central America. With the radicalization and communist turn of Nicaragua and El Salvador, Washington could use Grenada as a warning to the region and a deterrent to Cuban and Soviet infiltration. Scholars holding this view also suggest that the war was important to proving American commitment in the area. Considering the size and military strength of Grenada, Washington expected to gain an easy and complete victory at minimal political and military cost. According to this view, Reagan aimed to fight a prompt and relatively cheap war in Grenada so as to demonstrate his anti-communist credentials and commitment to the world.

Although this article does not challenge these two major views, it seeks to broaden the existing literature by highlighting British involvement in the war. Instead of being a wholly American operation, the invasion of Grenada was also the product of considerable effort by the U.K. government. This article emphasizes the understudied role of Britain in the conflict. Although Britain did not participate directly in the military operation, British support was crucial to the American victory. British intelligence from Barbados and the actions of both the London-led OECS and the Anglophile Scoon were essential to victory in the American war.

ANGLO-AMERICAN DIVERGENCE
It is important to account for the different set of interests and preferences in Washington and London before examining British actions before the operation. The extensively-studied Cold War context for the war explains the American intervention, but not British involvement. Washington, especially during the first four years of the Reagan administration, held a clear anti-communist stance. From the U.S. perspective, countering Moscow’s assertiveness was already a sound reason to start a war. British concerns were more nuanced. London, whether led by the Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan or his Conservative successor Margaret Thatcher, cared more about regional stability than about communist expansion. The security of Anglophile states like Jamaica and Barbados was a key consideration in British foreign policy. However, this was never a sufficiently strong motive to convince London to fight with its own hand. These differing interests also explain why the U.S. eventually deployed troops to Grenada while Britain took a more backstage role.

Reagan’s anti-communist position between 1981 and 1984 was widely evident. In his famous March 8, 1983, speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, he described the
Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and called for a massive military buildup to counter the threat of Moscow. As political scientist Michael Turner writes, Reagan believed that “the Soviet Union [sought] world domination and therefore must be resisted on all fronts.”11 Reagan’s understanding of the political development of Grenada reflected this central tenet. “The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada,” as he described it in a March 23rd national address, “can only be seen as power projection into the region.”12 Reagan regarded Bishop as a puppet of Moscow and found it necessary to pressure Grenada to leave the Soviet orbit and resist Cuban influence. U.S. anxiety over the possible loss of the Caribbean island state to communists was a major factor leading to American military intervention.

The respective decisions of the U.S. and Britain to become involved in the politics of Grenada reflected different value orientations. The U.S., led by the staunchly anti-communist Reagan, aimed to eradicate Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean so as to succeed in the global war against communism. Britain, taking the security of other Commonwealth states into account, supported the American initiative to defend its special privileges and linkages in the area. Their shared interest in clearing the Caribbean of competing forces facilitated the Anglo-American collaboration and eventually led to Operation Urgent Fury.

British interests, in contrast, extended beyond mere anti-communism. While the U.S. saw Grenada through the lens of a global crusade against communism, Britain focused more on regional security and stability. As a part of the Commonwealth, Grenada was legally part of the British Empire and recognized the Queen as its head of state. Thus, Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister, regarded Grenada as an essential part of Britain.13 As this implies, London had a special connection to the Caribbean country and former British colony. From the perspective of Whitehall, the political development of Commonwealth members was not only a domestic affair, but also, to a certain extent, a British affair. As a result, London was concerned about the political crisis in Grenada, as well as the island’s influence on surrounding Anglophone states. The strategy of active engagement pursued by the Commonwealth was thus consistent with London’s considerations.14 Britain’s objectives were to safeguard the London-led order and avoid challenges to the existing power balance. When Grenada became a vocal opponent to the existing political order and aimed to play a more assertive role in the Caribbean, Britain gained a motive to support the American military initiative.

The security of Anglophile Barbados, the British Cabinet agreed, was a key consideration in Britain’s Caribbean policy.15 Thus, prior to Reagan’s ascent to the presidency in 1981, both the U.S. and Britain were close observers of, but not assertive players in, Grenada.

The clear Leninist ideology of the NJM and its close ties to Cuba soon raised concerns in the Reagan White House.19 Beginning in January 1981, Washington applied more traditional Cold War containment policies to Grenada. In February, President Reagan withdrew Sally Shelton-Colby, the last ambassador to Grenada appointed by President Carter, from the country. Thereafter, the U.S. had no formal representative to Grenada until 1984. Furthermore, Reagan adopted a multilateral framework for his foreign policy. In early 1982, he called for more studies on the possibility of engagement with allies to counter the Soviet threat.20 The Caribbean Basin Initiative, proposed in 1982, was Reagan’s version of the Marshall Plan for Caribbean states and excluded only Grenada from financial assistance and loans. The U.S. accompanied economic pressure with a direct military threat to the island state. In 1982 alone, the U.S. staged three major military exercises in the Caribbean that included rehearsals of “procedures for the removal of an unfriendly island government and the temporary occupation of state territory.”21 The mutual suspicion between Reagan and Bishop continued to grow and soon became a key factor prompting the president’s famous Strategic Defense Initiative.
In the March 23, 1983, address that announced the start of research on SDI, Reagan described the construction of an international airport in Grenada as a plot of military build-up and infiltration by Moscow. Criticizing the Cuban and Soviet “financing and backing” behind the project, the president described the Caribbean state as an outpost of communism in the Caribbean. That the new Grenadian airport was designed solely for civilian purposes failed to ease Reagan’s mounting antagonism toward the NJM regime. The heavily-worded criticism soon led to a hostile response from Bishop’s government, marking a further deterioration of relations.

Days later, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the fiery U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), described Grenada as a sign of the global “left-wing revolutionary movements” that threatened world peace in a speech to the UN. It is highly likely that the President’s criticism of the new airport in Grenada reflected Washington’s heightened concerns, as the geographical proximity and strategic value of the island made the political stance of Grenada non-negotiable, and military operation to recapture the island inevitable. By the end of the first half of 1983, American hostility towards Grenada had become decisive.

In the months before the invasion, the U.S. relied on information provided by Britain to formulate its Grenada policy. The U.S. never had any foreign service staff stationed in Grenada; all ambassadors to the small island state had resided in Barbados, another island nation 162 miles away. Cooperation with Britain was thus consistent with Reagan’s new Grenada policy. Britain, unlike the U.S., maintained a High Commissioner (a British ambassador to a Commonwealth country) to the island continuously after its independence in 1974. At the same time, London probably found the American presence in the Caribbean region to be beneficial to its interests in the surrounding islands. According to the online catalog of the British National Archives, the first intelligence report from Barbados arrived in Washington exactly a week after Reagan’s March 23rd speech. A likely explanation would be that Reagan decided to seek London’s help in order to prepare a military operation in Grenada. When the president criticized the construction of the airport, he probably simultaneously requested British intelligence sharing. While Washington lacked firsthand intelligence on Grenada, beginning in March 1983, information from London filled the information gap and influenced American policy.

Accounts vary as to who received the intelligence reports on the American side. David Montgomery, the Deputy High Commissioner in Barbados, both communicated with and provided a selection of intelligence reports to U.S. foreign service staff in Barbados. The information provided by Montgomery was pivotal for the U.S. to follow the immediate political developments in Grenada. It was also very likely that all information provided to American personnel was to some degree framed and censored by the British side so as to create a narrative consistent with London’s interests. The British cable between Grenada and Barbados, as later incidents showed, was highly efficient and effective. For example, Washington knew of the arrest of Bishop within twelve hours. The fast delivery of messages from Grenada to Barbados and then to the U.S. was crucial for the Reagan administration to analyze the situation and respond accordingly. London’s framing of local events is an important but often missed factor leading to the war.

Most of the scholarship on Grenada casts the death of Bishop on October 19, 1983, as the precipitating cause of Operation Urgent Fury. Although a plethora of work has studied the subsequent developments extensively, very few of them understand the war as a product of interactions between multiple actors. Apart from the American desire to eliminate the communist outpost of Grenada, Britain also wanted the downfall of the NJM regime so as to protect its regional allies. Both Washington and London intended to defeat or at least contain Russian and Cuban influences in Grenada. The U.S. linked Bishop to leftist Central American regimes like Nicaragua and El Salvador. Amid the rise of leftist guerrillas like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador that threatened existing pro-American dictatorships, Reagan hoped to warn these groups against further collaboration with the Soviets or the Cubans. Britain, in contrast, emphasized the security of major pro-British Caribbean states like Jamaica and Barbados. This convergence of interests led to covert collaboration. With no local messengers in St. George, Grenada’s capital, Washington greatly relied on London for information on the political and social development of the island, especially after March of 1983 when Reagan explicitly identified Grenada as a threat to regional stability. The semi-institutionalized channel between the British Deputy High Commissioner and American foreign policy staff likely led to the final decision to invade Grenada. As latter developments proved, Britain played a major role in persuading the U.S. to fight in Grenada after the death of Maurice Bishop.

THE INVISIBLE HAND

Britain had a special interest in supporting Anglophile leaders in Caribbean states, especially Jamaica and Barbados. Being the largest and wealthiest states in the Anglophone Caribbean, the two countries received the most attention from London. In 1980, Britain intentionally delayed the provision of aid to Jamaica so that Edward Seaga, the leader of the conservative Jamaica Labour Party, would defeat the pro-Cuban and leftist Michael Manley and his People’s National Party in the general election and become the next Prime Minister. Seaga and other Anglophile leaders played a prominent role in justifying the American invasion of Grenada through diplomatic and military support. Britain, aiming to maintain its influence in the region and protect its close allies from the communist predation, was active in realizing the operation.
Britain hoped to maintain its long-established links with the Caribbean after the independence of various island states in the 1960s and 1970s. In June 1981, various independent states and dependencies in the Caribbean established the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to push for regional integration and independence from British control. Despite the OECS's claim of autonomy, London’s presence was still largely palpable in every sense, as the 1980 Jamaican election showed. Whitehall still viewed any attempt to transform the London-led regional order as a direct challenge to and intrusion into British territories. Since Grenada “had wished to take a revolutionary role in the Caribbean of its own accord,” the island state was an usurper of the British order in the region and thus an enemy of London. Maurice Bishop, the leader of the NJM, also showed clear Anglophobic sentiment. He refused to engage in dialogue with Thatcher and clashed with Jamaica and Barbados, two of the most pro-British countries in the Caribbean. Despite the deep animosity felt on both sides, London was reluctant to send troops abroad. After the tragic and humiliating Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, Britain had refrained from direct military intervention in another sovereign state to avoid diplomatic denunciation from the Third World. Still, London had strong reasons to support Reagan’s initiative to topple the NJM government. The opportunity to avoid direct military action was an important reason for London to support American action in Grenada.

Aware of the United States’ special relationship with Britain, Reagan paid close attention to Jamaica and Barbados. In April 1982, the President chose the two countries for his first foreign trip outside Canada and Mexico. After meeting the Prime Minister of Barbados on April 8th, he made a speech on the threat of Soviet and Cuban penetration in Grenada and hinted at further cooperation to tackle the problem. This unprecedented degree of attention to the two traditionally insignificant states reflected a common feature of Washington and London’s Caribbean policy. Apart from influencing multilateral platforms like the OECS, both states complemented each other’s foreign policy and gradually developed a common front against Grenada. Shared strategic interest made them pursue a similar approach to the region. While Britain wanted to borrow American power projection to defend its influence in the Caribbean, America utilized the relationship between Britain and the two countries to realize its policy agenda. It was unsurprising that Tom Adams, the Prime Minister of Barbados and an Anglophile, was highly supportive of American military action. Edward Seaga, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, shared a similar stance and was highly critical of Grenada. By utilizing these existing networks, the U.S. established close ties with major pro-British Caribbean states and built the foundation for its invasion.

The de facto Anglo-American alliance on Caribbean policy was also evident in the two nations’ activities with the OECS.
British Influence In Operation Urgent Fury

instructions from “the second man at the British Embassy,” referring to David Montgomery, the British Deputy High Commissioner to Barbados.49 Montgomery, as Charles said, collaborated with Ambassador Bish in lobbying the members of the OECS.50 Early in the morning of October 22nd, Reagan decided to deploy troops to Grenada after a brief discussion with McFarlane and Secretary of State George Shultz.51 The operation to defend both American and British interests finally came to fruition as the first batch of U.S. forces arrived in the island state on the 23rd.

Although Reagan’s announcement of the invasion on October 25, 1983, came as a surprise to many, the military operation was indeed the product of years of preparation. Despite the lack of a British military presence in Grenada, British influence in the war was remarkable in many ways. In the final stage of invasion, the lobbying effort by British diplomatic staff in Barbados put pressure on the OECS member states and eventually helped to pass the motion to aid Operation Urgent Fury. London played a covert but integral role.

THE QUEEN’S REPRESENTATIVE
The position of Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General of Grenada, and his impact on bringing in American troops is critical to understanding the different interests of Britain and the U.S. Serving as the representative of London in Grenada, the Governor-General prioritized the security and order of Grenada; anti-communism was not his concern. He was an active and loyal defender of British interests. After the death of Bishop, he tried to regain control of Grenada and form an interim government. Although Jamaica and Barbados both encouraged him to invite the American military in to topple the unstable NJM government, he refrained from taking any direct action until he received the endorsement of British officials.52 The subtle position of the Governor-General not only indicated the predominant British presence in the region, but also underlined the different interests of London and Washington.

Scoon was a key player in Grenada after October 19, 1983. Appointed by London in 1979, he wielded almost no power during the period of the NJM rule.53 His political insignificance changed after the death of Bishop. Without a legitimate head of state, Grenada was in political chaos. The Governor-General, serving as the representative of the Queen, engaged in dialogue with local politicians and other Commonwealth states in an attempt to form an interim government. It was remarkable that he did not view the NJM as the communist enemy like Reagan did; instead, he met with General Hudson Austin, the leader of the Revolutionary Military Council formed after the death of Bishop.54 In the October 21st meeting, he urged Austin to restore order and stability as soon as possible.55 Without any ideological burden, Scoon was willing to give the general some time to bring Grenada back to normalcy. Since he was more interested in maintaining law and order, he was more tolerant than Reagan. Between the 19th and 21st, he also had regular conversations in person with John Kelly, the British permanent representative to Grenada, and by phone with Sir Shridath Ramphal, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.56 In contrast, his first meeting with an American official was on the 24th, two days after Reagan decided to deploy troops.57 The arrangement reflected considerable British attention and maneuvering in Grenada. If the Governor-General had prioritized American interests, he would have invited the American military in on October 19th, the day of Bishop’s death. However, he had shown the willingness to mediate the local political conflict and communicate with London. Also important was that he remained silent on the possible American military plan, despite the approval given by the OECS on the 21st. A likely explanation is that he shared the British view on military operations after the disaster of the Suez Canal Crisis. In many ways, his stance was consistent with his position as the leader of the former British colony, although only a ceremonial one.

Scoon’s support of American action came on October 23rd after a discussion with British officials. Before that date, the Governor-General was critical of the possible American military operation on the grounds of inviolability of sovereignty, consistent with the post-Suez Canal Crisis British position. In his memoir, he criticized the October 21st OECS decision to support the American initiative as the product of active lobbying by pro-U.S. state leaders like Adams of Barbados and Seaga of Jamaica.58 His disapproval of the American plan soon disappeared after an October 23rd meeting with David Montgomery, the British Deputy High Commissioner to Barbados and two accompanying junior American foreign service staff. His change of mind during the meeting was of utmost importance:

In a calm, reassuring voice, Montgomery suggested that, in these circumstances, I should perhaps give urgent consideration to the role I would be expected to assume if a military operation were to be mounted against the Revolutionary Military Council, adding that clearly my views on military action as an option to restore my country to normality, would be crucial to any decision on that score. The awesome significance of these disturbing words caused me to ponder for some time before commenting that while military intervention into one’s territory was not the sort of thing I would normally advocate, the current, potentially explosive situation in Grenada was such that it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that only the presence of friendly, foreign troops could rescue Grenadians from the abyss into which they had fallen and bring stability and law and order back into our daily lives. Therefore, if a military operation to achieve that were to be undertaken by our sister states – if necessary with assistance from the United States, I would give such an initiative my fullest support [italics added].59
The exchange between Montgomery and Scoon on October 23\textsuperscript{rd} provides ample proof of British lobbying for the American operation. As articulated in the Governor-General's account, London clearly wanted to change its decades-long practice of non-intervention in another sovereign state's affairs and instead create a favorable environment for the upcoming American invasion of Grenada. His invitation to the American troops, sent to Adams, was a direct result of Montgomery's persuasion.\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, the reason he cited according to its objective of protecting Anglophone states in the Caribbean. As its interaction with the Governor-General showed, communist influence was never a major concern for Britain. Nor was London's role in the invasion that of a silent and passive bystander. While maintaining close contact with Scoon via various channels, Britain also formulated action plans for its representative in Grenada. London's invisible hand in Operation Urgent Fury, if seen from the Governor-General's perspective, was not that invisible.

“Hence, Operation Urgent Fury not only served Reagan’s pledge of a global crusade against communism, but also London’s interests in maintaining the wellbeing of the Anglophone Caribbean states.”

CONCLUSION

The headline of The New York Times on October 26, 1983, read: “1,900 U.S. Troops, with Caribbean Allies, Invade Grenada and Fight Leftist Units; Moscow Protests; British are Critical.”\textsuperscript{65} While observers at the time debated the legality of and rationales for President Reagan's abrupt military deployment, the response from London received less attention. Major newspaper reports only emphasized the centrality of Washington and viewed the conflict as a classic Cold War battle.\textsuperscript{66} With a majority of the media concentrating on the details of the American action or on the local and regional impacts, scholars and journalists have oversimplified or even overlooked the complexity of the war. Although most commentators acknowledge the role of London in the operation, there is no systematic study of British participation. This article highlights a key aspect of Operation Urgent Fury and provides an overview of London's assertiveness in the Caribbean region.

Scoon's decision to ask for American intervention after the death of Bishop was highly controversial. A largely ceremonial position after Grenada's independence in 1974, the Governor-General did not have any actual power in the daily politics of the island country. Scoon therefore did not wield the right to act as the head of state, as some legal scholars believed.\textsuperscript{62} Those holding a different view focus on the pressing situation in Grenada after Bishop's death. As Prime Minister Adams argued, “[g]overnment having been destroyed in Grenada itself, the Governor-General became the Constitutional Authority in the island who could formally invite foreign countries to enter and restore order.”\textsuperscript{63} Scholars also argue that “Scoon was the one non-partisan figure to whom people could look when the crisis left the island without political leadership.”\textsuperscript{64}

Although the legal aspect of the invasion is beyond the scope of this study, Scoon's position and its impact are momentous for understanding the different interests of Britain and the U.S. in the invasion. Throughout October, London closely followed the political developments in Grenada and acted

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Endnotes

[32] Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire, 166.


[45] Ibid.

[46] Lewis, "Revisiting the Grenada Invasion", 94.


[50] Ibid, 181.


[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.


[59] Ibid, 134-5.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.


[63] Ibid.


Rhetoric Against Pagans in St. Augustine’s *City of God*

As the works of a venerated scholar of Christianity in Rome after Constantine’s divisive reign, St. Augustine’s studies became a staple of Christian society and as such provide insight into the cultural climate of the era. A large portion of his *City of God* examines ancient pagan theology and belief systems, explicitly condemning the majority religion. Though the few remaining pagans in Rome still held influential positions in the community, they were dismissed as archaic, and St. Augustine argued that their polytheistic beliefs were regressive. This article examines the origins of the vast hysteria around paganism starting in fourth-century Rome, and the subsequent consequences of pagans’ estranged status as a population. St. Augustine’s rhetoric catalyzed a polarization of the two major religious populations in Rome, ultimately contributing to its decline.

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Saint Aurelius Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo (354-430 AD), was a revered theologian, writer, and philosopher. His works were foundational to early Christianity, and remain testaments to the religion’s role in the late Roman Empire. In *City of God*, arguably his most disputed work, Augustine argued in favor of Christianity’s place as the main religion of the empire by clarifying philosophical disputes and condemning paganism, and the work’s theological conclusions catalyzed the formation of Christian identity in the Roman Empire. In the fourth century, Christians strove to find a foothold in a diverse cultural climate by separating themselves from other religions. Augustine, in solidarity with the rise of Christianity, believed that divine grace and understanding of God were necessary to obtain salvation, and rejected the idea that humans have an innate ability to reason and follow a righteous path.

Christian theologians, aiming to create a cohesive belief system in the budding Roman religions, often encountered conflicts with other scholars. Pelagius was another Christian theologian of Augustine’s time, but unlike Augustine, he proposed that human free will could provide sufficient morality and righteousness. These theological debates reveal that Christianity was not yet built on a unified philosophy, but they also prove that theologians like Augustine worked to find a conclusive definition of Christian theology. To achieve this, Augustine publicly condemned the pagans in *City of God*, insulting their beliefs, arguing that their gods acted immorally, condemning their practices, and scolding them for their reluctance to follow the growing trend of Christianization. This work is representative of the gradual shift to Christianity in the Roman Empire at this time, because its rhetoric portrays the conversation between the two religions at the time it was written. The second half of the fourth century was marked by a complete shift in religious tolerance, as pagans were legally and socially marginalized. Pagans became the scapegoats of the empire where they had once been a powerful majority.

St. Augustine’s use of derogatory rhetoric to marginalize pagans in *City of God* contributed to the religious transformation of the empire. In the process of defending Christianity, he belittles the influence and legitimacy of pagans and contributes to the widespread Christian evangelizing movement to establish Christian superiority. Augustine’s unabashed denunciation of pagans provokes questions about the cultural changes in Rome at the time because of the inherent theological tension between the two religions and the hyperbolic language he used to convey the theological issues that prevented cooperation. Augustine’s rejection of paganism can be examined to show how pagan religions influenced him, the importance of the long-standing belief systems to the structure of the empire, and the arguments that convinced subjects of Christianity’s legitimacy. I will engage closely with his arguments against paganism to create a cohesive explanation of the cultural identity Augustine created for Christianity, with the help of other sources about pagan and Christian communities in Rome. Augustine sought to explain the damage caused by the old religion, and he worked through a catalogue of wrongs committed by pagans and their gods. In the conclusion of Book 1 of *City of God*, he lays out this goal: “we must mention the ills which [Rome] suffered before [pagan] sacrifices had been forbidden.” Augustine addressed the growing divide between pagans and Christians from the perspective of the Christians, dissecting pagan theology and its implications and arguing that the attack on Rome could not be blamed on Christianity because misfortune affects everyone.

**FOURTH CENTURY ROME**

In 313 AD, just one hundred years before St. Augustine wrote *City of God*, Constantine the Great issued the Edict of Milan. The Edict ensured that Christians in the empire would no longer be persecuted, allowing the religion to begin to freely proliferate. It was not until 380 AD that Emperor Theodosius established Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire. For centuries, pagans had dominated the empire...
and practiced intolerance towards Christians, but Christians soon gained power and influence. Pagans in the empire belonged to a plethora of belief systems, many of them tribal and polytheistic, and the long-term success of the empire had long been credited to pagan gods. Pagans were known in the empire as *pagani*. The Latin word *paganus* (s.), meaning country dweller, was used as a general derogatory term to describe citizens who lived in the rural areas of the empire and were purportedly slow to adapt to the new Christian religion. In the Roman Empire, the term encompassed a variety of old Phoenician, Neoplatonist, and Oriental cults, along with a collection of tribal, polytheistic beliefs. St. Augustine's use of the term primarily concerned the Greco-Roman pagan tradition, from which he drew the evidence for his arguments, but his slander extended to all religions encompassed by the word.

Pagans had a number of gods, assigned to every sector of life and every geographical region, and each god had its own realm of influence, whether it was a household, a threshold, or a city. Most gods were derived from earlier indigenous religious practices because tribes were fluid and changes of power were frequent, thus joining many belief systems together over the preceding centuries. Such adaptation of gods and the ideals they represented ended with the onset of Christianity. Christian worship did not involve the same celebrations and rituals that pagans performed, and it became increasingly apparent that the differing practices would not coexist. In 392 AD, a new law made the struggle for influence between the religions much more urgent by banning pagan worship within the empire. This was not the first restrictive law employed against pagans, but it lasted longer than any before it. Legal actions in the second half of the fourth century marginalized pagans, and forced them to contend with prevailing Christian influence. Still, myths, gods, and pagan scholars remained an intrinsic part of Roman culture. Paganism had a lasting influence on the education, government, and daily life of Rome, and the Christian population frequently encountered the remnants of the old religion. Pagan public figures like Praetextatus and Symmachus maintained fame and influence, and art on state structures depicted the beliefs of ancient religions.

In 410 AD, the Vandal tribe under King Alaric invaded, sacked, and seized the city of Rome, shaking the foundations of the empire. The Vandals were a tribe that was part of a larger region of dwellers in Europe, known as the Germanic peoples. These tribes practiced Germanic paganism, and the Romans eventually converted them to Christianity through a mixture of force and persuasion. When the Vandals took Rome, it put an abrupt end to a centuries-long period during which the empire was impenetrable. Threats from tribes on the outskirts of the vast, powerful empire revealed increasing instability and augmented the interreligious uncertainty plaguing Rome. This event, along with the third century economic crisis, left the empire damaged, and forced it to reassess its religious affiliations. The great size of the empire made tax collection difficult for the centralized government, and when inflation soared, the economy left the empire vulnerable and penetrable. Defeat infiltrated the great empire in both the east and the west, and the culture was fragmented ethnically, linguistically, and culturally.

Saint Augustine's influence grew from this dynamic era in Rome, and his writing is useful in understanding Christianity's journey to prevalence as the main religion in Rome and paganism's decline in tolerance and support. Anxieties about instability permeated the empire as opposing groups antagonized each other. St. Augustine subsequently wrote *City of God* in 413 AD, defending Christianity as the primary religion of the empire and arguing for the Christian god’s ability to protect Rome. The religious groups of Rome sought to defend their deities against notions of illegitimacy and
Rhetoric Against Pagans

inability to protect the great city. The Christians, emerging from centuries of persecution, incurred the blame for the detrimental attack by the Vandals and the gradual decline of the empire. Saint Augustine's primary purpose in City of God was to respond to those allegations.

relentless accusations against pagans allowed Augustine to portray his rhetorical victims as scapegoats. Augustine established this theme early in City of God, within the first two pages, and maintained its centrality throughout the work to achieve its main goal of rejecting the pagans.

“The divide shown by this rhetoric reveals ideations towards the pagans that prevailed in the Church and the empire, empowering Augustine to take literary ownership of the trend.”

A complete picture of the transitional period circumstantial to City of God is difficult to create. The tensions between Christianity and paganism existed in many forms and their progression was far from linear. The full chronological extent of Christianization is difficult to gauge, especially from the arguments and evidence in the hyperbolic City of God, because “it was a regular feature in Christian literature to compile catalogues of pagan cults and heresies, each with its Christian counter-argument,” thereby exaggerating the forsaken state of pagan communities. This cultural and religious transformation happened in layers, with varying intensities, among scholars and in city halls, in different regions of the empire, and in markets and homes. In City of God, Augustine provides essential information about the gradual transformation of the Roman Empire into a Christian one. The shift between religions is explicit in Augustine's indoctrinating presentation of the separation between the Christian and pagan communities, through careful use of rhetorical elements, attempts to convince his pagan readers of the validity of Christianity, and his hyperbolic depiction of paganism as evil.

SEPARATION OF A FLUID COMMUNITY

Augustine focused most heavily on pagans and their faults within the first ten of City of God's twenty-two books. He displayed an intricate understanding of pagan gods, their stories, and their purposes, but relentlessly questioned their morals, their plans, and their sufficiency as protectors of the earth and those who live on it. Augustine was a teacher of rhetoric, and he used his mastery of the discipline to form these arguments against the pagans. The growing cultural divide between the two religions appeared in City of God as an “our” and “their” disconnection, as if pagans were not a part of the Roman Empire. Augustine discussed the pagan population with a dismissive tone, giving the pagans the title of outsiders, and excluding them from the empire. In his dismissal of the non-Christians who took refuge in churches during the massacre by the Vandals in 410 AD, Augustine asserted, “among those whom you see insulting Christ's servants with such wanton insolence there are very many who came unscathed through that terrible time of massacre only by passing themselves off as Christ's servants.” These

Augustine also switches his pronouns when he begins to directly address the pagans, questioning and reprimanding their actions. “For why is it that you place blame on this Christian era, when things go wrong…It is because you seek an infinite variety of pleasure with a crazy extravagance, and your prosperity produces a moral corruption far worse than all the fury of an enemy.” This diction, used throughout the book, is accusatory and turns every comment on the pagan religion into an antagonizing element of his argument. Pagans lost their voice in society as the state decreased its support for their religion, and the Christians started to form
a social group knowing that they had the force of the empire behind them. Augustine mentions the Christian population in *City of God* in conjunction with “we” and “us,” highlighting the exclusivity of the new Christian identity. This association between the author and his audience includes the readers in his task of arguing the full extent of the theological debate on behalf of the Christians, as if they are working as a team. Augustine assumes an authoritative role over his audience: “Therefore, we must not fail in our duty, so that, when we have refuted their impious attacks...we may establish the City of God, and true religion, and the true worship of God.” Augustine’s influence in the Christian Church gave his words power, and he wrote to unite his followers in building the Christian identity and turn them against the old religion.

To intensify the intercultural disagreement depicted in *City of God*, Augustine employs other words that portray a conflict that would produce change in society. These terms include referring to pagans as “opponents of Christianity” and to their beliefs and stories of their deities as “fables.” These are further rhetorical techniques that Augustine successfully used to stress the diversity of society and encourage Christians to oppose what was foreign to their theology. Augustine repeatedly refers to pagans as the opponents, adversaries, or enemies of Christianity, an extremely harsh expression of his disdain towards them, using the word *adversarius* (n.), meaning enemy, antagonist, or rival. Augustine begins *City of God* by mentioning that both Christians and pagans found shelter in the basilicas and churches that the Vandals left alone out of respect for the god of the people they were attacking. As he recounts these events, he labels pagans *adversarii* because their lives were saved by Christ when they took refuge under his protection, but still “these Romans assail Christ’s name.”

Another term Augustine associates with pagans is “fable,” or folly, to delineate the myths and traditions that contain the wisdom and morality taught by paganism. Fable, translated from *fabula* (n.), meaning story or tale, is a derogatory term for this central element of pagan belief systems. It denotes fiction, as if these stories used to educate and inspire generations of Greeks and Romans were fabricated material. This negative connotation is apparent in Augustine’s moments of scrutiny of pagans. In Book IV of *City of God*, he discusses the unnecessary complexity of each god controlling a different realm, and demands, “let us not believe the fables; let us have better ideas about the gods.” Augustine concludes that the division of power for the pagan gods is counterintuitive and illogical, so he asserts that the myths are invalid. This is an extreme accusation, and Augustine’s repeated use of and comfort with it exposes his mindset towards the now-ostracized religion and that of those around him. This was the predominant attitude that Christians held towards pagans in the second half of the fourth century AD. It shifted Roman culture, and Augustine’s championing of it propelled its permeation of society.

**THE LEGITIMACY OF CHRISTIANITY**

As a representative of the Christian Church, St. Augustine was a prolific apologist, meaning that he was one of many church fathers of the era who made the case for Christianity to the pagans in the empire, so that the religion could continue its spread. Their writing was pertinent as Christianity triumphed over persecution and captivated Rome, while their increasingly scorned pagan counterparts still dominated powerful circles. Augustine shared this apologist goal and approached the defense of Christianity theologically. The bulk of *City of God* makes an exhaustive comparison of Christianity and paganism to prove that the former is much more deserving of the people’s devotion than the latter. The gods and their power, their moral value, and the theological implications differentiating the two are delineated to reveal the incriminating details of pagan philosophies. “Augustine repeatedly exploited damaging admissions from small sections of a small number of texts,” and his sources were questionably authoritative, yet he collected compelling evidence against the religion. Augustine cited the philosopher Varro for most of his information on the gods, acting carefully to select a notorious and prolific authority on the traditional religion, so that he could interpret the actions of the gods and pagans subjectively yet without uncertainty.

Augustine’s argument clearly divides the theological organization of Christianity from that of paganism, leaving no room for the arguments like those of Varro, who contended that Jupiter is the equivalent of the Christian God. *City of God* spoke to the inability of the pagan gods to set examples for and benefit their society by focusing on their preoccupations with excessive realms, and Augustine found the abundance of gods counterintuitive and superfluous. Augustine disagreed with the assignment of the gods to multiple sectors, because his philosophy was that only one God could rule over everything in the world. “I find the whole thing disagreeable…that pagans have not the impudence to allege that the Roman Empire was established, increased, and preserved by those divinities who were so clearly confined to their own particular department that no general responsibility was entrusted to any one of them.” St. Augustine thought that each god’s preoccupation with their own realm made them irresponsible and inefficient, and this sentiment permeated his attacks on paganism in *City of God*. In response to Varro’s categorization of the various gods into those of the theater, those of the city, and those of the natural world, he stated, “you would have shown much more candour and perspicience in your division if you had distinguished between ‘natural gods’ on one side and ‘gods of human institution’ on the other.” Augustine’s rebuttal reveals his belief in the illegitimacy of many pagan gods, and his treatment of Varro’s authority aimed to make it seem “inconsistent and inadequate, a confusion of competing gods and conflicting interpretations.” He explicitly dismissed the “host of tiny Gods” after stating his disdain for them, and looked to the greater deities for dependency and duration in their supreme state. The primary god of the pagans, Jupiter,
was considered the ultimate controller of all other gods and their realms: “it is Jupiter whom the Romans will have to be the king of all the gods and goddesses.” Still, he goes on to assert that even Jupiter’s sectors of influence and control have blurred lines and illegitimacy. “Jupiter is not the subject of the statement, ‘The whole universe is full of Jupiter’; if Juno also fills some part of it.” Augustine’s presentation of the gods as excessive and inefficient is joined by descriptions of the Christian God as the “one true God” in later books. Augustine fulfills his place as the voice of Christianity against paganism in Books VII and X, clarifying to his diverse audience that “all that is attributed to the world by the theology of those ‘select’ gods…should rather be ascribed…to the true God, who made the world, who is the creator of every soul and every material substance.” Using this comparison, Augustine boldly demonstrated the divide between pagan and Christian beliefs, practices, and identity.

Another rationale for Augustine’s separation of the two religions was the careless, obscene, and corrupt behavior that he perceived in pagan myths. In the story of Regulus, a pagan commander-in-chief of Rome taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, St. Augustine recounted the death of a man who piously followed his promise to the gods and was not rewarded. “He was devoted to their worship; yet he was conquered and taken into captivity and because he refused to break the oath he had sworn by the gods, he was destroyed by torture of an unprecedented and excessively atrocious kind.” Augustine compares this to the story of the prophet Jonah from the Bible, illustrating that the Christian god is much more protective and fair to his followers. Jonah also experienced captivity in the process of following his faith, but he was protected and transported to safety by God after keeping his word. Augustine used these examples to voice the superior power of the Christian God, writing that “our story about the prophet Jonah is...more miraculous because it is evidence of greater power.” This simple yet compelling distinction of the deities and their compassion is one example of the elements of *City of God* that contributed to the gradual conversion of Rome. Augustine did not only compile examples of the gods showing disregard for their people, but he also explored the qualities of their characters as role models for pagans.

St. Augustine uses multiple opportunities in *City of God* to point out the corruption of pagan gods. Corrupt pagans and their gods are associated with greed, immorality, and depravity throughout the book, severely antagonizing them to the point of criminality. Pagans’ moral corruption is attributed to the example set by their gods, which allowed pagan philosophy to be equated with uninhibited physical lust and material greed. Augustine established this in Book I and later reiterated, “there would be no occasion for this continuous progress [of the lust for power in arrogant hearts] if ambition were not all powerful; and the essential context for ambition is a people corrupted by greed and sensuality.”

The adjective for corrupted in Latin, *corruptorius*, does not only mean ‘tainted’, but carries the connotation of ‘destroyed’ or ‘perished’, so this word was strictly applied to pagans as if their religion ruined them and their value as living beings. Augustine directed this intensely biased and discriminatory language at pagans to address the whole attack on Christianity by proving that Rome was and would be worse off morally in the hands of the pagans. In Book II, he examined the history of the Roman commonwealth before Christ, and stated that pagans “do not blame their gods for the self-indulgence, the greed and the savage immortality which, before Christ’s coming, brought the republic to those ‘depths of depravity.’” Augustine cited the rapes of Lucretia, the Sabine women, and multiple wars to show this depravity, and these accurate historical details were a central part of his analysis. He also exhibited and applauded the Christian standards for the same vices, that “lust should be restrained by fear, and should not issue in debauchery, and the check on debauchery should stop greed from running riot.” Augustine’s specific arguments made his partisan perspective on the sack of Rome and its ripple effect on Roman culture influential for the growing Christian community.
Lastly, Augustine focuses on a darker part of pagan gods' corruption: their perceived obscenity. The Christian Church and pagan communities conflicted especially when it came to their practices of active worship. With the onset of Christianity, “just showing up [to church] was a sign of affiliation,” and pagans had no such practice. Pagans engaged in boisterous festivals, sacrifices, and plays. Augustine questioned these behaviors and the lack of rules of worship for the deities. He condemned the spectacles pagans made out of their worship as “disgusting verbal and acted obscenities,” emphasizing another crucial disparity between the religions that forced him to denounce it entirely from a Christian perspective. Pagan gods did not monitor the ways in which they were praised or depicted, and Augustine found it heinous that their gods were “not offended, but propitiated, by the representation of their depravities.” St. Augustine meticulously antagonized the pagan traditions with the combination of these rhetorical elements, making City of God his great influential work as an apologetic church father.

PAGAN EVILS
In City of God, St. Augustine paid the most attention to demarcating a group of pagan gods as demons, with cruel intentions and ambitions to corrupt the people. Indeed, an entire study could be written specifically on his use of the demonic label in regard to pagan gods because it is so extensive and theologically loaded. The main characteristic connecting Christianity and paganism in this period of transformation was the belief in and communication with non-physical entities, like gods, angels, and demons. Yet, it is unclear whether the demons Augustine mentions that pagans believed in are the same as the demons of Christian belief. Regardless, Augustine’s presentation of pagan deities in this light has a strong connection to Christian theological anxieties surrounding demons and their evils. “[Those demons] avouch themselves as the promoters of lives of real crime and indecency, by their crimes and misdemeanors, real or pretended, and by the public presentation of them which is demanded from the shameless, and extorted from the modest.” St. Augustine detailed the interactions that pagans have in religious practice with demons, which would strike a chord with his Christian audience, indoctrinated into fear and aversion of demons.

Christ with divine authority denounces and condemns the offences of men, and their perverted lusts, and he gradually withdraws his family from all parts of a world which is failing and declining through those evils, so that he may establish a city whose titles of ‘eternal’ and ‘glorious’ are not given by meaningless flattery but by the judgement of truth.

This was Augustine’s uplifting definition of Christian deities to his audience, removing the anxieties of evil.

CONCLUSION
City of God is a respected and studied work of late antique Christianity that made an exhaustive study of Christian notions against pagan belief systems and philosophy. St. Augustine’s rhetoric was hyperbolic, but it exemplified the shifting attitude of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries AD. The Christian community served as Augustine’s primary audience, and he kept them hopeful for their ‘City of God.’ He maintained that Christians would lose nothing as long as they kept their faith, while pagans would be punished for their obstinacy. “The Roman Empire has been shaken rather than transformed, and that happened to it at other periods, before the teaching of Christ’s name; and it recovered.” The decisive loss the empire endured in the fourth century augmented religious tensions in the culture, and St. Augustine’s contribution to a unified Christian identity strengthened the Christian population in the empire. Augustine wrote with devotion to the Christians in Rome, and taught them to stay faithful of God’s plan. He achieved his own apologetic goals and those of the Church and the empire. As a community only recently liberated from persecution, the newly-formed Christian identity was successful because of Christianity’s deviation from pagan worship practices. The empire was tightly intermingled, and “proximity does not just stimulate exchange: it also leads to the reaffirmation of one’s own identity.” The dominant Christian church perceived pagans as possessing all of the negative characteristics that St. Augustine detailed, like moral ineptitude, cooperation with evil forces, fabrication, and blind faith, and they defined the young Christian orthodoxy by growing away from the groups they saw as heretics. Pagan influence lasted in the Roman Empire even after St. Augustine’s time, but the assumption of Christian dominance changed the ‘City of God’ in every sector of life, transporting the Roman Empire from antiquity to the Middle Ages.
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Endnotes

[16] Ibid., 43.
[17] Ibid., 8.
[21] Ibid., 47.
[22] Ibid., 147.
[27] Stephen Mitchell and Peter Van Nuffelen, Monotheism between Pagans and Christians in Late Antiquity (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 185.
[28] Ibid., 189. "Augustine took Varro as a spokesman for the traditional religion…this was indeed an authority that every schoolboy knew."
[30] Ibid., 237.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 146.
[35] Ibid., 352.
[36] Ibid., 291.
[37] Ibid., 25.
[38] Ibid., 24.
[46] Ibid., 56.
[47] Ibid., 83.
[48] Ibid., 69.
This article explores how white anti-communist groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, appealed to racial tensions in order to undercut the budding pro-black communist movement in the American South during the 1930s. It analyzes how Southern anti-communists organized inside and outside of government venues to target pro-black communist organizing. I address how the Klan and local government entities partnered to attack perceived communist threats by targeting interracial and gendered environments like universities through protests, vigilante justice, and police violence.

A local band played “There'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight” in the town square, while flocks of white families from neighboring counties descended upon Scottsboro, Alabama, on April 6, 1931. The National Guard, though nominally on hand to prevent violence against the black community, bayoneted a black child. A sense of fanfare and unrest overwhelmed the town as the festivities began for the last of the nine trials of the “Scottsboro Boys.” The Scottsboro Boys case, which became a symbol of the Communist Party in the Depression-era South, began on March 25, 1931, when nine black teenage boys were arrested for assaulting a few white men who were illegally riding on the train. After researching the events, the police changed the charge from the assault of the white men to the rape of two white female passengers. While these women were not riding in the same car as the nine boys, the Scottsboro Nine were each tried for rape, convicted, and sentenced to death via the electric chair over the course of three days.

The trial would have been forgotten if it were not for the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). The NAACP and the black elite pulled away from the conflict, afraid of supporting accused rapists, but the CPUSA devoted significant resources to fighting the Scottsboro Boys in court. The Scottsboro case placed the CPUSA at the center of public debate, demonstrating its role as a significant political actor in the American South during the 1930s. The events in Scottsboro also elicited a strong anti-communist response from vigilante justice organizations and government actors, providing an early example of how anti-communist groups would use racially targeted, gender-based appeals to attack communist organizing.

The anti-communist movement enjoyed success through its racist and gendered arguments against social and economic equality, alongside targeted attacks on academics and activists. In examining the rhetoric and structure of these appeals, the relationship between race and communism in the American South during the 1930s can be better understood. In this article, I will discuss how anti-communists organized inside and outside of government channels in order to target pro-black communist organizing. I will argue that white anti-communist groups appealed to racial tensions in order to undercut the budding pro-black communist movement in the American South during the 1930s.

OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY

Much of the existing literature surrounding Depression-era communism focuses on the CPUSA’s appeals to African Americans. Scholars situate Depression-era communism at the intersection of a Soviet desire to exert a sphere of academic, and gender. This dialogue is primarily focused on the years following World War II, when national dialogues on race and communism occupied the center of American public opinion, policy, and national events. Framed within the context of McCarthyism, the Cold War, and the civil rights movement, anti-communists used racialized, hyper-sexual themes and rhetoric to gain support. This language proved successful in undermining the communist movement. However, the success of this racial approach to anti-communism was not a foregone conclusion. In order to understand the efficacy of anti-communist actions in the latter part of the twentieth century, it is important to understand the origins of anti-black anti-communism.

The Great Depression provided a unique opportunity for the CPUSA to promote the failures of capitalism. Drawing on the racial history of the American South, the CPUSA recruited black Southerners with the promise of civil rights and racial equality. The success of black communism elicited a strong response from white Southern anti-communists. These anti-communists linked racial equality with communism by exploiting negative stereotypes of black Americans, such as the image of a predatory black man threatening white women.
influence in the United States and the racial disparities of the Jim Crow South. This literature highlights prominent activists, Communist International (Comintern) policies, and divisions between black communists and the black community at large. Exploring the vital role that race played in bolstering the CPUSA’s authority, this literature rarely addresses the opposition to these racial appeals. The primary weakness of this historiography is its inability to address the degree to which Depression-era black communism was met with a racially charged, anti-communist response.

Robin Kelley’s *Hammer and Hoe* is the most authoritative source on Depression-era communism. Kelley analyzes how and why the CPUSA enjoyed success in the American South, with an emphasis on its activity in Birmingham, Alabama. Yet Kelley does not address other key hubs of communist organizing and anti-communist responses, such as Atlanta. As anti-black anti-communists organized across state lines, targeted statewide university systems, and circulated literature across the South, it is important to develop a more regional understanding of Depression-era anti-communism. Through a broader inquiry into anti-black, anti-communist rhetoric and organizing on a regional level, this paper builds on Kelley’s findings.

Alongside Kelley, most historians writing on the role of anti-communist opposition highlight the cleavages forged between black communists and non-communist, pro-equality blacks. There is little scholarship, however, outlining responses to black communism outside of the black community. While some of this literature references central actors in the anti-communist movement, such as the American Legion and Ku Klux Klan, this literature does not delve into the structure, tactics, and aims of these third party anti-communist groups.

THE RISE OF ANTI-BLACK ANTI-COMMUNISM

As early as 1922, the Comintern began to discuss what it referred to as the “Negro question” in the United States.5 Noting the discrepancy between stated American values of democracy, freedom, and equality, and the reality of life for many black Americans, the Comintern identified race in the United States as a major political issue. In 1924, the Comintern Executive Committee stated that “by ignoring the question of racial antagonism our Party has allowed the negro liberation movement in America to take a wrong path and to get into the hands of the Negro bourgeoisie.”6 Referencing a class of African Americans who were quickly accumulating land and wealth, the Comintern blamed this “negro bourgeoisie” for dividing the black community along class lines.7 At its Sixth World Conference in 1928 the Comintern called for a “national revolutionary movement” in the American South.8 Determining that blacks in the American South were an oppressed nation, the Comintern hoped to bring about economic and racial equality through a communist revolution.

Following the Sixth World Conference, the CPUSA increasingly directed its attention toward black Southerners. The CPUSA argued that because black Southerners constituted an oppressed nation, they retained the “right to self-determination: political power, control over the economy, and the right to secede from the United States.”9 Through this, the CPUSA hoped to establish a separate black nation-state in the South. Selecting the industrial city of Birmingham, Alabama, as the center for its Southern efforts, the CPUSA brought Northern white labor organizers and other veteran communists to the South to reach out to black Southerners.10 These efforts proved successful and the CPUSA quickly gained a strong following in the black community.

Evolving in reaction to black communism, Southern anti-communist actors emerged as a loose network of third-party community organizations. This nebulous structure stood in stark contrast to the CPUSA’s intentional, well-structured efforts in the South. Composed largely of preexisting community actors, these organizations introduced anti-communism into their platforms through conversations regarding American values. Using nationalistic, populist language, these groups gained traction through letters to the editor in local newspapers, distributing broadsides, and by releasing explic-
it anti-communist statements. One undated pamphlet from the Baltimore-based Christian Social Justice Fund listed the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Affairs, and National Guard as anti-communist ringleaders and “so-called Vigilantes whose principal occupation has been beating up labor organizers.” Initially adopting a strategy of vigilante justice, these anti-communist groups eventually settled into a system of loose partnerships with local and state governments.

Gaining momentum during the interwar period, these anti-communist groups developed in the midst of a period of extreme nativism. Part of this nativist framework lumped Catholics, radicals, and immigrants together as un-American actors. Creating a dichotomy between American and un-American values, this nativist framework defined un-American activity as left-leaning or anarchist. Under this framework, labor disputes existed as radical and innately un-American activity. To this end, it was common practice for anti-communists to hyperbolize the foreign origins of labor agitators in order to emphasize labor's anti-American nature. This was witnessed in the Sacco and Vanzetti case of 1920, during which two Italian immigrants were convicted of robbing and murdering a factory payroll representative. Noted anarchists, Sacco and Vanzetti became nationwide symbols of the belief that foreign labor actors represented a radical threat to democracy.

Anti-communists drew on this framework to gain support, appealing to this critique of foreign labor. The membership card and oath for joining the Ku Klux Klan in the mid-1930s, for example, listed a series of provisions for new members. One of these tenets was a delineated ideology of “Pure Americanism” that required new Klan members to oppose “unwarranted strikes by foreign labor agitators.” Within the context of interwar nativism, the Klan’s membership provision opposing “foreign labor” can be understood as a near synonym for radicals or communists at the time.

The anti-communist movement seized upon this anti-labor rhetoric, with local newspapers using headlines such as “Reds Linked with Violence” and “Outbreak Believed Work of Agitators” to describe union strikes. While many of these strikes were organized by neither communists nor foreigners, this exclamatory language created a framework of labor, violence, and foreign agitation that dominated the public discussion regarding communism. Anti-communists pinned labor strikes and violence on the CPUSA, regardless of the Communist Party's official position on the events. In perpetuating this perceived relationship between “foreign labor” and violence, anti-communists framed the CPUSA as rabble-rousing outsiders.

“Directly targeting perceived communist threats, these explicit anti-communist appeals served as the central component of new member drives for organizations like the Klan and the White Legion.”

Given the anti-communist framework surrounding “foreign labor,” the Klan’s inclusion of this phrase in its membership agreements gains an increased significance. The inclusion of these anti-communist statements alongside central Klan values such as upholding “white supremacy” and “law and order” suggests the degree to which white supremacist groups felt threatened by communism. Through holding its members to a stringent anti-communist, anti-foreign, and anti-black standard in its membership cards, the Klan explicitly articulated and emphasized a division between pro-American values and communism.

This language seeped into other aspects of daily life. In 1922, for example, a Presbyterian pastor in St. Louis, Missouri, devoted a full sermon to justifying each point of the Klan’s platform as uniquely Christian and pro-American. In discussing his disdain for labor agitators, the pastor noted, “I think the melting pot is about full and if much more is put in, it is going to boil over.” Suggesting that foreigners dominated too much of the “melting pot” of the United States, this sermon reinforced the Klan’s skepticism toward foreign labor. While not explicitly naming communists in his sermon, this preacher’s veiled jabs at foreigners functioned to target the CPUSA. By establishing a framework of coded language targeting communism, anti-communists were able to integrate their framing of communism as an un-American ideology into everyday conversation.

In some instances, this veneer of veiled language was abandoned, leading to more flagrant and straightforward attacks on communism. Directly targeting perceived communist threats, these explicit anti-communist appeals served as the central component of new member drives for organizations like the Klan and the White Legion. In the 1920s the Klan experienced the largest membership boom to date. This growth continued into the early 1930s, with...
forty-four new Klaverns established in northern Alabama alone in 1934. For the Klan, communism provided a link between racial, economic, and gender equality movements. In opposing communism, Klan members could take action against each of these ideologies all at once.

Translating the anti-communist rhetoric of its membership pledges into action, the Birmingham Klan distributed thousands of leaflets in black neighborhoods reading “Negroes Beware: Do Not Attend Communist Meetings... Alabama is a good place for good negroes to live in, but it is a bad place for negroes who believe in SOCIAL EQUALITY. The Ku Klux Klan is Watching You. Take Heed.” These warnings were matched by actions from groups such as the White Legion, which burned crosses in the yards of prominent white communists. Though with the intent of specifically targeting communists, these cross burnings also targeted pro-racial equality whites who were not members of the CPUSA. Breaking past a system of veiled rhetoric, the direct and racially-targeted nature of these vigilante justice actors served as the foundation of organizations such as the Klan and White Legion’s uniquely racially-motivated anti-communist platform.

The case of Ben Davis illustrates the strength of anti-black, anti-communist vigilante justice organizations. Ben Davis was a member of an established upper-middle class black family from the Atlanta area. A prominent black communist intellectual, Davis served as the editor in chief of the well-circulated black weekly newspaper the Atlanta Independent. While coming from a strong Republican family, Davis became active in the CPUSA when he defended communist organizer Angelo Herndon in a 1932 trial. Soon joining the CPUSA, Davis used his social status, education, and family legacy to convince other middle-class Republican blacks to join the black communist movement. Davis’ magnetism placed him on the radar of anti-black, anti-communists. One day, Davis came to work to find a revolver tilted against his door with a note inside reading “The Ku Klux Klan rides again. Georgia is no place for bad niggers and red communists. Next time we’ll shoot.” Persistent threats from the Klan and other vigilante justice actors led Davis to flee the state of Georgia and gain a security detail to ensure his safety. Davis’s need to seek asylum and additional security measures demonstrates the degree to which the Klan proved threatening. More than letters and editorials, the anti-black, anti-communist language of these third-party organizations was translated into tangible action against black communists as well. Davis was one of many communist agitators who received similar threats and messages that demonstrated the strength of anti-communist aggression.

**ANTI-COMMUNISM AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS**

The role of third-party organizations in exacting vigilante justice was furthered through partnerships with local governments. Many anti-black, anti-communist groups maintained close relationships with prominent local government figures. To this point, in his autobiography on his experience with the communist movement in the American South, black communist organizer Harry Haywood noted that “men took off their police uniforms to put on the robes of the Klan.” More than a perceived relationship, these ties between anti-communist actors and local governments were most notable in the case of Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge. Standing firmly against the New Deal, Talmadge’s flamboyant and inflammatory stances granted him a strong public following. Rising to the governorship in 1932, Talmadge incorporated this anti-communist rhetoric into a statewide political platform. Equating the New Deal with communism and warning the public of a “Nigra takeover,” Talmadge aimed to build a coalition that was “united to opposed Negroes, the New Deal and ... Karl Marx.” Linked to the Klan, Talmadge provided a legitimate governmental voice for the opinions of anti-communist community organizations. Labeling all proponents of racial equality as “nigger-lovers” and communists, Talmadge integrated the rhetoric of the Klan and White Legion into a statewide political platform. In doing so, Talmadge normalized racialized anti-communist rhetoric as a contending political ideology.
With government support, anti-communist vigilante justice groups gained a state-sponsored enforcement mechanism. Early communist activity in Alabama in the 1930s sparked a series of local criminal anarchy ordinances in Birmingham. Aiming to “curb communism,” these laws were applied unevenly against black communist organizers. Despite offering legal avenues for attacking black communism, these anarchy laws were unable to fully subdue anti-communist vigilante justice. Rather than allowing police codes to manage “criminal anarchy,” however, white mobs continued to burn black communists in effigy. The CPUSA acknowledged this relationship between vigilante justice actors and the government, classifying the Georgia Klan as “virtually an arm of the state.” This blurred line between third-party anti-communist actors and government action was further exhibited when the City of Birmingham introduced the “Red Squad,” a special police unit established to target communist actors. Public code allowed the Red Squad to arrest and detain perceived public threats without a warrant for up to seventy-two hours, during which these officers physically abused communists until they “nearly lost consciousness.” In these examples, city and state governments codified anti-communist actors and government action was further exhibited when the City of Birmingham introduced the “Red Squad,” a special police unit established to target communist actors. Public code allowed the Red Squad to arrest and detain perceived public threats without a warrant for up to seventy-two hours, during which these officers physically abused communists until they “nearly lost consciousness.”

Anti-communists found fertile ground for support in attacking left-leaning academics and academic institutions. Anti-communists connected racial equality, education, and communism to suggest that academics intended to use the classroom as a breeding ground for communist doctrine. For example, Frank Porter Graham, President of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) from 1930 to 1949, was berated in local newspapers for “social race mixing.” Though Graham was not affiliated with the CPUSA, anti-communists used his support for “race agitation” as evidence that he was sympathetic to communism. In this manner, anti-communists capitalized on a fear that Graham would allow racial agitation and communist thought to seep into the North Carolina education system. Through these accusations, anti-communists used race-baiting to delegitimize Graham’s role as UNC President.

This oblique challenge to Graham’s authority stood alongside other anti-communist critiques of Graham’s liberal approach to racial equality. One letter to Graham written by anti-black UNC Professor Wesley Critz George in 1933 condemned racial mixing at the university as “almost sure to lead not into the smooth waters of universal amity but into the stormy seas of race conflicts.” Publishing this letter in the Burlington Daily Times News, George’s statements served to publicly undercut Graham’s authority as UNC President on the basis of his positions on race. Though Graham was not a communist, anti-communists framed his support of racial equality as communist-sympathizing. Letters attacking Graham’s opinions on race and identifying him with communism served to present a public argument that Graham and other pro-racial equality academics were also seditious communists. In many ways, arguments such as this used communism as a way to discount racial equality. In framing Graham’s positions as radical and pro-communist, these critics were better able to discount Graham’s support for racial equality.

In their attack on academia, anti-communists monitored known pro-black communist academics. For example, anti-communists singled out Arthur Franklin Raper, a UNC Ph.D. and sociology professor at the all-female Agnes Scott College in Decatur, Georgia, for his role in promoting pro-black thought in the classroom. Prominent within the Atlanta communist intellectual community, Raper served as the secretary for the Commission on Interracial Cooperation and as a co-founder of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. Mildred Davis Adams, valedictorian of the Agnes Scott Class of 1938, noted that Raper was not the only communist professor on campus. Of these professors, however, Raper was one of the most progressive on issues of racial equality. In one example, Raper organized meetings between students from Agnes Scott and Spelman, a nearby historically black college. These meetings served as a forum to discuss how both sets of college students were studying and performing at the same level. Breaking past racial stereotypes through hands-on action, it was Raper’s noted communist affiliation that led to his fame among anti-communists. In addressing racial equality in his coursework and identifying as a communist, Raper represented a series of progressive value sets that challenged supposed American values.

Due to his role as a professor and his study of race and communism, Raper was regularly monitored by anti-communist groups. Anti-communist actors collected old copies of the CPUSA’s newspaper The Daily Worker and other CPUSA materials, maintaining files on prominent communists and their activity. Believing that the best way to undercut the success of communist theory was through publicity, these anti-communist groups shared their findings through small publications and community newspapers. For a few months in 1937 the anti-communist broadsheet Georgia Women’s World mentioned Raper almost every day. Articles and letters to the editor questioned Raper’s teaching certifications and connections to the CPUSA, as
anti-communists continually dismissed Raper’s teachings as “obscene and vulgar filth.” Aware that he was being monitored, Raper kept copies of the newspapers and articles that mentioned him. The references to Raper were so constant that when Raper was not mentioned in a nationally-run article on pro-black communism by the prominent anti-New Deal journalist Westbrook Pegler, Raper added in the article margins “I feel slighted. –AR.” Raper’s case reflects the dedicated rhythm of anti-communist monitoring and reporting of prominent communist academics. Though Raper was not the only academic to be monitored by anti-communist organizations, the daily articles on Raper in Georgia Women’s World demonstrate the sophistication and degree to which anti-communist groups kept tabs on perceived threats.

Anti-communist surveillance of Raper serves as an example of a broader wariness of pro-black communist academics that translated to tangible anti-communist action. In addition to monitoring pro-black communist academics, anti-communists also targeted universities at an institutional level. In 1940, a University of Georgia (UGA) history professor testified that Dr. Walter Cocking, the Dean of the UGA College of Education, hoped to “establish an integrated branch of the [UGA] campus near Athens.” Georgia Governor Talmadge ignored a University System Board of Regents report stating that there was no basis to these claims, instead circulating the story in his own weekly paper The Statesman. Talmadge then restructured the Board with solely members who opposed integration. Using ties with the Klan to elicit additional testimonies supporting the history professor’s initial claim, Talmadge went to great lengths to purge the UGA system of what he perceived to be a pro-racial equality communist threat. In light of the letters to Frank Porter Graham and surveillance of pro-communist, pro-equality academics such as Raper, Talmadge’s actions against the UGA system represented a step toward tangibly acting in response to communist academics. Moving beyond surveillance and threats, Talmadge’s example demonstrates how anti-communist thought manifested itself in policy and action against academics.
RACE, SEXUAL CORRUPTION, AND COMMUNISM

Anti-communists also developed a series of racialized, sex-based appeals that targeted fears of miscegenation and black promiscuity. This was achieved in a two-step process. First, anti-communists emphasized the relationship between communism and racial equality. Then, anti-communists emphasized an overly sexualized image of black men. Through a transitive property, anti-communists built a framework for equating communism with sexual deviancy. These appeals drew on a longstanding stereotype of black men as sexually aggressive and threatening toward white women. Highlighted in the 1915 film Birth of a Nation, this theme can also be traced through minstrel shows and other cultural portrayals of black men throughout American history. In appealing to these racial stereotypes, anti-communists connected pro-black communism with the longstanding cultural image of the rapacious black man. Exhibited in the Scottsboro trial, anti-communists employed the image of “negro rapists” to create a “direct assault on white womanhood.” By framing black communists as a threat to vulnerable and easily corrupted white women, anti-communists established a paternalistic element to anti-communism.

In 1937, a series of mixed-raced communist meetings in the Atlanta area highlighted this sexualized anti-black approach to anti-communism. With the support of Raper, students from Agnes Scott attended these meetings. The Atlanta afternoon newspaper The Atlanta Georgian reported one such event, noting there was a “circle of approximately 45 people both white and negro boys and girls” in attendance. Hosted at the First Congregational Negro Church of Atlanta, the meeting was calm, orderly, and devoid of “fiery oratory” or other demonstrations. While described as a peaceful event, the meeting received significant backlash in local papers. Ardent anti-communists William L. Van Dyke, head of the Georgia White Legion, and James C. Davis, Chair of the Georgian American Legion, circulated letters expressing their outrage at the meeting. Commenting “do you think our young girls are old enough or wise enough to take care of themselves in communist-promoted meetings of mixed races,” these letters positioned anti-communism at the intersection of white female purity. Described by Robin Kelly as a “Southern ruler’s most precious property,” white women proved to be a valuable pawn of the anti-communist movement. In questioning whether Agnes Scott, or the public at large, was doing enough to protect young women, anti-communists presented an argument that was difficult to attack. In equating communism and racial equality with the exploitation of young white women, anti-communists developed a gendered and moralistic approach to their racial messaging.

Anti-communists incorporated this gender-based argument into their anti-academic rhetoric. Anti-communists argued that educators corrupted young women’s minds by promoting racial equality and integrating communist theories in the classroom. Van Dyke penned a series of letters to Agnes Scott President J.R. McCain demanding to know why these interracial meetings were housed at black churches and demanding to know who at the college allowed young women to attend interracial meetings. Van Dyke added that it was a citizen’s duty to be “alert and vigilant” when their “church, customs, usages and even government itself” was under attack. Suggesting that protecting young women was a civic duty, Van Dyke questioned the authority of institutions such as Agnes Scott when they did not protect young women. Another article in Georgia Women’s World commented that universities that did not protect the minds of young women acted as “Pied Pipe rs’ who are influencing the very cream of our young womanhood to degradation and ruin.” These statements stood alongside numerous others from letters questioning the validity of educators who did not protect the sanctity of female chastity. In this manner, anti-communists aimed to discredit educators and hold them accountable for exposing young women to supposedly corrupting values such as interracial mingling and perceived communist threats.

Many of these anti-black, sexually-charged statements were published in Georgia Women’s World. An anti-communist broadsheet with dubious ties to Governor Talmadge, the newspaper boasted the byline “All the News that’s Really News for Georgia Women.” Supported by the Women’s National Association for Preservation of White Race, the newspaper intentionally directed anti-communist propaganda toward young women. Filled with examples of communist impurity, riots, and attacks on white women attributed to communists across the South, each issue served as a warning sign to young women on the dangers of racial mixing and communism. In developing a newspaper strictly devoted to warning women away from the dangers of black communism, the anti-communist movement demonstrated its deep-seated fears of sexual corruption.

Anti-communist fear of black communists’ sexual impurity extended beyond public statements to private inquiries as well. On January 18, 1937, a woman who identified herself as Mrs. W.T. Mobley called Jessie Ames, one of Raper’s communist associates. Asking for more information on local communists, Mrs. Mobley asked Ames whether Raper and other prominent southern communists received payment for, what Mobley deemed to be, “propaganda.” Expressing concerns about “decent white girls [being put] up before Negroes as prostitutes,” Moby’s comments demonstrated a fear of black sexuality and miscegenation. Adding that pro-racial equality communists were “endangering the safety of all white people in the South,” Moby’s comments played into the broader conversation established in anti-communist literature. Demonstrating a fear that Southern morals and values were under attack by communists, black men, and “nasty, dirty Negro hussies,” Moby’s comments reflect those of an average citizen in the South.
Anti-Communism in the Depression-Era South

Though it cannot be ascertained that Mobley read anti-communist propaganda, the arguments used by the anti-communist movement are salient in her statements. That Mobley, an average citizen, took action by calling a local communist to discuss perceived connections between race, sexual deviancy, and communism demonstrates the degree to which anti-communist thought permeated Southern public consciousness.

CONCLUSION
The intersection of race and anti-communism is vital to understanding Depression-era black communism. The actions of racially motivated anti-communist actors in targeting academics, activists, and black communists in the 1930s provides insight into the racial, social, and political tensions of the era. These anti-communist actors arose out of existing community organizations, using vigilante justice tactics before building stronger relationships with government actors to exact justice. With support at the local and state government levels, anti-communists were able to codify their beliefs by shaping local ordinances, university systems, and police action. It was the actions of these Depression-era anti-black, anti-communist groups that established what would prove to be an enduring understanding of communism as un-American.

Depression-era anti-communists targeted black communism through calculated racialized attacks on academics and by portraying black communists as sexual predators. These themes continued to prove central to conversations on race, communism, and American identity for the remainder of the twentieth century. In 1965, anti-communist organizers sponsored a billboard reading “Communist Training School” on the route of Martin Luther King Jr’s historic march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. Historian James Zeigler identified this moment as the epitome of what was, by the mid-1960s, an “all-too-familiar” anti-communist strategy of linking racial equality with communist activity. While King was not a communist, this anti-communist strategy of treating pro-black movements as seditious and anti-American can be traced to the rhetoric of Depression-era anti-communists.

In proving the saliency of gendered, anti-black messaging in garnering opposition to communism, Depression-era anti-communists’ work served as a foundation for Cold War anti-communism. Ultimately, through use of racialized messaging and appeals to racial tensions, anti-communists developed a series of rhetoric, attacks, and commentaries that allowed them to question and retaliate against the rising communist movement of the time.

Endnotes

[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[22] Kelley, 73.
[28] Harvey, et. al., 93-100.
[31] Haywood, 405.
[34] Ibid.
[37] Kuhn, 72-76.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Zeigler, 19.
[57] Ibid.
This article illustrates Sino-Cuban bilateral relations—often referred to as “fast friends, good comrades, and intimate brothers”—under the continuing global socialist network in the 1990s. This article shows that Cuba’s hybrid economic system of both capitalism and socialism is not the outcome of infiltration by American capitalist ideology, but the outcome of lessons from the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) successful reform policy, also known as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The first part of the article traces the initial establishment of Sino-Cuban relations in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution (1959-1965) and the subsequent deterioration of Sino-Cuban relations due to the Sino-Soviet split (1965-1989). The second part of the article compares PRC’s social and economic transformation under the Reform and Opening Up policy with that of the USSR and Russian Federation. This comparison illustrates that PRC’s gradualist reforms could serve as a better example for Cuba’s economic reforms within the socialist framework. The third part of the article explores how solid political ties between the PRC and Cuba laid the foundation for economic cooperation and cultural exchange in the twenty-first century.

By Ashley Shiyan Sun
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During the 1960s, China and Cuba shifted from being the closest of friends to the worst of enemies within just a few years of the Sino-Soviet split. It is true that the Soviet Union played a significant role in the deterioration of Sino-Cuban relations, but the relationship, either official or personal, between China and Cuba during the early period of the Cuban Revolution was far more intimate and complicated than has previously been portrayed. China and Cuba’s fast reconciliation in the 1990s cannot be fully explained without tracing their connections in the first half of the 1960s, when they were defined by a relationship that would later be referred to as “friends, comrades, and brothers.” Indeed, before Fidel Castro officially declared the Cuban Revolution to be socialist, China already influenced the Revolution via unofficial relations between the CCP’s Xinhua News Agency (XHNA) and the Communist Party of Cuba (PSP). At the time, China perceived the Cuban Revolution as drifting from nationalism toward socialism. Yao Zhen, the head of XHNA’s delegation in Havana, recalled his meeting with Raúl Castro in July 1959 and stated that the Castro brothers aimed to establish a close relationship with the PRC, not the Republic of China (Taiwan), and even expected the CCP to send an envoy to Cuba. That was the first time the Cuban leaders openly showed their interest in the world communist network, yet their intentions were still ambivalent. In response, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai quickly appointed a delegate to Cuba and intensified XHNA’s central connection with its Havana branch to track the dynamics of the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement, which was separate from the PSP at the time. Both Mao and Zhou could not fully determine Fidel’s true intentions, but they expected the Revolution to move forward in a socialist direction.

The relationship between China and Cuba warmed up quickly once the two nations established official diplomatic ties in September 1960, and Fidel openly declared that he was a Marxist-Leninist in December 1961. China immediately provided Cuba with a substantial amount of economic aid and military support in the hope of strengthening Sino-Cuban relations. During Che Guevara’s official visit to China, the two governments signed their first economic and technical cooperation agreement, in which China would provide $60 million of interest-free loans to Cuba and buy a million tons of sugar annually. Later, in 1963, Zhou Enlai told the Cuban trade delegation that “the loan was just a form of aid. If you are unable to pay it off when it is due, you can postpone it.” China was even willing to purchase Cuban sugar at a price adjusted to the Soviet Union’s compensation rate, which was higher than world market prices. This was quite a remarkable gesture: the Chinese economy itself was struggling in the early 1960s. The amount of aid and sugar purchases outlined in the agreement could have further burdened China’s economy, making it evident of China’s determination to defend the communist brotherhood between China and Cuba.

Domestically, the CCP promoted slogans such as “Cuba Sí, Yanquis No” to present an image of a united Communist front between China and Cuba. Cuba and China shared a similar national history of humiliation and oppression during the entire nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The CCP took advantage of the anti-western sentiment shared by most Chinese and Cuban people to strengthen the two nations’ socialist solidarity against western imperialism and colonialism. While Cuban freedom fighters, including Chinese Cubans and ‘coolies’ (Asian contract laborers), had devoted themselves to the War of Independence against Spain, Chinese revolutionaries had struggled to end the semi-feudal and semi-colonial society in China.

Neither the Cuban Republic nor the Chinese Republic fully protected the rights of the people, except for the elites, and they failed to defend national sovereignty in the face of internal inequality and external foreign aggression. The U.S. heavily intervened in Cuba’s politics and economy through repeated military occupations in 1906, 1912, and 1917 and the enforcement of the 1901 Platt Amendment in the name of “preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.” The U.S. was also involved in the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950) by supplying a substantial amount of weaponry to the pro-U.S. Kuomintang. Through its continuous interference in China’s internal affairs after 1949, especially on the Taiwan issue, the U.S. further infuriated the CCP.
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As a result, the CCP was eager to exploit the shared memory of oppression and anti-American sentiments to facilitate Sino-Cuban relations. For example, in a film pictorial published by CCP’s official film press, the editors harshly criticized the U.S. for plotting the Bay of Pigs invasion and numerous bombings and acts of sabotage on sugar estates, Cuban cities, and Havana Harbor. The film pictorial portrayed the capitalist U.S. as a vicious “robber, colonist, and terrorist,” and praised Fidel Castro and the communist revolutionaries as “defenders of justice and the people.” The sharp contrast between capitalism and communism was very common in Chinese propaganda in the 1960s when the CCP relied on an ideological polemic to enhance its legitimacy. By embracing the Cuban Revolution while rejecting Yankee capitalism, the CCP aimed to reinforce relationships between China and Cuba as “fast friends, good comrades, and intimate brothers.”

However, in the second half of the 1960s, Sino-Cuban relations deteriorated rapidly as Cuba sided with the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split. From 1960 to 1964, Cuba still attempted to remain neutral in the dispute because it not only valued its close relationship with the CCP in the international communist movement but also heavily depended upon Soviet oil imports and weapon supplies. In particular, Fidel Castro shared many more ideological similarities with Mao Zedong than with Soviet leaders. Fidel and Mao both emphasized people’s consciousness and dedication to the revolution and relied largely on mass mobilization and mass organizations (e.g., Cuba’s Zafra de los Diez Millones and China’s Great Leap Forward) rather than on the Soviet model of the Five-Year Plan to achieve socialist development. The Great Leap Forward was a manifestation of Mao’s radical leftist ideology and his utopian expectation to surpass the Soviet Union in the socialist competition. The campaign promoted excessively ambitious targets in agricultural and industrial production—to overtake Britain in steel production within five years and overtake the U.S. within fifteen years, and to achieve thousands of catties of grain production per person. Fidel’s program, the Zafra de los Diez Millones (“ten million ton harvest”) similarly mobilized the Cuban people to dedicate themselves to “battles for sugar” in the harvest. Like Mao’s program, it led to disastrous economic and social outcomes for Cuba, and moreover further alienated Khrushchev and the Soviet specialists. Moreover, just like Mao, who disdained Khrushchev for being a weak leader and adopting a soft attitude towards the West, Fidel was also disappointed at Khrushchev’s concession to the U.S. during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet Fidel still remained silent in Mao and Khrushchev’s competition for leadership of world communism.

China sought to gain the favor of Cuba in the confrontation with the Soviets. The CCP still insisted on the principles of “class struggle” between the bourgeoisie and proletariat and stated that “peaceful coexistence” (the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or CPSU) would violate revolutionary principles and Marxism-Leninism.

In 1962, an article in People’s Daily applauded “the correct line of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations” against the U.S.’s imperialism and the “heroic Cuban people” for not committing the error of “capitulationism,” a term directly targeting the CPSU and its policy of “peaceful coexistence.” Consequently, the early stage of the Sino-Soviet split did not negatively influence the Sino-Cuban relationship.

With the aggravation of Sino-Soviet polemics in the second half of the 1960s, the breakdown of Sino-Cuban relations became inevitable as Cuba could no longer maintain its neutrality. In 1964, after the fall of Khrushchev, both Fidel and Che Guevara visited China and attempted to ease the tension between China and the USSR, thinking that the removal of Khrushchev would immediately improve Sino-Soviet relations. However, the Cuban leaders underestimated the ideological divide between the CCP and the CPSU, which went far beyond the personal rivalry between Mao and Khrushchev. Moreover, even if its leaders had fully understood the fundamental causes of the Sino-Soviet split, Cuba, a rather new member in the socialist camp, would have had little impact on either side.

In response to Fidel’s visit to the Chinese embassy and the Cuban delegation to Beijing, Chinese leadership refused to compromise on its ideological stance, and even accused Fidel of accepting “Soviet Revisionism.” The aggressive attitudes of the CCP undermined Cuba’s effort to negotiate and further pushed Cuba to the Soviet side. In 1966, Sino-Cuban relations deteriorated rapidly with China’s unilateral termination of the sugar and rice trade, a crucial trade agreement between two nations, and Fidel Castro’s humiliation of the CCP and Mao Zedong in public speeches. Subsequently, China and Cuba almost entirely cut diplomatic ties for the remainder of the Cold War era. The memory of “friends, comrades, and brothers” in the early 1960s was shattered by the Sino-Soviet split. Yet after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the communist brotherhood between China and Cuba would revive quickly in the 1990s and encounter new dynamics for restoring Sino-Cuban relations.

REFORM MODELS AND SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

In this section, I will first discuss political and economic outcomes of China’s gradual economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up policy and Russia’s radical economic reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev’s “perestroika” and Boris Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” policies. I will then illustrate that the Chinese path of reform, “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” was more applicable to Cuba’s socialist transformation.

In the 1990s, China experienced spectacular economic development as a result of the Reform and Opening Up policy, which incorporated a certain degree of free market principles into the planned economy and opened the
domestic economy to foreign trade and investment. It is noteworthy that China's market-oriented reform was slow and cautious. It took more than two decades to fully develop the socialist market economic system after Deng officially proposed the policy in December 1978. Within enterprises, and divisions of power between central and local governments. From the perspective of the Chinese officials, Fidel's enthusiasm indicated that he highly appreciated lessons from China's Reform and Opening Up policy and was willing to implement his own market reforms soon.

"In stark contrast to China, Russia (the former Soviet Union) suffered devastating economic and political crises in the 1990s."

the socialist market economy, China gradually allowed private ownership of small enterprises in the handicraft, retail, and food industries, whereas the state still controlled the strategic industries and heavy industries (i.e., the coal, iron, steel, and energy industries). Furthermore, in regard to liberalization of foreign trade, in the 1980s China established five Special Economic Zones (NEZs) and opened fourteen Coastal Development Areas. These NEZs and Coastal Development Areas served as experimental fields to test the compatibility of the socialist market mechanism and the global market and allowed the state to limit the scope of foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) within the selected areas. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by the 1990s, China was the second largest FDI recipient in the world after the United States, and the largest FDI recipient among developing countries. In addition, China had the largest share among major exporters in the world merchandise trade and nearly tripled its share in world exports in the 1990s. Thus, under the Reform and Opening Up policy, China achieved great success in domestic market reform as well as international trade.

Among China's reform strategies, Fidel Castro was particularly interested in rural reforms in Sichuang, including the Household Responsibility System, rural markets, township enterprises, relations between collective and individual farms, and various land cultivation methods. As China's economy prior to 1978 was dominated by the agricultural sector, reform started from the countryside and first replaced the People's Commune (renmin gongshe) with the Household Responsibility System, granting more freedom to individual farms (though the land was still state-owned) and enabling peasants to sell surplus beyond state quota to the rural market. Cuba had a similar agriculture-dominated economic structure, but on a much smaller scale. Therefore, Cuba's reform program could prioritize rural reform and then implement urban reform in stages. In 1994 and 1997, Fidel had two long conversations with the party secretary of Shanghai about Shanghai's Pudong Development New Zone (pudong kai fa xin qu), which was a milestone of China's urban reform policy in the 1990s. According to the Chinese delegate presented in both meetings, Fidel was determined to become “an expert of Shanghai Studies [sic]” with regard to large construction projects, foreign investment, joint venture...
the implementation of several economic reform measures.38 The life of the Cuban people during the Special Period (1989-2006) was also miserable, with shortages of food and basic necessities, breakdown of public transportation system, and proliferation of (and increasing inflation in) the black market.

In light of its own economic hardship and geopolitical reconfiguration of international relations, Fidel Castro turned to Cuba’s former communist brother China for help during the Special Period. In particular, it seemed that the Chinese model (gradualism and “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) was much more successful than Russia’s “shock therapy” in spite of structural differences between the two economies. China’s economic reform campaign focused more on local and national conditions and started with experiments within assigned regions, such as the NEZs, whereas the Soviet Union’s reform measures were largely influenced by western neoliberal economists and international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which may not have fully understood the Soviet Union’s complicated socioeconomic situation.39 Unlike the rapid price liberalization in the Soviet Union, China implemented the dual-track price system (shuang gui zhi) as a transition from the state-controlled price system to the market price system and held tight control over monetary policy in order to stabilize the domestic price level.40 Also, by the end of the twentieth century, the living standard in both rural and urban areas had improved significantly as the CCP focused on the concept of a “moderately well-off society” (xiao kang she hui); China’s GDP per capita had reached 800 dollars.41 In Russia, most working class and middle class people lost their savings because of hyperinflation and resented market reforms. Therefore, based on previous mistakes and the experiences of Russia and China, Cuban leaders should have adopted pragmatic policies that were suitable to the nation’s own economic and social circumstances rather than directly applying western neoliberal theories.

More importantly, China’s reform policy was largely controlled by members of the old nomenklatura (the system of personnel administration used by the CCP), and the success of Reform and Opening Up campaign, in return, strengthened political control of the state and the CCP.42 In contrast, Soviet economic reform was accompanied by political liberalization and led to more uncertainties. The CPSU not only lost to the proponents of democracy in the 1990 election but was even put on trial in 1991 after the failure of the August Coup. Fidel Castro aimed to alleviate Cuba’s miserable conditions in the Special Period by implementing economic reforms and reversing rigid ideologies to a certain degree, but he still adhered to socialist principles and ensured that economic reforms were undertaken within “the framework of the existing political order.”43 As Fidel claimed in 1995, “we will not lose control...We are not just struggling to save [socialism], we are struggling to improve it.”44 “Socialism with Cuban characteristics” therefore could be a better alternative to capitalism and help Cuba to save and improve its socialism without incurring ideological conflicts and political unrest. At the same time, China, as a forerunner of this model, was willing to share its rich experiences with communist Cuba in order to consolidate existing international communist ties and raise its international standing in the post-Cold War era. By recalling the nations’ old communist friendship and opening a new page in bilateral relations, Cuba would gain both political and economic support from this emerging superpower.

SINO-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE NEW ERA
Sino-Cuban relations in the 1990s were framed not by a neoliberal global market, but through the international socialist network. Their diplomatic relations as “friends, comrades, and brothers” in the 1960s prepared Beijing and Havana for reconciliation once the antagonism between Beijing and Moscow ended.45 The 1990s not only pushed Cuba to reverse its foreign relations and seek new trading partners but also marked a shift in China’s foreign policy strategy towards Latin America. Jiang Zemin, the President of the PRC, officially proclaimed that the “multipolarity” of the world was crucial for China to pursue its foreign policy of peace and development and to oppose power politics and hegemonism.46 In the process of multi-polarization, China aimed to promote solidarity and cooperation with developing (Third World) countries in order to counterbalance U.S. hegemony in a potential unipolar world. Cuba was the first Latin American country that established diplomatic relations with China in 1960, and the only communist nation in the Western Hemisphere.47 Therefore, the restoration of Sino-Cuban relations was an important step for China to practice its multipolarization policy in Latin America and to strengthen ties within the international socialist network.

The political ties established in the 1990s laid the foundation for broader intergovernmental cooperation in economics, culture, technology, education, and healthcare in the twenty-first century, when the Sino-Cuban bilateral relationship entered a stage of comprehensive development. In the 1990s, both sides made frequent official visits to strengthen their diplomatic ties. According to the official website of the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, almost all of the top leaders of the CCP visited Cuba constantly throughout the 1990s, and Cuban leaders also paid frequent return visits.48 The continuous state visits demonstrate an increasingly close connection between China and Cuba. Phrases such as “good Cuban friends, comrades and brothers” and “Cuba and China heart to heart” appeared frequently in Chinese official reports and leaders’ talks.49 Moreover, the Chinese and Cuban governments also signed a series of bilateral agreements during these visits.50 In 1991, they signed their first intergovernment trade agreement. In 1992, the Chinese National Tourism Administration and Cuba’s Ministerio de Turismo signed a Trade Cooperation Agreement, opening a gateway for the fast-growing number of Chinese tourists in
In 1993, the two governments signed an Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation. In 1995, they extended the Agreement on Cultural, Educational, and Technological Cooperation, and signed an Agreement on Promotion and Protection of Investment.

As a result of these sound political relations, two comrades gradually became close trading partners. From 1990 to 1999, the two countries initiated a total of 153 projects in agriculture, light industry, food, chemical engineering, nuclear power, biotechnology, and other fields. In 2000, China’s International Technology Center and Cuba’s Center of Molecular Immunology established a joint venture, Biotech Pharma Company (Baitai Shengwu), a cooperative project utilizing the most advanced biotechnology of the time and marking the largest investment to date between China and Cuba. In addition, when Cuba suffered from severe shortages of gasoline and fuel oils due to the 1989 cuts in Soviet subsidies, China sent almost half a million bicycles to Cuba and helped Cuba build its own bicycle factory to deal with the urgent transportation problem. Chen Jiuchang, the former Chinese ambassador to Cuba, pointed out that Chinese bicycles had gradually changed the lifestyle in Cuba and served as “a Goodwill Ambassador [sic]” that enhanced the friendship between China and Cuba. While trade cooperation was not the ultimate goal, it was an essential economic means for China to expand its soft power influence in Cuba and strengthen the Sino-Cuban bilateral relation in a transforming international system, in which the Soviet Bloc had already collapsed into the capitalist Russian Federation.

Under the global neoliberal movement, it was impossible for China and Cuba to stay isolated and maintain rigid socialist ideologies. They had to implement a certain degree of market reform to create wealth and open the domestic economy to foreign trade and investment. Yet these market reforms do not necessarily mark the end of socialism since the nations and their communist parties still held tight control over the economy, including major state-owned enterprises, NEZs and Development Zones, flow of FDI, and legislation on foreign trade. State power and socialist hierarchy were regenerated in the semi-open market economy. By exporting the model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to Cuba, China could gain another trading partner in Latin America and consolidate political ties with one of the remaining communist regimes in the international socialist network.

CONCLUSION

Sino-Cuban relations in the post-Cold War era were built upon political ties as “fast friends, good comrades, and intimate brothers,” constructing a socialist alternative to neoliberal globalization. The 1990s were an important decade for China and Cuba to resolve past conflicts and promote prospects for cooperative international development projects in the twenty-first century. In the early period of the Cuban Revolution, China and Cuba formed a united communist front against U.S. imperialism. Based on a similar national memory of oppression and humiliation, the two nations equated capitalism with colonialism and imperialism to elevate the image of their communist parties as the guardian of the people and defender of national sovereignty. The ideological similarities shared by the two revolutionary leaders, Fidel Castro and Mao Zedong, also closed the distance between China and Cuba in the early 1960s. Admittedly, the Sino-Soviet split had once forced Cuba into a political and ideological dilemma and Cuba’s increasing pro-Soviet stance greatly undermined Sino-Cuban relations. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union provided China and Cuba with a great opportunity to restore their diplomatic relations in a new international situation.

Cuba’s economic reforms in the 1990s were closer to the Chinese model than that of the USSR and Russian Federation. China had experienced fast and stable economic growth under Deng’s Reform and Opening Up policy since 1978, while Russia suffered from financial crisis and political turbulence, such as the 1991 and 1993 coups. After witnessing the fall of communism in the Western Bloc, Fidel aimed to “save and improve” socialism in Cuba but not to overturn the existing political and social order. Thus, Fidel was largely interested in China’s gradual reform policy and hoped to gain experience from China to build up Cuba’s own reform model based on its social and economic realities. Capitalism was no longer the symbol of evil imperialism, but part of an essential cure to socialism. The establishment of Sino-Cuban bilateral relations in the 1990s paved the way for the construction of “socialism with Cuban characteristics.” Solid political ties between the two nations promoted full-scale economic and technological cooperation. Even with the changing international dynamic in the twenty-first century, diplomatic relations between China and Cuba are still based on the notion of “friends, comrades, and brothers.”
Building Socialism with Cuban Characteristics

Endnotes

[3] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[12] The Cuban War of Independence refers to the Ten Years’ War (1868-1878), the Little War (1879-1880), and the Spanish-American War. Chinese revolutionaries refer to those who participated in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, the Xinhai Revolution marked an end to the Qing imperial rule and established the Republic of China (ROC). In 1912, Sun Yat-sen also formed the Guomindang (GMD), China’s National People’s Party, which was later led by Chiang Kai-shek and was defeated by the CCP during the Chinese Civil War.
[15] Ibid. 3-4.
[24] Ibid., 112. In his 1996 speech at the University of Havana, Fidel Castro blamed China's economic aggression in reduction of rice exports to Cuba and openly called Mao “a senile idiot.”
[27] Twenty Years of China’s Reform and Opening Up, Central Party History Research Center (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Publisher, 1998), 114. The New Economic Zones in the 1990s include Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, and Hainan. Coastal Development Cities include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qindao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 139.
[36] Ibid.
Ashley Shiyan Sun

[42] Ibid.
[43] Louis A. Perez, JR, Cuba between Reform and Revolution, 325.
[44] Ibid., 326.
[49] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[56] Louis A. Perez, JR, Cuba between Reform and Revolution, 326.
This paper re-examines Elizabeth Fry's place in British history as well as the role gender norms played in British prison reform in the nineteenth century. Fry advocated for, and demonstrated the viability of, compassionate, restorative justice. Fry's ideas were eventually rejected, largely because she was a woman, in favor of reforms geared towards impersonal institutionalization, which had horrific results. Not only did Fry present a viable alternative system of imprisonment, but she also created an unprecedented degree of influence for women in nineteenth-century British society.

To propose to punish and reform people by the same operation is exactly as if you were to take a man suffering from pneumonia, and attempt to combine punitive and curative treatment. Arguing that a man with pneumonia is a danger to the community, and that he need not catch it if he takes proper care of his health, you resolve that he shall have a severe lesson, both to punish him for his negligence and pulmonary weakness and to deter others from following his example. You therefore strip him naked, and in that condition stand him all night in the snow. But as you admit the duty of restoring him to health if possible, and discharging him from sound lungs, you engage a doctor to superintend the punishment and administer cough lozenges, made as unpleasant to the taste as possible so as not to pamper the culprit.

—Bernard Shaw

In 1818, Queen Charlotte, in one of her last public appearances, met with Elizabeth Fry, whose work with the female inmates of Newgate Prison had rapidly thrust the introverted Quaker into the international spotlight. Fry is one of the most influential figures in British penal history. Yet, she is barely mentioned in works like Michael Ignatieff’s A Just Measure of Pain, which tracks the evolution of the highly regulated, psychological torture chamber that was the Victorian prison. Ignatieff’s Michel Foucault-esque narrative is a largely teleological work wherein the highly regimented, Bentham-esque Pentonville prison is presented as the logical conclusion of seventy years of prison reform. However, Elizabeth Fry’s story, which is glossed over by Ignatieff and many other historians, complicates such an understanding of nineteenth-century prison reform. The way gender and the patriarchy influenced British prison reform has been all but ignored by historians. Examining Fry’s story can help deepen understanding of these influences.

Elizabeth Fry achieved her remarkable success in reforming women’s prisons because nineteenth-century British society believed female prisoners required a more delicate form of punishment than men. Taking advantage of gender norms, Fry found a niche where she could have an unprecedented impact on society. Over the next fifteen years, she travelled across Britain and developed a massive following among women eager to follow in her footsteps. She had a platform to effect institutional change that was unheard of for a woman in her day. Within a generation, however, she was forced from political relevance, in no small part because she was a female challenging male authority; like a female Icarus, she flew too close to the sun. Nevertheless, her achievements demonstrated that a system of reformatory justice had the potential to be remarkably successful. Examining how and why the influential space Fry occupied disappeared is essential to understanding why nineteenth-century British prison reform ended so horrifically.

The story of prison reform in nineteenth-century Britain is filled with convoluted and conflicting ideas. Chief among these was reformers’ and legislators’ desire to create a justice system that could both deter citizens from committing crimes and reform the criminals who committed them. The idea of deterring potential criminals with harsh prison conditions persisted throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was detrimental to all efforts to successfully reform criminals. Faith in deterrence flew in the face of evidence that crime levels did not vary significantly with the severity of sentencing. The idea of deterrence came from a misconception among the well-off that criminality was a simple choice rather than a necessity in times of hardship. As Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer argue in Punishment and Social Structure, it was above all else the economic instability caused by the Industrial Revolution that led to a 540 percent increase in the number of convictions in Britain between 1780 and 1830. Rusche’s work demonstrates brilliantly why balancing reform and deterrence was an exercise in futility: reform required that prisoners be kept in decent health and deterrence required that prisoners’ conditions be worse than those of the poorest members of society. If the poor were starving, then prisoners needed to
be pushed to the brink of death. However, Britain’s legislators pursued a system of “punishment which would strike fear even into the hearts of the starving”—solitary confinement. Solitary confinement is psychological torture. As Beatrice and Sydney Webb documented in English Prisons Under Local Government, solitary confinement was “found to be, very naturally, of all punishments, the one most dreaded by criminals.” In short, it resulted in serious mental and physical health issues. Ignatieff’s work centers around the story of Pentonville penitentiary, which opened in 1842 and subjected prisoners to complete solitude upon conviction; every year, fifteen convicts would be taken to the mental asylum, driven mad by the effects of solitary confinement.

The practice was adopted as the only standard for male prisons across Britain in 1865. How and why Britain, the most advanced civilization in the world, adopted a brutal system of torture is a mysterious and troubling problem with which historians grapple. An analysis of how gender dynamics influenced nineteenth-century prison reform can help bring much-needed clarity to this field of study.

The long march of the prison reform movement towards solitary confinement for all male prisoners began in the 1770s with John Howard. Howard, the High Sheriff of Bedfordshire, was inspired to tour prisons across Britain in order to raise awareness about the need to reform Britain’s unregulated and disease-ridden prisons. Howard’s travels, and meticulous detailing of prison conditions, led to the publication of The State of the Prisons, which was a watershed moment for the prison reform movement. His work inspired the Penitentiary Act of 1779, and Howard paid to have the Act printed and sent to the keepers of every county jail in England. However, the results of Howard’s work were more symbolic than substantive. None of the national penitentiaries called for in the Act were ever built. In 1812, a general survey of prisons found that nine-tenths of local prisons were all but unchanged since Howard’s time.

THE STORY OF ELIZABETH FRY

“Since hope is essentially necessary to reformation, the females who compose this most degraded of classes ought—with great care and deliberation—be raised step by step into higher classes, when their conduct merits it.”

—Elizabeth Fry

It was not until the emergence of Elizabeth Fry as a national figure that prison reform actually made a real breakthrough in Britain. Elizabeth Fry, née Gurney, was born on May 21, 1780, and became a devout Quaker in her teenage years. She married at twenty, but only after long consideration of whether marriage could be beneficial to her philanthropic passions. In 1813, she visited the notorious Newgate Prison in London for the first time. There she encountered three hundred women, some still awaiting trial and many with children, all crammed into a space that measured just 190 yards. Three and a half years later, she returned and, along with a dozen friends, established “An Association for the Improvement of the Female Prisoners in Newgate.” By the fall of 1817, Fry’s work had resulted in a transformation among the women of Newgate that garnered significant public interest. Fry travelled across Britain and organized Ladies’ Prison Committees to visit prisons and continued to instruct her disciples through letters for several years. She eventually published a book that would serve as a blueprint for women looking to assist in prison reform.

The catalyst for tremendous legislative changes that occurred over the next fifty years, though tragically, women would cease to influence the direction of these reforms after less than twenty years.

An understanding of Fry’s successful method of reformation is necessary in order to amend the prevailing narrative in prison scholarship. Fry advocated for a system of punishment that was based on benevolence towards and communication with prisoners, in stark contrast to the authoritative, institutional model of prisons that eventually became the standard in British prisons. She presented a strict system of rules to the convicts; however, she only implemented them after receiving the prisoners’ unanimous assent. The foundation of her philosophy was “that when prisoners are tenderly treated, there is a general willingness to submit to such regulations.” She instructed her followers to go into prisons with a “spirit, not of judgement, but of mercy.” She showed compassion for the religious ignorance of the prisoners because she understood that this ignorance was the “natural consequence of the disadvantages under which they have been brought up.” In her experience, there was no alternative to the individual attention and mentorship of a person ready to lead by example. The uplifting, hopeful intentions of Fry’s work were vital to her success.

Fry’s method of reformation had a detailed structure that went beyond positive encouragement. In her testimony before the House of Commons in 1818, Fry stated that if prisoners received education, religious instruction, remunerated employment, were divided into classes, and were separated from all men besides doctors and preachers, she had “not the least doubt that wonders would be performed, and that many of those, now the most profligate and the worst of characters, would turn out valuable members of society.” She placed the utmost importance on education for the women and their children. When Fry began the school at Newgate, many of the mothers in the prison cried out of gratitude. The courses
were so popular that the untried female prisoners at Newgate signed a petition in order to be allowed to participate. The Bible was the primary textbook for reformatory education, but writing and arithmetic were also taught along with various marketable skills. Fry’s educational system involved mutual education, wherein the prisoners at Newgate elected a schoolmistress from among them to teach. This allowed female inmates to be the masters of their own fates, in contrast to the male inmates of typical Victorian penitentiaries, who became the faceless subjects of a highly ritualized system of control.

Fry’s method created an incentive structure that rewarded good behaviour. The prisoners were divided into classes, so that the most hardened criminals would not corrupt the youngest inmates, who had the greatest possibility to reform themselves. The “higher-class” criminals, those who had been convicted of lesser crimes, would receive some comforts and privileges, as well as more access to remunerated work, including but not limited to teaching the lower-class prisoners. The highest privilege was election to the position of “governess,” which oversaw other prisoners, maintained order, and reported to the prison matron; Fry was adamant that this supervision role should be filled by one of the prisoners. Other prisoners would learn skills, such as sewing or knitting, and their productive output could be sold for personal gain. Good behavior would allow prisoners to progress to the “higher classes.” Hope, even for the most hardened and destitute prisoners, was at the heart of Fry’s philosophy. Also essential to the program was that prisoners would be paid for their work, which would be a “powerful stimulus” to positive reformation; because a portion of income would be set aside for when the prisoner was discharged, women did not have to resort to crime out of financial desperation upon release. The primary form of employment for women outside of prison was domestic work, for which good character was a prerequisite. Thus, a prison sentence effectively prevented access to the most common form of female employment. The desperate need for convicts to learn marketable skills led Fry to declare to the House of Commons Committee on Prison Discipline that reformation was “impossible” without employment. Prison authorities’ belief in individual uplift would disappear when Elizabeth Fry’s followers were forced from positions of influence.

Fry’s final proposal, to separate female prisoners from nearly all male contact, had a dual purpose: first, it allowed female inmates to be given the benevolent treatment that society would never allow male prisoners to receive, and second, it created a space for women to influence reform and legislation and effect positive change in their community. Fry’s efforts to reform women’s prisons were based on her stated belief that female prisoners were “persons of light and abandoned character.” Thus, female inmates needed to be “tenderly treated” and cared for in a way only women could deliver. Fry almost certainly found authorities more sympathetic to her altruistic efforts to uplift female inmates because of deeply rooted conceptions of natural differences between men and women and the sorts of punishments they could handle.

What makes Fry’s efforts to segregate prisons by gender most interesting is how this segregation created a social space for nineteenth-century women. Fry believed that women could have “nearly, if not quite equal, influence on society” as men. In her mind, “it [was] quite obvious, that there are departments in all such institutions which ought to be under the especial superintendence of females.” Her ultimate goal was to make the oversight of public institutions a profession dominated by women. She made a highly pragmatic push to insert women into positions of authority in one of the few spaces where that was possible in her time. She even pointed out that it would be cost effective, given the salary of a female officer would undoubtedly be less than that of a male. As Lucia Zedner points out, the responsibilities Fry created for women in public institutions were unparalleled in society at that time.
Fry's method of reformative justice achieved unprecedented success. On March 17, 1821, the Royal Cornwall Gazette wrote that the Association for the Improvement of Female Prisoners' "truly benevolent labours have affected such a reformation in the prison of Newgate." Her testimony to the House of Commons Committee in 1818 detailed how the school had "prospered beyond all expectation" with "highly satisfactory progress" in all branches of instruction from reading to knitting. The average working inmate was earning eighteen pence a week, which paid for a third of the cost of keeping the women "covered and decent." Drunkenness had also nearly completely disappeared. The results were drastically different from other prisons where inmates had not been put under the care of a Ladies' Committee. The results were lasting as well—the 1836 Inspectors Report noted the "highly beneficial" contribution of the Ladies' Committee to lessening the "depravity of the place."

The orderly behaviour of the female inmates she worked with who were transported to Botany Bay was an important source of proof for Fry's success. The Surgeon Superintendent who oversaw transportation called the behaviour of Fry's inmates' "exemplary," noting especially the quality of work they did on the voyage. The trinkets women made on board the ships were sold for their own profit when they landed in Australia, which helped the women afford housing and a stable lifestyle when they arrived. The earnings were essential because prior to Fry's intervention, there were no support structures in place for women upon arrival. Several prisoners wrote back to Fry to thank her. One woman wrote from New South Wales to offer her "most sincere thanks for the heavenly instruction I derived from you...during my confinement at Newgate...Believe me, my dear Madam, I bless the day that brought me inside Newgate walls." Fry's successes are difficult to quantify, but that a prisoner in nineteenth-century Britain could call her time of imprisonment a "blessing" is staggering in comparison to the traumatic experiences of most prisoners.

Fry's model was far from dependent upon her direct involvement and was successfully replicated elsewhere in Britain. After Fry's success at Newgate became public, she received letters from all parts of the country from women who wished to form associations to visit prisons. In 1829, the Inspectors General of the General State of the Prisons of Ireland noted the huge progress achieved by one such Fry-inspired group, the Hibernian Ladies' Society for Promoting the Improvement of Female Prisoners. After Fry visited Cork, local ladies had followed her advice exactly, and the Inspectors' Report noted the "permanency of improvement." In Dublin, Grange Gorman Lane Female Prison was the first female-exclusive prison in the United Kingdom, and its matron, Mrs. Rawlins, was selected and taught by Fry. The experiment was so successful that similar institutions were planned in Scotland and Australia. Vast numbers of women were eager to contribute their time and effort to improving public institutions by following Fry's lead.

That Fry's reforms had any success at all was miraculous considering the immense challenges she needed to overcome. At the time of her first visits to Newgate, there were three hundred women, many with children, who stayed in a cramped space regardless of whether they were awaiting trial or already convicted serious offenders; there was no superintendence besides a man and his son, there was no provision of clothing, and most inmates slept on the floor. Her friends, who were acquainted with prison management, told Fry that anything close to what she wanted in terms of individual reformation could never be accomplished; that if we got them work, it should have it immediately be stolen; and that if we formed regulations, they might be obeyed for a week, but they would be broken almost daily, and for a number of ladies to think of ruling women, whom they themselves could not govern, was out of the question.

Another tragedy was that no care or assistance was given to women after transportation to the colonies. Reverend Samuel Marsden of New South Wales wrote Elizabeth Fry to inform her of the conditions that the women she worked with encountered upon arrival. Women told Marsden they "must starve or live in vice." There was a factory where the women were sent upon arrival, from which women left worse than when they entered. Marsden felt that "the neglect of the female convict in this country is a disgrace to our national character, as well as a national sin." Fry understood that she did not have a panacea and that the Ladies' Societies could not cure criminality alone, but the sheer lack of support for women upon release from prison was a major motivating factor in her insistence on paid work for inmates and greater government involvement in the penal system. This type of female lobbying eventually contributed to the abolition of this influential space for women within British prison administration.

Fry's endeavors lacked adequate funding and support. In the decades after Fry began her work, the ideal matron figure, as Fry had been at Newgate, was rarely a reality because of chronic underfunding, understaffing, and the grueling nature of the work. Matrons were not trained social workers and scientific expertise about mental illness in this era was primitive. The transformation of prisons relied entirely on charitable funds, and the Sheriffs even ceased to clothe prisoners at Newgate after the women began providing clothes themselves. These deficiencies would force the Ladies' Societies to advocate for stronger government intervention in the prisons, which eventually undermined their benevolent efforts.
To a significant extent, Fry's successes were limited to women's prisons because of pervasive ideas about differences between men and women. The British widely believed that women needed to be subjected to a lesser degree of punishment than men. One newspaper wrote that women should not be exposed to the infamous tread-wheel because “they then become hardened and horny, and unfit for any of the work that is suited to their sex.” A 1825 House of Commons study summarized the general, and misguided, sentiment of the era by saying, “we are by no means opposed to the judicious use of the tread-wheel, confined to males, and believe that the introduction of hard labour to the prisons has had a considerable tendency to diminish crime.” Women were also not subjected to solitary confinement nearly to the same extent as men—though this happened in part because many female inmates were prostitutes and men like Reverend Clay thought them irredeemable. The 1836 Inspectors’ Report demonstrated the limited sphere in which the government felt the Ladies’ Committees should be allowed to operate. Female reformers, by being “virtuous and pure,” represented feminine ideals and could thus serve as a “powerful...example to the adoption of improved principles and conduct” for wayward women who were too fragile for the harsh punishment their male counterparts required in order to reform. Fry utilized these conceptions to create space for women in society by promoting a belief that male prison officers tended to become hardened and were not sufficiently “tender” to work with delicate female inmates.

The major motivation to re-examine Fry’s place in history is that there was no reason that Fry’s successes should have been limited to female prisoners. Her work showed tremendous promise and could have staved off the horrors that befell men in nineteenth-century prisons. Fry’s followers made efforts.
to educate and uplift female prisoners far beyond what men received. The 1836 Inspectors’ Report noted that there was no provision for instruction of male prisoners at Newgate over the age of fifteen nearly twenty years after Fry had begun her school for the female inmates.75 In 1829, the Hibernian Ladies’ Society noted that the schools for male prisoners in Ireland did not operate with “sufficient diligence to render them of much advantage to the prisoners.”76 The problems facing male and female inmates were not wildly different; when Fry began her work, both the male and female sides of Newgate prison had been overcrowded and disorderly.77 Yet, despite the successes of reform on the female side of Newgate and elsewhere, even by the 1830s Fry had not succeeded in attaining significant access to male prisoners.78

“The space that Elizabeth Fry carved out for women reformers in early nineteenth-century British society disappeared in the 1830s—and with it the opportunity to improve the entire penal system.”

THE END OF BENEVOLENT REFORM

[The prisoner] envies the unfortunate animals in the Zoo, watched daily by thousands of disinterested observers who never try to convert the tiger into a Quaker by solitary confinement, and would set up the most resounding agitation in the papers if the most ferocious man-eater were made to suffer what the most docile convict suffers. Not only has the convict no such protection: the secrecy of his prison makes it hard to convince the public that he is suffering at all.

—Bernard Shaw79

The space that Elizabeth Fry carved out for women reformers in early nineteenth-century British society disappeared in the 1830s—and with it the opportunity to improve the entire penal system. There were two reasons for the disappearance of this space: first, reform was perceived to have failed in preventing crime, and second, the Ladies’ Committees had challenged male authority to too great a degree. As Randall McGowen noted, virtually the only constant in the evolution of British prisons from 1780 to 1850 was an increase in crime and the number of prisoners.80 The number of prisoners doubled from 1820 to 1840.41 The recidivism rate remained high, and it was commonly suggested that the threat of imprisonment had lost its terrors for a population already suffering from inadequate diet and twelve-hour days at a handloom or in a factory.82 As a result of this, it became fashionable as the 1820s went on to deride the “spurious benevolence” of Elizabeth Fry and her Societies, who were apparently convinced of a “fallacious idea” of reformation through “moral persuasion.”83 The number of visitors to prisons began to frustrate authorities by 1836, who believed visitation tended to “dissipate reflection, diminish the necessary gloom of a prison, and mitigate the punishment which the law has sentenced the prisoner to undergo.”84

The second reason the power of the Ladies’ Prison Societies disappeared was that they had begun to outgrow their allotted social space. One early instance of this came when Fry raised hell to help spare the life of Harriet Skelton, who was condemned to death for assisting a man she fancied in a counterfeiting operation. The Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth was annoyed at Fry for what he perceived as an attempt to meddle with the Criminal Code; Fry in her journal called the instance a “grievous misunderstanding” where “in the efforts made to save [Skelton’s] life, I too incautiously spoke

of some in power.”85 Fry was aware of the constraints upon female reformers and went so far as to explicitly advise in her book that visiting ladies should not, except in extremely rare circumstances, lobby for the shortening or pardoning of sentences.86 Nevertheless, the 1836 Inspectors’ Report used the Skelton incident as an excuse to justify the limitation of women’s influence and of legal leniency. The Inspectors made it explicitly clear that women were not to tell their male superiors what to do when they stated that

we consider the exercise, on the part of the Ladies, of any authority within the prison, their using any influence to obtain a mitigation of sentence or a pardon, to be a departure from the object for which alone (as appears to us) they should be permitted to attend—the affording employment and instruction to the female prisoners.

Funding for the Ladies’ Societies dried up in the mid-1830s about the time when their oversight roles were taken over by government inspectors.88 The brief window where women led the charge in enacting benevolent prison reform was closed less than two decades after it had begun.

Beginning in 1835, the national government centralized the prison system and excluded female reformers. In 1835, Home Office Inspectors became the main source of information about the British prison system.89 This coincided with the arrival of news from America about the complete ‘silence and separation’ method of incarceration, known as the Philadelphia system, which the Home Office Inspectors embraced wholeheartedly.90 According to Beatrice and Sydney Webb, this began “a new epoch in English prison history.”91 Britain’s prison system became
progressively more standardized and repressive under the successive regimes of William Crawford, Major Joshua Jebb, and then Edmund Du Cane. The Prisons Act of 1839 “gave explicit approval of separate confinement,” which led to the opening of the infamous Pentonville prison in 1842.92 In 1865, solitary confinement under the separate system practiced at Pentonville became the standard form of punishment in Britain.93 Not until after the Ladies’ Societies lost their lobbying ability did the type of penitentiary-style imprisonment that is horrifically detailed in the works of Foucault and Ignatieff really began to dominate. This development left a legacy of secrecy in the British prison system that would last a century.94

The disappearance of the influential space Elizabeth Fry and her followers occupied meant that all discussion of benevolent reform was over. The removal of female influence on prison legislation at the very least coincided with the end of critical thinking about prisons. The Webbs call the Prison Act of 1865 “the last occasion on which even an opportunity was allowed for cellular isolation to be seriously treated as an open issue,” but the struggle for benevolent reform was lost long before then.95 1835 saw the end of female reformers’ capacity to advocate effectively for the kind of personalized punishment that was essential to Elizabeth Fry’s method, as they were replaced in their oversight role by government inspectors. In Pentonville, and all the other prisons built on the Pentonville model, a prisoner ceased to be an individual and became a number—one of many identical units.96 The Ladies’ Societies no longer made regular visits to oversee prisons or engage with prisoners; these visits were essential to building public awareness about prison conditions and sufficient sympathy for prisoners. The penitentiary largely disappeared from public consciousness, and the public’s empathy for prisoners evaporated. In addition to this, Reverend John Clay observed that it became “heresy” to “critique the reforming efficacy” of the tread-wheel; the only debate was over how many “revolutions…yielded maximum reforming power.”97 Reformation was now supposed to be achieved by breaking down prisoners instead of building them up. The network of women who visited prisons had been the last great means to incentivize legislators to support benevolent reform.

UNDERSTANDING THE STRUGGLES WITHIN THE PRISON REFORM MOVEMENT

“Something was dead in each of us; and what was dead was Hope”

–Oscar Wilde, The Ballad of Reading Gaol

From the moment John Howard popularized prison reform, there was a battle over the role of deterrence in the penal system; this undying idea of deterrence was ultimately the undoing of benevolent reform. In the eighteenth century, George Onesiphorous Paul, who oversaw the prisons of Gloucestershire, embraced the structural reforms for which Howard advocated and was determined to demonstrate their deterrent value.98 Paul was adamant that he was not implementing reform out of a “misplaced tenderness of heart,” and could make prisons cleaner and more efficient “places of terror.”99 Paul was the first of many proponents of deterrence to hijack the reform movement and use the same methods advocated by misled reformers to inflict immense suffering upon inmates. Whig essayist Sydney Smith condemned the “softness” shown to criminals and was an influential advocate of using technology to psychologically torture.100 This critique of the supposed coddling of prisoners was common throughout the reform movement. In 1821, a member of the House of Lords argued that “gaols and Houses of Correction, are generally considered by offenders of every class rather as a sure and comfortable asylum whenever their better fortunes forsake them, a sort of refuge for the unfortunate of their profession.”101 This sentiment was behind the invention of the treadwheel, which was praised for facilitating the sentence of hard labour.102 In 1836, the Prison Inspectors emphasized that the main object of prisons was to deter criminals and others from crime through “endurance of hardship and privation…[and] seclusion.”103 As Ignatieff notes, it is almost as if Howard succeeded too well in convincing magistrates and legislators of the dangers of association between criminals and the need for seclusion, to the point that the movement he began created prisons that would have horrified his benevolent heart.104
Deterrence never ceased to be a priority in prison reform. At times, it was disguised as deprivation, whereby anything deemed a “luxury or comfort” was to “be excluded from the prison altogether.” This included remuneration for work and anything else that could serve as an incentive for good work or behaviour, which was, of course, essential to the Fry method of positive reinforcement. The system of incentives was replaced only by tough enforcement for even minor infractions, such as not paying attention in chapel or speaking to a fellow inmate. Order was maintained through extreme surveillance and repression. Food was also cut to a bare minimum, contrary to the advice of Howard, who hoped to use the possibility of meat during Sunday dinners as “an encouragement to peaceable and orderly behaviour.” Deprivation was just another means to govern prisoners through fear.

The idea of deterrence was so powerful that at all stages, benevolent reformers needed to amend and even handicap their plans so that they would fit into the dominant paradigm of retributive justice. Howard justified his recommendations by asserting that he was “not an advocate for an extravagant and profuse allowance to prisoners…I plead only for necessities.” The final line of Fry’s manifesto on prison reform is an attempt to fit her philosophy into the paradigm of deterrence:

Let our prison discipline be severe in proportion to the enormity of the crimes of those on whom it is exercised; and let its strictness be such as to deter others from a similar course of inquiry; but let it be accompanied by a religious care, and a Christian kindness, and let us ever aim at the diminution of crime, through the just and happy medium of the reformation of criminals.

As Shaw wisely pointed out, deterrence “necessarily leaves the interests of the victim wholly out of account.” The persistence of the notion of deterrence undermined all efforts for benevolent reform—before the biggest proponents of deterrence eventually co-opted the methods of reformers as a means to inflict unimaginable psychological suffering on prisoners through isolation and sensory deprivation.

Interpreting the legacy of John Howard has been a focal point for understanding prison reform in nineteenth-century Britain. Overall, there remains a tendency in contemporary scholarship to interpret the prison reform movement as unrealistically monolithic. Michael Ignatieff was too simplistic when he made the teleological argument that “Pentonville represents the culmination of a history of efforts to devise a perfectly rational reformatory mode of imprisonment, a history that stretches back to John Howard’s first formulation of the ideal of penitentiary discipline in 1779.” The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was an era of struggle over whether kindness or strictness was the central goal of reform. For certain types of reformers—those corrupted by the notion of deterrence—rationality and strictness were always central to their thinking, focusing on the institution first, and the prisoners second—and crucially the idiosyncrasies of imprisoned individuals were all but ignored. The early champions of deterrence were George Onesiphorous Paul, William Blackburn, and to some extent Jeremy Bentham; by the time of Edmund DuCane, well-ordered deterrence was the dominant paradigm in penal philosophy. For the benevolent reformers like Elizabeth Fry, orderliness was a priority; however, order was to be achieved not through standardization and strictness, but through individual attention, respect, and emotional support. Fry’s method was not about the imposition of a system of reform, but a mutual commitment to a cooperative effort at self-improvement. Fry was a rational and pragmatic thinker, but this differs immensely from the rationality in Ignatieff’s narrative, whose main objective was social control. Howard’s legacy was two-fold. There was an easily corruptible technocratic side, wherein prisoners were deprived of indulgences, had their lives perfectly regimented, and were confined to spaces explicitly designed to control their every action. But there was also a genuinely benevolent part of Howard’s work—and Elizabeth Fry represented a continuation of that legacy.

The nefarious kind of reform was predicated on what Foucault referred to as the “scientifico-legal complex.” Ignatieff, in applying a seemingly Foucauldian lens to the evolution of Britain’s prisons, argues that “the originality of Howard’s indictment lies in its ‘scientific,’ not in its moral character.” Ignatieff believes Howard’s legacy was carried on by the architect William Blackburn, who designed Paul’s prison in Gloucestershire, and who believed that a rationally organized space, first and foremost, would foster the development of reason and self-regulation in inmates. That same legacy was part of Jeremy Bentham’s notion of the Panopticon, which had many important affinities with the prisons built on the Pentonville model. Ignatieff argues that “if one returns to the pages of Howard, Hanway, and Colquhoun, one encounters the language of ‘police,’ not ‘humanity.’” Howard did help craft the Penitentiary Act of 1779, which encouraged sentencing convicts “to labour of the hardest and most servile kind…such as treading in a wheel.” This certainly contributed to William Cubitt’s invention of the tread-wheel in 1818, and the fact that wheels were installed in twenty-six counties by 1824. However, it is inaccurate to say that there is only one language present in Howard’s work; Howard spoke both of “police” and of “humanity.”

Howard advocated for the separation of prisoners only at night and warned against isolation for the entirety of the day; he also encouraged the improvement of bedding, which strongly differed from the “hard labour, hard fare, hard bed” philosophy of the mid-eighteenth century. Howard did truly believe that “gentle discipline is commonly more efficacious than severity.” He also expressed “vigorous
disapproval” of Paul’s prison at Gloucestershire. There is certainly some truth to the Webbs’ assertion that Howard’s “whole life was marked by a purity of motive, and an ever-present impulse to relieve human suffering.” Ignatieff himself even acknowledges that Howard did his work because he was “moved by a feeling of brotherhood with the confined” with whom all people were “bound together under the common sentence of sin” that necessitated a “moral obligation” of the state to aid the prisoner. This was an attitude that was perfected by Elizabeth Fry; she reminded her followers that they must not think themselves superior to prisoners because we are all sinners.

Of course, Howard did not present a flawless philosophy when it came to prison reform. Howard did not claim to be a messiah; he made it clear that he did “not pretend to be qualified for drawing up a perfect system of this difficult business.” The fact of the matter is that most benevolent reformers were trying something new and to some extent needed to be given the opportunity to learn from their mistakes. Elizabeth Fry’s brother, J.J. Gurney, endorsed a system of silent and highly supervised work in his notes on prisons, but he was also adamantly against forcing prisoners to work out of fear, which would be all but impossible to avoid in a silent labour system. As McGowen noted, major changes in the evolution of the prison system, such as the Gaol Act of 1823, were actually fairly major compromises between camps with competing ideologies when it came to prisons. Prison reform was far from a dichotomous issue, and portraying it as either positive or negative, as opposed to a complex blend of pros and cons, is overly simplistic.

ELIZABETH FRY’S PLACE IN PRISON HISTORY

“I desire to live in the fear of God rather than of man, and that neither good report nor evil report, the approbation nor disapprobation of men, should move me the least”

—Elizabeth Fry, April 29, 1818

There were important distinctions between the actions and proposals of Elizabeth Fry and her followers and the misguided or maleficient reforms enacted by the men featured most prominently in Ignatieff’s narrative. While most reformers could never separate themselves from the belief in reformation through fear, Fry looked to instill hope. While most reformers looked to impose their systems upon prisoners paternalistically, Fry sought to govern prisons only with the consent of the governed; her manner of reformation was personalized. Whereas Paul wanted prison officials to be a higher class of person than the criminals, Fry saw all people as equal under God. Fry believed in a mutual instruction system where well-behaved prisoners were given the paid responsibility to oversee and educate other prisoners. In 1836, the Inspectors argued that “these duties ought to rest solely upon the proper and responsible authorities.” The Inspectors also condemned the fact that the Ladies at Newgate appointed and paid a shopkeeper who would sell tea, coffee, and various other articles to the prisoners who had earned money through their hard work. The Inspectors argued this was “productive of much evil” because the things sold were “luxuries or comforts, not necessities, and ought therefore to be excluded from the prison altogether.” This was similar to Paul, who believed that “the use of money [should be] denied and, by this denial, every means of luxury, or partial indulgence, and of corruption is prevented.” Contrast this to Fry who believed reformation to be “impossible” without employment because it created such the possibility of incentives. In 1850, a House of Commons Committee formalized the policy of “hard labour, hard fare, and a hard bed.” When a new prison was opened in Durham in 1818, Fry “expressed much satisfaction at the prospect of superior comfort which the new gaol was likely to afford to the prisoners.” Fry’s work opposed and did not contribute to the development of a Victorian prison system based around isolation, discomfort, and deprivation.

Fry’s efforts were also crucially distinct from those of the most famous prison chaplains. Chaplains, like John Clay, were enemies as much as they were allies of Fry’s benevolent reform movement, despite being vocal proponents of prison reform. Not only were chaplains the strongest advocates of the separate system, but Clay believed only the chaplain had the necessary insight into the character of the offender—implying the women like Fry were not well-suited to their work. Clay was also “disheartened at the effects of ‘profitable employment’. This contrasted with Fry who, on her first visit to Newgate, said “nothing can be done, or was worth attempting, for the reformation of the women, without constant employment,” because it served as a powerful incentive and provided some safety and stability for prisoners upon their release. The chaplains promoted and benefited from the centralization that removed female influence from prison legislation. They also had much more ideologically-driven views that differed from the pragmatism that was essential to Fry’s work; all too often this meant chaplains believed in breaking prisoners down mentally and attempting to build them back up, whereas Fry’s benevolent reform consisted only in uplifting inmates. Sympathy was much more central to the work of women than to the efforts of the men of God.

Elizabeth Fry’s heroic struggle for benevolent reform did not fail so much as it was defeated. Her ideas were not naïve, nor were they well-intentioned but impractical. She strengthened a number of her claims about reform by placing emphasis on the fact that they were proven by experience. Fry was not, for example, as naïve and boastful as one magistrate from Hereford who saw a drop in the number of people committed to his prison in 1821 as proof that the introduction of hard labour was beneficial. In her 1818 testimony, the always modest Fry made it clear that officials should not expect “very great results” until more suitable conditions were established in the prison, which would
require significant governmental assistance. When pressed about the recidivism rate at Newgate, she retorted that this would not be a “fair criterion” by which to evaluate her work until the prison was expanded to provide the room necessary for proper classification among other conditions essential to her system of reformation. She also made efforts to temper the expectations of the public, whose interest in her work grew out of “tales of lions being turned into lambs.” Fry was under no such delusions; she advised her followers that “the work of reformation was a very slow one.” The nature of Fry’s work forced her to fight against the powers that be. As early as March of 1817, Fry acknowledged in her journal the “very unpleasant necessity” that she needed significant assistance from “men in authority.” Simply put, the forces she was struggling against were too powerful to be overcome by a woman in the early nineteenth century.

Elizabeth Fry does not fit neatly into the commonly accepted grand narrative of nineteenth-century British prison reform. Georgina King Lewis’ 1909 biography of Elizabeth Fry noted the “ingratitude” with which Fry’s remarkable efforts were all too often met. This was not only true of her contemporaries but has been true of most historians as well. Scholars have not recognized the extent to which Fry’s movement was frustrated by the rules governing gender in nineteenth-century Britain. By the mid-nineteenth century, prison reform was no longer a significant issue in the public’s mind. It was because of this public apathy that, as Ignatieff observes, “the penitentiary slowly inserted itself into the realm of the taken-for-granted.” It must be remembered that what made the public care at all in the nineteenth century was the work of women like Elizabeth Fry. Benevolent reform depended entirely upon the public pressure and sympathy that Ladies’ Societies led the way in building.

Fry’s work is grossly misunderstood by too many historians. McGowen mischaracterizes the disappearance of Ladies’ Societies from positions of influence when he writes, “their call for voluntary action as the basis for a permanent penal policy proved utopian, but their organizational flair and zeal for publicity had a considerable impact on political discussions.” Fry’s vision was not utopian, nor did it intend to depend on volunteers. The positions Fry sought to create for women were voluntary largely out of necessity—voluntary positions were the only positions available to women. Even in 1818, the Ladies’ Committee paid the matron of the convicts at Newgate. When Fry pushed for government-appointed inspectors for the prisons, and said it was the “duty of the Government and the people” to instruct the prisoners, she was, without a doubt, attempting to create paid positions for the people most qualified to oversee and teach in the prisons—and most of those people were women. Fry’s desire to form a plethora of nationally-linked Ladies’ Societies should be seen as an attempt to build a platform designed to create space in society for women.

What is perhaps most disappointing is the extent to which Elizabeth Fry is dismissed or ignored entirely in many intellectuals’ explanations of nineteenth-century prison reform. George Rusche falsely asserts that, in the early 1820s, “all agreed that nothing beyond the barest minimum should be supplied to the prisoners.” He also claims that “the reformers saw their hopes realized in a strict system of solitary confinement,” in a paragraph where he explicitly listed Elizabeth Fry and her two brothers as three such reformers. In 1818 Fry said, “I would think solitary confinement proper only in atrocious cases” and at no time changed that position. Anyone who achieved as much as Fry is deserving of substantially better treatment and significantly more respect by historians.

Elizabeth Fry’s story speaks to much of women’s history. She was a woman with superior expertise and the solutions to solve major problems in British society—and yet, she was ignored, and eventually denounced, for being an ambitious woman operating in a man’s world. Deterrence has long proven to be a morally bankrupt philosophy, as well as ineffective; Elizabeth Fry’s work indicates that perhaps there is a viable reformatory alternative to punitive justice. She was the face of a legion of women who were forced out of the policy realm despite having demonstrated the most successful method for reformatory justice, and perhaps proving that the entire concept, which has been denounced as a horrific failure for over a century, had promise. Had she been afforded the respect she was due by virtue of her talents, instead of silenced by virtue of her sex, she may well have saved many of the souls condemned to suffer in the solitude of Victorian prisons.
Gendered Justice

Endnotes

[7] Ibid.
[9] Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, *A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol. 1*, (MacMillan and Co.: London, 1883), 487. The separation of imprisoned men and women was something gradually implemented during the reform period of the nineteenth-century. The work of Fry and other reformers helped create a prison system wherein men and women were subjected to drastically different forms of punishment.
[12] Ibid, 64.
[25] Ibid.
[27] Ibid, 41.
[28] Ibid, 44.
[31] Fry, Fry, and Cresswell, 256.
[32] GK Lewis, 120.
[33] Ibid, 41.
[34] The notion of class here does not directly relate to socio-economic class. Higher-class criminals were low risk and well behaved inmates. A former violent offender could in theory progress to higher-class status over time with good behavior. (Fry, 47).
[35] House of Commons Committee on Prisons 1818, 34.
[37] Ibid, 35.
[38] Ibid, 52.
[40] House of Commons Committee on Prisons 1818, 44.
[45] Ibid, 5.
[46] Ibid, 52.
[47] Zedner, 344.
[49] House of Commons Committee on Prisons 1818, 34.
[50] Ibid, 35.
[51] Ibid, 39.
[52] Ibid, 36.
[53] Ibid, 19.
[54] GK Lewis, 93.
[55] Ibid, 86.
[56] Ibid, 187.
[57] Fry, Fry, Cresswell, 287.
[59] Ibid, 18.
[60] GK Lewis, 185. Female-exclusive is of course distinct from gender-segregated prisons.
[63] Ibid, 34.
[64] GK Lewis, 90.
[65] Ibid, 183.
[66] Ibid, 91.
[67] Zedner, 345.
[70] Ibid.


[74] GK Lewis, 130.

[75] Reports of the Inspectors 1836, 18.


[77] House of Commons Committee on Prisons 1818, 8.


[79] Shaw, x.


[81] Ibid, 98.

[82] B. Lewis, 143.

[83] Ignatieff, 174.

[84] Reports of the Inspectors, 1836, 19.

[85] GK Lewis, 81.


[88] Clay, 92.


[90] Ibid, 94.

[91] Ibid, 96.

[92] Ibid, 127; Ignatieff, 4.

[93] Stephen, 487.


[96] Ignatieff, 7.

[97] Clay, 98.

[98] Ignatieff, 100.

[99] Ibid.

[100] McGowen, 98.


[103] Reports of the Inspector, 1836, 22.

[104] Ignatieff, 103.


[106] B. Lewis, 144.


[108] Ibid.

[109] Fry, 76. No emphasis added.

[110] Shaw, xviii.

[111] Ignatieff, 11.

[112] Ibid.


[114] Ignatieff, 52.


[116] Ignatieff, 113. “the affinities between the penitentiaries and the Panopticon are more important than their differences.”

[117] Ibid, 221.


[119] Ignatieff, 177.

[120] Howard, 43. Howard also added that “debtors and felons, as well as hostile foreigners, are men, and as such they ought to be treated as men” (Howard 10).

[121] Ibid, 32.

[122] Ibid, 40.

[123] Ignatieff, 102.


[125] Ignatieff, 55-56.


[127] Howard, 45.


[130] Fry, Fry, and Cresswell, 297.


[132] Fry, 47.

[133] Reports of the Inspectors, 1836, 19.


[136] House of Commons Committee on Prisons 1818, 44.

[137] DuCane, 59.


[139] McGowen, 100.


[142] Fry, 22.


[144] House of Commons Committee on Prisons 1818, 43.

[145] Ibid, 45.

[146] GK Lewis, 68.

[147] Fry, 23.


[149] GK Lewis, 37.

[150] B Lewis, 147.

[151] Ignatieff, 214.


[154] GK Lewis, 125-126.


[157] Rusche, 133.

[158] House of Commons Committee on Prisons 1818, 41.
This article explores representations of McCarthyism by four of the largest newspapers in the Soviet Union in the twelve years following World War II (1945-1957). Unsurprisingly, these contemporary accounts of events in American politics—from within the House Un-American Activities Committee to the meetings of grassroots opposition groups to the wave of anti-communist fervor sweeping the country—were often shaped or selected to fit a Marxist narrative. Articles often presented events in terms of a struggle between the working people who desired the 'ideal of democracy' found in the Soviet Union and the reactionary members of the American government. As Joseph McCarthy's influence grew, he provided the Soviet newspapers no shortage of material with which to contrast an America portrayed as tightly controlled by fascists with a propagandized image of the Soviet Union.

The McCarthy era was one of the darkest periods of American political history. Fear became the predominating factor orienting political life at the expense of freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Yet even in this diminished form, personal freedoms in America remained far more extensive than in the Soviet Union. If McCarthyism made America more closely resemble the Soviet Union, how did the U.S.S.R. view this development? To answer this question, I will examine several major newspapers in the Soviet Union and how they covered McCarthyism. Although this is a somewhat top-down approach to analyzing these reactions, because the Communist Party controlled Soviet public opinion to such an extent, analyzing the Soviet media provides valuable insight into the kinds of open discourse about McCarthyism that occurred. From the end of the Second World War to the death of McCarthy in May of 1957, Soviet newspapers presented McCarthyism as a manifestation of American fascism. These publications highlighted oppressive aspects of McCarthyism in order to make the Soviet Union appear superior to the United States by comparison, and they glorified progressive resistance to it to show that even in the heartland of the enemy, dissenters pushed for change that more closely aligned with Soviet ideology.

The government of the Soviet Union strictly regulated the media as a means of controlling the information to which its citizens could be exposed. During the first twelve years following World War II, from 1945 to 1957, the press in the Soviet Union remained tightly controlled by the Communist Party, as it would for many years following. As such, the newspapers discussed in this article constitute sanctioned opinions and subject matter if not direct communication from the state to the masses. Nevertheless, even within these bounds a spectrum existed in terms of freedom of expression among these newspapers. Pravda, which translates as “truth,” issued “the official voice of Soviet communism and the Central Committee of the Communist Party.” An equally official publication, Izvestiia, which translates as “reports,” served as the voice of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. At the other end of the spectrum, newspapers targeting the intelligentsia of the Soviet Union presented more thoughtful and critical pieces on culture and the arts both domestically and internationally. The most unrestricted of these papers, Literaturnaia gazeta, “allowed Soviet Russia’s preeminent authors, poets, and cultural figures a particular podium for commentary” and focused on literary and intellectual subject matter. Finally, Sovetskiaia kul’tura covered the arts and culture, including many critical articles on major events and reviews of literature, theater productions, and other artistic pieces. By examining these four newspapers’ coverage of McCarthyism at its height, a well-rounded understanding of how they treated this political development in the United States can be ascertained.

The importance of how these publications discussed, analyzed, and critiqued McCarthyism cannot be overstated. The extraordinary totalitarian power the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exercised over those under its control meant that there was little room for disagreement with the opinions expressed in these papers. By controlling the news and ‘liquidating’ those who expressed dissenting opinions, the Party could influence people’s thoughts by only allowing them to be exposed to particular ideas and information. Ironically, this kind of power over the minds of citizens was a major aspect of what these papers criticized about McCarthyism.

Soviet Newspaper Coverage of McCarthyism

By Frank Spence
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A PICTURE OF AMERICAN OPPRESSION

In the Soviet press, McCarthyism meant thought control and the suppression of freedom of expression. This kind of oppression is contrasted with depictions of the arts flourishing in the Soviet Union. In keeping with its focus on literary and artistic life, an article in the July 1, 1952, issue of the Literaturnaia gazeta compiles statements from The New York Times critics who are disturbed by the political climate and its effects on artists. One expresses the opinion that “artist-creators…do not dare to say what they think…The macabre persecution of ‘heretics,’ the fanatical suppression of the individual - all that is commonly understood by the common name of McCarthyism, triumphs.” The August 17th edition of Izvestiia from the same year ran a similar article presenting its readers with evidence of suppression of thought in the United States from the American journal The Nation. It quotes the chairman of the New York Theater Critics Club as saying “[t]he actors are afraid to play, writers are afraid to write, directors are afraid to put on plays.” By citing American sources these articles present a persuasive picture to readers of an America terrorized by ruthless overlords. The Izvestiia article concludes with the dark outlook that “in the US one cannot think freely, cannot freely create, without risking being put behind prison bars.” In the Literaturnaia gazeta article this situation is contrasted starkly with a glowing depiction of Soviet one: whereas “Broadway,” under the control of the American government, “cultivates military psychosis, contempt for the human race, rudeness and vulgarity, the theater of socialism fights for peace, fosters respect for people, and surrounds its employees with care and attention.” Thus, the article not only decries the suppression of free expression in the American arts, but it also depicts the subject matter that these artists are compelled to create works about as crude and backwards. Then, it pronounces the Soviet arts as being enlightened and its artists as free and supported.

In the August 20, 1953, issue of Sovetskaia kul’tura, the picture of American oppression is even worse; it reports that in addition to the creative class of artists and writers, “led by McCarthy, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security and the House of Representatives Commission investigating anti-American activities, subject[s] teachers, professors and even university students to investigation.” This article contends that “everyone whose views do not coincide with the reactionary views of the obscurantist McCarthy and his colleagues is being categorized” as “non-loyal” and therefore a security risk that must be dealt with. The article highlights an atmosphere of fear in educational institutions and states the goal of McCarthy and company is “to take full control of educational institutions, turning them from educational authorities into…training [schools] of obedient soldiers.” On July 7, 1954, an Izvestiia article discussed the American government taking “total control over the convictions and thoughts of citizens” by using a variety of surveillance techniques that penetrate into even the most remote backwaters of American society and punishing those whose views do not align exactly with those of McCarthy and his cronies. Even as far back as October 28, 1945, Izvestiia published an article citing California representative Ellis Patterson calling the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) “[r]eminiscent of Japanese control of the mind and the activities of the German Gestapo.” These bleak depictions of the United States were a powerful way in which these newspapers could persuade Soviet citizens that they lived in far superior conditions to their American counterparts.

THE AMERICAN GOVERNING CLASS: FASCIST, CORRUPT, ABSURD

While the Soviet press portrayed American society as incredibly oppressed, it also vilified the perpetrators of McCarthyism as fascist and reactionary, seeking to crush progressivism. Again using a source from America to make its perspective appear more concrete, on July 17, 1948, the Literaturnaia gazeta quoted former Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge as saying that HUAC “from the first day of its existence [was] headed only by pro-fascist members of the [C]ongress,” and that the newly-elected chairman of the committee, J. Parnell Thomas, had even been “a member of the fascist terrorist organization the Ku Klux Klan.” In this way, the article conflates so-called fascism with bigotry. The same newspaper announced on January 18, 1951, that the American Congress, from which the committee drew
its members, had only gotten worse with its reconstitution after the midterm elections, taking the stance that “in its composition this [C]ongress is perhaps the most reactionary in the whole history of the United States,” and that “in full accordance with the ‘emergency situation’ proclaimed by Truman, the Congress will do its utmost to strengthen the process of US fascism.” If Congress and HUAC were fascist, however, Joseph McCarthy, in the eyes of the Soviet press, was nothing short of a neo-Nazi.

Understandably, these newspapers reserved their harshest rebukes for McCarthy, depicting him as wildly delusional and his actions comparable to those of leading Nazis. Izvestiia on January 7, 1953, described McCarthy as an “obscurantist and fascist…put[ting] forward the most fantastic accusations against individuals and entire organizations, with no facts or evidence to back up his accusations.” The Literaturnaia gazeta took far greater liberties in characterizing McCarthy. On July 17, 1952, it called him a “rabid reactionary” and “a pathological liar who possesses the insolence of street hooligans.” In its January 18, 1951, issue it even went so far as to call him “the modern American Goebbels” and a “zealous advocate of the Nazis.” On July 7, 1954, Izvestiia added to these portrayals of McCarthy as a neo-Nazi by naming him “a candidate for the successor to Hitler.” These extreme descriptions of McCarthy may seem absurd, but they fit in perfectly with the image the Soviets sought to portray of an American government controlled by ‘fat-cat’ capitalists.

The Soviet papers also incorporated a Marxist interpretation of McCarthyism into their articles, emphasizing the power of political lobbying and characterizing American politicians as the pawns of Wall Street capitalists. According to the Literaturnaia gazeta on July 24, 1948, “[a]fter Roosevelt, the well-fed gentlemen from Wall Street came to power, trying to establish a political regime in that country which, by honor and conscience, can only be called a fascist one.” This Marxist interpretation of all power in America being held by capitalists is foundational to the image these newspapers sought to paint of the United States. It gives the Soviet Union the moral high-ground as the champion of the working man. Significantly, all reports of corrupt dealings in Washington by Soviet newspapers have this moral undertone. Therefore, when on January 7, 1953, Izvestiia reported that “McCarthy received $20,000 from lobbyists of Pepsi-Cola company, after which he, in the interests of this
company, began zealously to oppose government control over the supply of sugar," it not only highlights McCarthy as financially corrupt but also reinforces the image of a morally corrupt American system of government. The willingness of McCarthy to support particular policies on behalf of corporations is taken by Izvestiia to be indicative of an entirely corrupt system, and it uses examples like this to remind its readers of their true enemy, the bourgeoisie.

"However, these newspapers also presented their readers with a kind of dark humor about McCarthyism, perhaps as another approach to making their readers feel more satisfied about living in the Soviet Union rather than America."

These newspapers clearly described a dismal situation for the common man in the United States. If he dared to step out of line and hold an opinion contrary to the ones espoused by McCarthy and other reactionaries, then he is persecuted because these fascist politicians were loyal only to the capitalists of Wall Street. However, these papers also presented their readers with a kind of dark humor about McCarthyism, perhaps as another approach to making their readers feel more satisfied about living in the Soviet Union rather than America. A satirical column of the Literaturnaia gazeta on June 30, 1948, depicted Karl Mundt, co-author with then-Representative Richard Nixon of a bill to keep communists out of government, as physically intolerant of the color red. It said that if he came in contact with an object painted red "a nervous rash" would appear on his skin, and it concluded with the punchline "[s]uch a refinement of sensations can truly be envied by a Spanish bull." Similarly, on June 20, 1953, the Literaturnaia gazeta ran an article about a proposed bill by California Senator Hubert Scudder to mandate the destruction of a painting by progressive artist Anton Refregier in the San Francisco Post Office on the logic that "the prevailing color of the picture is red. Consequently, the whole fresco is red. This mural is clearly subversive and is intended to spread communist propaganda." Although the latter article concerned a real event and the former invented a condition for Mundt, a fixation on the color red was certainly an element of McCarthyism, and the Literaturnaia gazeta effectively mocked it. Thus, the Soviet press did not only treat McCarthyism as a serious menace, but at times depicted it in a humorous light to make the Soviet Union appear far more sane and reasonable compared to an American government riddled with absurdities.

THE U.S.S.R. STANDS FOR DEMOCRACY

These newspapers certainly vilified McCarthyism as a reactionary, oppressive force, but they also focused on what was being suppressed in addition to highlighting the individuals and groups that suffered under McCarthyism. In particular, the Soviet press characterized McCarthyism as anti-democratic and made clear the irony that a country proclaiming itself as the pinnacle of democratic freedom in the world actually suppressed democracy. An article in Pravda on March 21, 1946, reported that "American liberal and progressive figures, artists, writers, trade unionists..."
restoration of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state.”30 Meanwhile he affirmed the Soviet Union’s stance as protector of peace and democracy, calling these American actions “pathetic...attempts to distort and cast a shadow over the relations existing between the Soviet Union and the countries of the democratic camp, based on mutual trust, respect and fraternal cooperation!”31 In this manner, Izvestiia portrayed McCarthyism as a global menace to democracy through the meddlesome and extortionist practices of the United States government and asserted Soviet superiority as a promoter of democracy rather than a detractor.

PROLETARIAN RESISTANCE
While a decisively negative tone characterized much of the Soviet press coverage of McCarthyism, these newspapers also highlighted resistance to this oppression, whether from within the American government or from without, as a means of presenting their readers with a hopeful picture of a United States in which a grassroots progressive movement could never be eradicated. An October 28, 1945, article in a United States in which a grassroots progressive movement meant of presenting their readers with a hopeful picture of a United States in which a grassroots progressive movement could never be eradicated. An October 28, 1945, article in Izvestiia reported on a “group of progressive members of the House of Representatives...[who] condemned the activities of [HUAC] and demanded the liquidation of this commission, since it...encourage[d] ‘the persecution of the Reds,’ incite[d] racial enmity and defend[ed] pro-fascist elements.”32 Demands like these also came from progressives in the general population and were covered frequently. Later that year, on December 5th, Izvestiia published an article about “[twelve] large organizations, including the Congress of Industrial Unions (PPC), the National Negro Congress, and the National Guild of Lawyers” who had “stated that they are starting a campaign to liquidate the [House Un-American Activities Committee].”33

In Literaturnaia gazeta, articles presented more thorough explanations of the meaning and significance of such resistance. A May 5, 1948, piece discussed numerous progressive American “writers, journalists, artists, composers, [and] scientists” who had signed a letter sent to the newspaper and published in the previous issue that affirmed their commitment to the cause of peace and democracy.34 It elaborated on the backgrounds of many of these individuals before proclaiming that these “[r]epresentatives of the advanced American intelligentsia who raised their voice in defense of peace and democracy, and all progressive masters of American culture, are not alone. They are supported by millions of ordinary people in America.”35 This optimistic view of the agitation of the masses for progressive reform that would ideologically align the people of the United States closer to the Soviet Union is repeated in another article published December 4th of that year. This article presents a dark portrayal of the West, saying “[t]he Fascist plague already penetrates into all the pores of the state life of America and England, France and Italy. Increasingly, in the countries of Western Europe and America, Hitler's methods of governing peoples are used.”36 However, it then asserts that this “new ‘Führer,’ and all the contenders for this post cannot drown out the ever-growing rumble of the revolutionary, progressive, and liberation movement throughout the world.”37 This extremely Marxist outlook is a hopeful one, and it glorifies these advocates of Soviet ideological principles as part of a movement of millions that will inevitably overcome the reactionary forces of capitalism to establish a communist state like the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION
The Soviet press’s response to McCarthyism involved two main themes: vilification of the architects of this reactionary movement and praise of those who dared to stand against it. Avoiding entirely the irony that the environment in the Soviet Union could not have been further from supporting freedom of expression—the Communist Party would never have permitted journalists to draw such parallels—these publications depicted the American government as corrupt, fascist, anti-democratic, and controlled by the bourgeoisie. All of these criticisms leveled at the United States either implied or were accompanied by outright statements that the Soviet Union represented the opposites of all of these negative qualities. Thus, the Soviet press served as a font of propaganda to inspire love of the state and disgust with America. Even articles that presented events with fairly straight reporting are clearly part of a broader pattern of selection bias to portray McCarthyism in the most negative light possible and progressives in the United States in glowing terms.

The four newspapers examined in this paper (Izvestiia, Pravda, Literaturnaia gazeta, and Sovetskaia kul’tura) published articles on McCarthyism throughout the first twelve years following World War II, and they reached a vast audience. Coverage peaked in 1953 and 1954, during the height of Joseph McCarthy’s influence, with ninety-six articles in the former year and eighty-six articles in the latter, that included the terms “McCarthy,” “McCarthyism,” and “House Un-American Activities Committee.” Furthermore, these four newspapers comprised the two most widely distributed papers in the Soviet Union and the two most prominent papers for the intelligentsia. With circulations at their heights of nearly eleven million copies of Pravda, seven million copies of Izvestiia, and four million copies of Literaturnaia Gazeta among a Russian population with a literacy rate over 81 percent by 1939, these papers made it into the hands of many citizens.38 Thus, readers of all kinds in the Soviet Union encountered this press coverage of McCarthyism on a regular basis.

Ultimately, Soviet newspaper articles on McCarthyism should be understood as serving the purposes of the state. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. was among the most totalitarian regimes in history, and it wielded the media as a powerful tool to influence opinion. Having no alternative
viewpoints to balance the ones advanced by the regime, the Soviet press supplied its readers with a worldview rather than allowing them to develop informed opinions. While McCarthy may have sought to quash dissenting opinions in the United States, that state of affairs had long since become the reality in the contemporary U.S.S.R.

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**Endnotes**


[4] This newspaper was published under the name Sovetskoe iskusstvo from 1944-1952. Subsequently it became Sovetskaia kul’tura.


[6] Note: All quotes from Soviet newspapers have been translated from the original Russian into English by Google Translate.


[9] Ibid.

[10] Sillen, “‘Tears’ by Brooks Atkinson.”


[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.


[21] Zavyalov and Evgeniev, “McCarthyism is a threat to the world and the security of peoples.”


[23] Mikhailov, “‘The battle for... beans.”


[31] Vyshinsky, “On measures to treat the threats of a new world war.”

[32] “Members of the US House of Representatives Demand the Liquidation of the commission for the Investigation of Anti-American Activities.”

[33] “Campaign in the United States for the liquidation of the commission to investigate anti-American activities,” Izvestiia, December 5, 1945.


[35] Ibid.


[37] Ibid.

The Southern Cross, a newspaper printed for the Irish immigrant community in nineteenth-century Argentina, attempted to create an Irish identity made from elements of the broader diasporic Irish identity to which the immigrant community in Argentina could adhere. This identity was formed by employing romanticized language and pastoral imagery about Ireland and reminding readers of their roots by printing articles about Irish history, arts, religion, and language. Irish readers shared the language of the newspaper editors, demonstrating the function of The Southern Cross as both a vehicle and a catalyst for communicating and creating Irish identity in Argentina.

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The country around San Pedro is dotted with Irish homesteads; and the genial smile, the gay humour, and the proverbial hospitality of the occupants indicate at once a state of comfort and independence which forms a striking contrast with the forlorn condition of their countrymen at home. Nor are the Irish people of San Pedro forgetful of their traditions, or of that faith which seems to be so mysteriously bound up with their existence.1

An Irish campo correspondent communicated this serene picture to the Buenos Aires-based newspaper The Southern Cross in May of 1881.2 Though he described an Argentine partido, the author employed many of the rhetorical elements used throughout the global Irish diaspora—pastoral imagery, an oppressed Ireland, ancient traditions of hospitality, and adherence to Irish Catholicism.3 Such language and imagery infused The Southern Cross, connecting readers with a transnational Irish identity interpreted through an Argentine lens. Using this broader diasporic Irish identity, The Southern Cross’s chief editor and Irish chaplain, Patrick Dillon, and his editorial board attempted to create an Irish identity to which the immigrant community in Argentina could adhere. This was not a one-way process; Irish readers often used the same language as the editors to describe Ireland and their situation in Argentina, as the correspondent from San Pedro did. Despite these similarities, the acceptance of a common Irish identity was not enough to unite the community.

Between 1830 and 1930, about 50,000 Irish immigrants came to the South American city of Buenos Aires and its environs, or the “River Plate,” in search of new socioeconomic opportunities.4 The majority of these immigrants came between 1860 and 1889, though Irish settled in Argentina as early as the British invasion of Buenos Aires in 1806. Most made a living as sheep farmers in the campo of Buenos Aires province, living isolated existences on estancias (ranches) in the pampas, though others worked in the city of Buenos Aires as merchants, craftsmen, laborers, or domestic servants. The wealthier elite of the Irish community tended to be the earlier immigrants or their sons who usually lived in the city and made their fortunes from their massive estancias, worked and rented by small-scale sheep farmers. Faced with a strange land, foreign tongue, exotic Argentinian celebrations of Catholic Mass, and an unfamiliar governing system, Irish immigrants banded together into a largely self-sustaining community, with their own churches, priests, hospitals, schools, and newspapers. The Southern Cross was created to connect the scattered Irish immigrants in the campo. It was published weekly and sent out from Buenos Aires to inform readers of Argentine, Irish, and international politics, local news and events, and provide moral teachings. It served as a voice for Patrick Dillon, the Irish chaplain and chief editor of

Our Exiled Eyes

Remembering Ireland in Argentina through The Southern Cross

The Irish diaspora of North America and Britain has been subjected to extensive scrutiny by historians, who have examined everything from its use of humor to the influence of clothing choices. In comparison to the abundance of research concerning Irish immigrants to the United States and England, the lives and experiences of the Irish diaspora in South America has been left relatively untouched. Though the number of Irish who moved to countries like Mexico and Argentina was much smaller than those who migrated to North America, the Irish of South America formed their own distinct communities and viewed themselves as part of the global diaspora. Very few studies have touched on the newspaper culture of the Irish community in the Argentine Republic, despite its central place in the formation of identity in the community.
the newspaper, to connect with those Irish who lived outside his city network, and as a platform for discussion between readers who wrote to the paper. As a product of the both the city and the campo, of Dillon and the Irish sheep farmers, *The Southern Cross* reveals the shared and differing anxieties and conceptions of identity amongst the Irish in Argentina.

Extensive research has been dedicated to immigration to the early Argentine Republic and the global Irish diaspora. Argentina is unique as the only destination for Irish immigrants where English was not the native language and Catholicism was the national religion. Despite this, Argentina’s Irish immigrant community remains a topic relatively unexplored by historians of the Irish diaspora or Argentine immigration. Instead, most scholars have directed their attention towards the Irish diaspora elsewhere in the world, the role of British economic and international policy in Argentina’s early development, or Argentina’s larger communities of Italians, Spaniards, Germans, and Jews. The few studies of Irish immigrants in Argentina tend to be broad in geographic and time scope, take either an economic, religious, or biographical perspective, and leave the matter of the construction and negotiation of immigrant identity for both individuals and the community largely untouched. This work focuses on the Irish community and its interests, anxieties, and identities expressed in *The Southern Cross* between its foundation in 1875 and the end of Irish immigration to Argentina following the Dresden scandal of 1889, thereby considering the communal social experience and negotiation of identity for Irish immigrants in Argentina during this period.5

*The Southern Cross* was an English-language newspaper with Irish editors published in Buenos Aires and marketed to the Irish Catholics living in the River Plate. Four years after the death of Father Anthony Fahey, the Irish chaplain who unofficially lead the Irish community of the River Plate in both spiritual and secular matters, his protégé, Patrick Dillon, founded *The Southern Cross*. The newspaper assumed the role as a unifying force for the Irish immigrant
Our Exiled Eyes

community in Argentina. While articles about Catholicism, Irish culture, and both Irish and Argentine politics are revealing in themselves, the newspaper also served as a platform for dynamic interactions between editors and their audience through the sections for readers' correspondence and letters to the editor. Here, readers asserted their own political and moral views and reported on their daily lives outside of the Buenos Aires metropolis. The Southern Cross and its notes from readers demonstrate that the Irish of Argentina considered themselves to be distinctly Irish in both religion and heritage, and part of a global group of exiles who could still influence political events in Ireland through written and monetary support. The Irish immigrant community of Argentina, as presented by The Southern Cross, considered itself to be part of Ireland, Argentina, and the Irish diaspora—transnational citizens rooted in religion, nationality, and economic opportunities in an increasingly mobile world.

Scholars of the Irish diaspora have argued that by the nineteenth century, Irish nationalism was redefined by immigrants and took the form of money sent back to Ireland, creative nationalist expressions, and means of political engagement. Irish nationalism within the diaspora was a combination of an Irish identity founded on shared religion, traditions, territory, and language and a dynamic process of “political imagination and discursive invention.” The Irish of the diaspora, including those in Argentina, contributed to the imagining and defining of Irish nationalism and added a transnational aspect to it.

The editors of The Southern Cross asserted that “our ambition is to make our creed and country respected, not by empty vauntings, but through the conviction contact with us would induce.” In creating respect for “creed and country” for both Irish and non-Irish readers, The Southern Cross printed reports about Ireland's culture and history and poems expressing longing for home. Through these articles, the editors of The Southern Cross tried to craft community solidarity by way of a shared Irish identity for their audience drawn from elements of Irish nationalism—an Irish Catholic association, an emphasis on a “Celtic” past, a pastoral idealization of Ireland, a tragic but fortifying historical memory of English oppression that shaped an Irish worldview, and language of exile. The editors also engaged with the global Irish diaspora in this way, by reprinting articles from Irish-American or Irish newspapers and fitting their readers' experience in the framework of the broader exile narrative of the Irish immigrant. Though scholars have neglected the Irish of Argentina in their diasporic studies, the writers and readers of The Southern Cross certainly saw themselves as part of that global community.

The Irish identity articulated and promoted by The Southern Cross involved more than what one called one's homeland; it also indicated a certain interpretation of past events and identification with a global Irish community. The Southern Cross served both as a means to communicate to readers the diasporic Irish identity and as a channel for readers and editors to contribute their own ideas to what it meant to be Irish. Dillon and the editors attempted to express and propagate this common identity as a means for the Irish immigrant community to come together despite socioeconomic divisions. Though they ultimately failed to reunite the community based on Irish identity alone, readers' responses indicate that they did incorporate some elements of this identity into their own conceptions of themselves.

REMEMBERING ERIN: HISTORY, MUSIC, AND PASTORAL LANGUAGE

Irish culture was celebrated as a way to distinguish the Irish and their works from English art, history, music, and language, thus emphasizing their validity as a distinct nation and culture in their own right. The Irish culture expressed in The Southern Cross did not specifically draw on the lived experiences of many of the Irish immigrants in Argentina, most of whom came from the Midlands and southeastern coast of Ireland (Counties Meath, Westmeath, Longford, Offaly, and Wexford). This differs from the origins of the Irish immigrants who moved to North America, many of whom were from the western Irish coast, which particularly suffered from the Great Famine that devastated Ireland from 1845 to 1852. A foundational part of an Irish identity for these North American immigrants was the trauma of the Famine and the fact that some were forced to emigrate for their survival. In contrast, the Irish immigrants to Argentina were from relatively prosperous areas less impacted by the Famine and chose to go to Argentina for increased economic opportunities, rather than out of necessity. While the language of the Irish exile and invocation of Famine horrors might not have touched the Irish in Argentina on a personal level, the pastoral references would have almost certainly resonated with natives of the Midlands, the fertile agricultural center of Ireland. Additionally, many of the ancient Celtic sites described and explained in The Southern Cross, such as Tara and Newgrange, are located in County Meath and other parts of the Midlands, although the predominantly farm-working residents' awareness of the ancient relics surrounding them is debatable.

The Southern Cross often used images of a green and idyllic Ireland to evoke a longing for the simplicities of home, a theme that was used in nationalist Irish narratives. Scholars of fiction written by Irish immigrants to the United States and England in the late nineteenth century note images of a Famine-stricken wasteland that contrast with descriptions of an idealized, green Ireland. Depictions of a post-Famine, ravaged Irish landscape are less common in The Southern Cross, but portrayals of the Emerald Isle abound. The imagery often avoided addressing the harsher economic realities that forced many of the Irish to emigrate, and instead cultivated
a bittersweet sense of loss for a place that never truly existed. One 1875 report from Ireland, for example, began, “News from the old country is almost as refreshing and cool as a draught of iced water. Jack Frost has been hard at work over the lakes and ponds, so skating is the order of the day and he has pinned the stones as tight as to the very road as if they had been fastened there by twelvemenny nails.” This description gave readers a tantalizing reminder of winter in Ireland, especially compelling given that it was published in January, the middle of Argentina’s hot summer. The author ignores the more realistic concerns about farm work or food, setting a serene scene made all the more charming by the mythical “Jack Frost, a distinctly European character.

The Southern Cross communicated efforts to revive the traditional Irish Gaelic language in Ireland, another feature of Irish nationalism in the nineteenth century. A report celebrating the adoption of an Irish language prayer by the Board of National Education in Ireland expressed the hope that “the ancient and honoured tongue of the Irish race will form a portion of the curriculum in Irish Primary Schools.” From 1366 until the nineteenth century, Irish Gaelic had not been an honored language—English officials since the time of the Tudors had suppressed the native tongue of Ireland. In the nineteenth century, Counties Kerry, Cork, and Donegal (on the west coast of Ireland) still spoke Irish, but the Anglicized Midlands did not. Though these English-speaking Irish immigrants in Argentina did not have a personal stake in the resurgence of Irish Gaelic, the article argued, “on the whole, every patriot has a reason to be proud of the present condition of this question. The love of the Irish soil, Irish history, Irish ruins, the Irish language, the Irish race is a broad platform of true patriotism, which can include men of every creed and political opinion.” The celebration of Irish “culture”—here, embodied in language, history, and ancient sites—was seen as a common ground on which all Irish could gather, showing that inevitable fractures in the Irish community as a whole were anticipated and addressed, just as The Southern Cross aimed to do with the community in Argentina by reminding all Irish immigrants of their shared roots.

Occasionally The Southern Cross printed informative pieces on “Irish ruins” and the ancient Irish past in response to burgeoning interest in Celtic archeology in Ireland. In the late nineteenth century, studies in Irish literature and history contributed to increased Irish patriotism, though this interest originated with German and English scholars. Alongside this Celtic Revival and under the influence of archeologist and scholar George Petrie, Irish interest in Irish archeology increased in the nineteenth century, both domestically and internationally. Petrie in particular saw his work as part of a larger nationalist and ethno-cultural movement in Ireland. This application of an ancient past to modern nationalism was not only a product of efforts by elite intellectuals, but also by Irish immigrants. These pieces in The Southern Cross, usually reprinted from Irish or Irish-American newspapers, emphasized a shared pride in the Irish past that defined itself as distinctly not-English. In 1880, a brief report on Tara—a site of political and ritual importance in ancient Irish kingship—invoked the reader’s imagination by introducing the topic: “the origin of Tara, obscured by the mists of time, has given rise to a great deal of discussion among the antiquarians.” The rest of the article adopted a more scholarly tone, including excerpts from a Trinity College Dublin study explaining the dimensions of the ancient structure at Tara and the Celtic system of making laws “for the general defense of the Kingdom, as well as the preservation of domestic tranquility.” This emphasis on the civilized and legal aspects of Celtic society refuted stereotypes about savage and violent Celts that the English used to legitimize their invasion and colonization of Ireland. The reclaiming of the Celts thereby restored respectability to the history of the Irish as a civilized people.

The report added that “of course the sacred rites of hospitality were not neglected; and, where so many Irish men and women assembled, it may well be supposed that there was a good deal of music, dancing, and fun generally, to assist legislation.” This projection of contemporary Irish customs and gatherings on the ancient rituals of Tara exhibited the peaceful and artistic nature of Celtic culture, but more importantly connected present readers to the past, mirroring the Irish hospitality cited in the San Pedro article. The description of an artistic and cultural celebration with music and dancing emphasized the sociability of the ancient Irish, reminding readers of similar gatherings involving Irish music and dancing with neighbors not only in Ireland but also in Argentina.

With a less scholastic tone, in 1887 The Southern Cross reported on the origins of Guinness, the famous Irish beer, in a rags-to-riches tale of the company’s founder. Arthur Guinness had worked as a servant for the Protestant Bishop of Meath until the bishop died, leaving him unemployed. Undaunted, Guinness “erected a hotel,” from which he began brewing his famous ale. Guinness embodied the broader Irish dream of overcoming Protestant dominance to be successful and independent. The writer also noted Guinness’ use of Irish resources, specifically malt from “Wicklow barley, the finest in the world, and water from “the Hill of Allen… pure as crystal.” The author argued for the natural beauty and quality of Irish resources, despite depictions of Ireland as a barren, overpopulated land. Besides giving the history of a successful Irish businessman, this article also made a case for Ireland’s wealth and value in its people and resources, making Irish readers proud of their homeland, especially since “time and again the English brewers have tried to manufacture «stout porter» [sic]…[and] all their attempts have been failures.” The Irish, in this instance at least, triumph over the English specifically because of where they came from and the “flavor of the native grain and native water.”
Our Exiled Eyes

REMEMBERING EXILE
A fundamental part of Irish identity, both in the diaspora and for Irish immigrants in Argentina, was the interpretation of their immigration as unwilling exile, regardless of the actual circumstances of their departure from Ireland.32 Like pastoral imagery, the language of exile conveyed a sense of longing for "home" that was sparked by any number of things. Instead of disheartening the Irish abroad, however, The Southern Cross used this language to rally the Irish community’s members in solidarity with each other, as exiles determined to thrive, and with Irish around the world, including those back in Ireland suffering physically and emotionally.

Poems as well as readers’ submissions expressed a poignant identification as exiles. One, titled “Shamrock Leaves,” was printed in 1879, a week after Saint Patrick’s Day:

Oh! if for every tear
That from our exiled eyes
Has fallen, Erin dear,
A shamrock could arise
We’d weave a garland green
Should stretch the ocean through
All, all the way between
Our aching hearts and you!33

The author immediately identified Irish immigrants as forlorn exiles painfully separated from their homeland. He personified Ireland as “Erin,” the traditional Irish name for the country, and hinted at the pastoral beauty associated with Ireland with the mention of the shamrock and “garland green.”34 The imagery of “tears” and “aching hearts” explicitly addressed the emotional pain of immigrants, as does the overwhelming desire of the exile to return home—not just to familiar villages or family members, but Ireland itself.35 Even if not every Irish immigrant in Argentina felt this level of sorrow when remembering his or her homeland, many Irish immigrants throughout the world discussed their immigration in such a way.

One writer for The Southern Cross in 1875 related a short anecdote employing the tropes of exile:

Yesterday, whilst passing along the Paseo Julio, we were surprised to see a number of our countrymen evidently listening with attention to a poor blind hurdy-gurdy man. On approaching we caught the last few strains of what was intended for St. Patrick's day, but it sounded quite melancholy, evidently mourning its exile. When it had quite finished, and our feelings were wrought up to extreme agitation, we dropped the sympathetic tear, and, a few dollars into the musicians [sic] hat.36

The “hurdy-gurdy” musician, who was probably Irish given his knowledge of Saint Patrick’s Day melodies, evokes the image of the Irish travelling bard.37 Interestingly, the song is the active subject, “mourning its exile [emphasis added],” speaking to the role of music itself as a response to the homesickness of Irish exiles.38 The speaker displays a sense of solidarity not only with his “countrymen,” whom he recognized despite walking around a large city, but also with the poor musician, illustrating the unifying power of “Irishness” beyond class status. This was particularly relevant to the readers of The Southern Cross, given the growing tensions at the time between the wealthy, landowning estancieros living in Buenos Aires and the rural laborers and farmers who rented their land. The editors of the newspaper tried to reconcile the Irish rural and urban workers by reminding them of the common love they shared for Ireland. Irish immigrant readers of The Southern Cross were reminded that despite their homesickness, they were not alone in their exile. A few months prior, an editorial had asserted that “we do not love our native land with an abstract love: our love embraces her people, for we are of them.”39 Though readers might have felt distanced and isolated in Argentina, they were a part of a global and local Irish community made up of people united by a love of homeland, common sense of exile, and shared cultural and religious traditions in Saint Patrick’s Day celebrations and songs.

Dillon and his editorial board were not the only ones projecting a romanticized recollection of their homeland. An 1880 letter to the paper signed by “A Leinster Maid,”
who identified herself as “an Irish girl who has been some years in this country,” reminisced about “pleasant winter nights when we all sat by the fireside and one of the boys read a chapter of some pious book or some funny story. It is a pity the practice is not kept up in this country.” The letter writer relied on her memory of Ireland, which was influenced by the presence of her family and the familiarity of a distinctly rural Irish home setting. Her inclusion of the fireside memory was particularly significant, since a characteristic of Irish farm life often mentioned in diaspora literature was the scent and warmth from a peat fire. “A Leinster Maid” used imagery that aligns with the view and language found in *The Southern Cross*, confirming an exchange between the editors and readers. She also related to the homesickness of the exile, showing that despite many years in Argentina during which she could have assimilated and acculturated, she still felt a strong, bittersweet connection to her homeland.

This sense of belonging to the global Irish diaspora meant more than fondly remembering the old country. Though Irish immigrants viewed themselves as exiles, they also acknowledged that from an economic point of view, they fared much better than their countrymen who remained at home. This financial stability was called upon when *The Southern Cross* reported the first signs of famine in Ireland in 1880, and implored readers to donate to the Famine Relief Fund, stating, “[t]he Irish in the States and other countries have nobly and spontaneously come forward; and we trust, for the honour of the flourishing Irish colony in La Plata, that it will not be found one iota behind its brother exiles in helping on the good work.” The writer utilized Argentine Irish pride as a distinct part of the Irish diaspora to match the generosity of Irish elsewhere. The ultimate goal, however, was not to divide the diaspora into regional factions but to come together for the benefit of its homeland. The mention of the Irish in the United States demonstrates the awareness of the Argentine Irish community for the rest of the diaspora. Not only were Irish immigrants called upon to consider their duty within the larger diaspora, but *The Southern Cross* also printed the names of those who donated, leading to comparison within the community in Argentina.

**REMEMBERING SAINT PATRICK: THE CULTURAL INFLUENCE OF CATHOLICISM**

*The Southern Cross* willingly embraced stereotypes of the Irish celebration of Saint Patrick. Following Saint Patrick’s Day in 1875, *The Southern Cross*’s editors, presumably Dillon, printed a homily about the holy day in which he asserted, “Catholicity and Ireland are so identified that the same day proclaims our creed and native land.” Saint Patrick, and Catholicism more generally, were frequently invoked by individuals throughout the Irish diaspora, including in the pages of *The Southern Cross*, when discussing Irish nationalism, politics, and nostalgia for Ireland. Dillon and the editors asserted that:

the example of your Catholic ancestors is a precept you are bound to follow, and their voices are crying out to you to-day to pass on to your descendants, pure and untainted, the holy inheritance preserved for you at such a price: and surely you cannot allow yourselves to hide away for ever [sic] this glorious talent, lest it should reach and enrich your children.

For them, the survival of the Catholic faith in Argentina was in question, particularly the brand of Catholicism passed on from Irish martyrs and sufferers for the faith. They enjoined readers to embrace and support it, hinting that they could do so through donations to the Irish schools, hospital, or charities run by the Irish Catholic priests and nuns in Argentina. Celebrating an Irish Catholic identity united the Irish in Argentina not only with their homeland, but also with the Irish diaspora. As the editors remarked,

To-day [sic] the Feast of Saint Patrick is being celebrated all over the known world. Our display is doubtless humble compared with other gatherings in lands where our brethren are more numerous, their union better organised, and—shall I say it?—their pride of race and creed more warmly entertained. But our attempt is surely accepted in His sight who bids us do honor to His saints.

They employed Saint Patrick’s Day as a reminder to their readers that the Irish in Argentina were not alone in exile on this day that they might feel particular longing for Ireland. At the same time, they gently encouraged immigrants to actively claim their Irish identity, as other, more successful and united parts of the Irish diaspora had.

The fusion of Irish patriotism and Catholicism was prolific throughout *The Southern Cross*. Reporting on Saint Patrick’s Day celebrations in Carmen de Areco, one writer remarked, “[t]he well-known patriotism of the Rev. Mr. Leahy has undoubtedly been the mainspring of this respectable and worthy movement.” John Leahy, an Irish priest who served the Irish immigrant community in Argentina from 1867 to 1882, embodied both the Catholic faith as a priest and Irish “patriotism” as a supporter of Irish nationalist causes, demonstrating that the two were effectively one and the same. Dillon and his editorial board also viewed Saint Patrick as belonging exclusively to the Irish Catholics. In 1880, they disparagingly noted that “a certain class of Protestant dignitaries…claim Saint Patrick; not that they know much about his life and beliefs, but that somebody has insisted on making a Protestant of him.” While some parts of Irish nationalism strove to include Irish Protestants, Dillon and the other editors chose to emphasize the Catholic nature of Irishness. That being said, Irish Catholicism in *The Southern Cross* was not foisted on an unreceptive audience. On Saint Patrick’s Day in 1875, Father Leahy gave a homily entitled “Panegyric of Saint Patrick,” which *The Southern Cross* then
The article for Saint Patrick’s Day in 1887 employs an impressive blend of religious, historical, and traditional Irish mythology allusions. With an optimistic tone, Dillon and the editorial board declared, “in former times the national feast was welcomed with feelings which, however hopeful, were not unmixed with anguish and affliction.” Their immediate categorization of the religious celebration of Saint Patrick as an Irish “national feast” demonstrates their view of Ireland as an intrinsically Catholic nation. They continued, “our forefathers believed in the deliverance of Ireland, just as the prophets believed in the coming of the Saviour, and they readily suffered hardship and persecution.” Though the editors celebrated that this generation would “reap with joy what other men sowed in affliction,” they did not undervalue the sacrifices of past Irish nationalists who had died in failed rebellions. By comparing them to Biblical prophets and later explicitly stating “they died martyrs and patriots because they had hope in the resurrection of their country’s liberty,” the editors cast patriotic loyalty to Ireland not only as a nationalist but also religious duty of any truly Irish individual.

In addition to Biblical references, they also invoked a traditional Irish tragedy when they compared the fate of the children of Ireland with the children of Lir and declared “all the sufferings which the ancient legends tell us were endured by Finuola and her brothers under the magic spell of enchantment for seven hundred years, were endured in reality by Ireland and her children for the same period of time at the hands of her cruel step-mother.” The editors reminded readers of past injustices suffered by the Irish and warned them to stay united so as to prevent “the despoiler” from “lay[ing] waste to the entire country as Mountjoy did, or spea[ring] infants upon his lance as Carew did, or spatter[ing] the Cross with the blood of women and children as Cromwell did.” This imagery, while deviating from the images usually associated with the beloved, green-robed Saint Patrick, still invoked religious descriptions of martyrs, again conflating those who die for religious and national causes. The editors constantly used the language of ownership when referring to Ireland, its past, and its impending victory—“our proud privilege,” “our forefathers,” “our countrymen in their present struggle,” and “we shall see our country crowned with the crown of freedom.” The article ends with a call to action, for readers to recognize “whether the day of our deliverance arrive in one year or in a century, our duty is plain to second by every means in our power, our countrymen in their present struggle, and to remember the example which our ancestors gave us.”

Our Exiled Eyes

Argentina's recognition of the distinct nature of Irish Catholics in their country. On Saint Patrick's Day in 1880, Andres R. Sófia, on behalf of the Club de la Paz, wrote to Mr. Edward Murphy, who then passed on the letter to the editorial board of The Southern Cross. Sófia sent his congratulations on the holy day, noting “Saint Patrick’s Day is a national day for the homeland of O’Connell, the homeland of the greatest abnegations in Europe.” Daniel O’Connell, who lived from 1775 to 1847, is regarded as Ireland’s first nationalist politician, though Ireland did not achieve independence from the United Kingdom until 1921. O’Connell is called “the Liberator” or “the Emancipator” for his rallying of the Irish populace and successful petitioning for the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, which removed many of the social, economic, and political restrictions placed on Catholics under the Penal Laws. Sófia’s reference to O’Connell shows his familiarity with Irish political history, either as a result of his interactions with Irish immigrants in Argentina or the international fame of O’Connell. He also unquestioningly recognized the tragic history of Irish oppression, or “the greatest abnegations.” This letter not only externally validated the Irish experience of oppression, but it also demonstrates foreign recognition of a unique Irish Catholic identity.

REMEMBERING ENGLISH OPPRESSION

In addition to celebrating their Celtic heritage, the editors of The Southern Cross often recalled the long history of oppressive English rule and celebrated the stalwart steadfastness of the Irish throughout their trials. Looking toward the future, these experiences were portrayed in a way that granted Irish immigrants a degree of authority and experience in Argentine politics and society because of and not despite their Irishness.

A tale reprinted in 1880 from Haverly’s Irish American Almanac describes an incident during the Penal Times in Ireland. The “Penal Times” or “Penal Days” refer to the post-Reformation Penal Laws passed against Irish and British Roman Catholics by the British government in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Catholic worship was highly restricted and Catholics were not permitted to hold office or participate in government. The story tells of Mr. K. Geoghegan of Donower in County Westmeath who, “though remaining faithful to his creed, enjoyed the esteem and respect of the Protestant resident gentry of his country.”

One of these gentry, Mr. Stephney, gives Geoghegan twenty pounds for his team of four fine carriage horses. Geoghegan begs the gentleman’s pardon and returns with two pistols, offering one to Stephney. The gentleman “declined the combat and quieted the room leaving Geoghegan the object of the unanimous condolments [sic] of the rest of the party, regretting the perversion of the law.” The narrator concludes the tale by reminding any confused reader that during the Penal Times, “no Catholic was allowed to possess a horse worth over five pounds. If that were offered by a Protestant
devotion. By reporting not only on the speeches and masses united “heart and soul” around a figure embodying patriotic centenary. “The newspaper editors hailed an Irish people gratitude to the Liberator…heart and soul we unite with our Irishmen are seeking channels through which to express their orations spoken, processions formed, masses sung, and by noting that “all over the world meetings are being held, of Irish nationalist politician Daniel O’Connell’s centenary. The Southern Cross heralded the celebration

The editors of The Southern Cross did not curb their criticisms of restrictive English policies that suppressed Irish unrest over the issue of home rule, a nationalist movement begun in the mid-nineteenth century that campaigned for Irish self-governance. They announced in 1889: “it would seem that the English Government are determined to renew all the horrors of the Penal Days in Ireland.” They felt particularly targeted by the laws which allowed for the governing of Ireland by mainly Protestant English officials. Though increasingly ignored in the eighteenth century, the Penal Laws were only officially nullified by the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. The alarmist language of the newspaper indicates the editors’ investment in events happening in Ireland as well as their eagerness to inform their readers of them. It also demonstrates the tendency of The Southern Cross’s editors to frame current events in Ireland within the context of the past, which allowed their readers to understand the present situation in Ireland through their own past experiences and memories, or the historical memory of the Irish people, thus connecting them emotionally to happenings in a distant Ireland. Even if Irish immigrants in Argentina had no personal memories of such events, these stories put a face to the consequences of British rule.

Though their past contained dark days of subjugation, the Irish also celebrated heroes who fought against English Protestant tyranny. In a tone reminiscent of the praise sung for Saint Patrick, The Southern Cross heralded the celebration of Irish nationalist politician Daniel O’Connell’s centenary by noting that “all over the world meetings are being held, orations spoken, processions formed, masses sung, and Irishmen are seeking channels through which to express their gratitude to the Liberator…heart and soul we unite with our countrymen, at home and abroad, in honoring O’Connell’s centenary.” The newspaper editors hailed an Irish people united “heart and soul” around a figure embodying patriotic devotion. By reporting not only on the speeches and masses taking place in Ireland, but also “sending our warm regards to our Irish brethren of Carmen de Areco, who…celebrate the occasion so patriotically and becomingly,” the editors demonstrate the truly international nature of the celebration for O’Connell’s centenary.

“The editors actively celebrated government and military efforts to put down Indian violence ...”

While the Irish often railed against the dispossession of their land and culture by the English and cited it as their reason for leaving Ireland, they were participating in a similar process against the indigenous peoples of Argentina. Another article about the Irish language concluded, “it is a point on all hands conceded that neither colonies nor conquerors can annihilate the aboriginal language of a country.” But the Argentine Republic encouraged Irish, and European, immigration and settlement of the pampas as a means of establishing “colonies” to crowd out indigenous people from their ancestral land. The editors of The Southern Cross never took note of the similarities between their situation and that of Argentine native people. Instead, articles throughout the nineteenth century declared “the first in rank [of national afflictions] have been the frequency and disastrous effects of Indian raids,” and demanded “the repression of the evil” attacks on estancias by Indians. The editors actively celebrated government and military efforts to put down Indian violence, including when “a young ensign and civilian are said to have been shot for joining the Indians in a looting expedition. Served them right.” This complete lack of empathy demonstrates the uncompromising Irish view of Indians and those associated with them. Racial prejudices and the differences in setting and history prevented the Irish from identifying with the plight of the indigenous people of Argentina despite their similarities. Alternatively, realization of the parallels between Irish and Indians made the Irish all the more adamant about their suffering under the English, thus justifying their search for a new life in the pampas.

The Southern Cross’s desire to present and argue for a united Irish immigrant community was not without reason. An 1886 letter to the paper signed “Ardsallagh” freely criticized the “wealthy Irish” in Argentina. The author asserted that of the rich Irish immigrants,

there are a few who are heart and soul with the national movement, there are others who care no more about the fate and destiny of the land which gave them birth, than they do about colonizing the Gran Chaco...these men are always proud in being styled and styling themselves 'British citizens'...There is another class who profess to hold national sympathies, but are very careful of expressing them lest they by so doing should offend Mr. So and So.
Our Exiled Eyes

The harshest critique that “Ardsallagh” (presumably from the campo) hurls at these wealthy Irish is their lack of loyalty towards Ireland as well as their willingness to adopt a British identity. This accusation might have stemmed from the fact that wealthy Irish were more likely to live in the city of Buenos Aires and therefore associate with the diverse members of the English-speaking community, while Irish immigrants in the campo were typically only able to socialize with their neighbors, usually other Irish immigrants. The Irish of the city were more willing to move beyond Irish circles, though “Ardsallagh” sees the self-reliant Irish immigrant community as an expression of loyalty to both the community in Argentina and Ireland in general. The Southern Cross worked to remind both the urban and rural Irish immigrants of their shared ties and interests, but evidently some of their readers disagreed with the unified front that the newspaper presented.

This condemnation of the adoption of a British identity was echoed elsewhere in The Southern Cross. While fighting against negative stereotypes of drunkenness and improvidence, the editors strongly encouraged readers not to renounce or hide their Irish identifiers—namely, their accent. An article reprinted from the American Exchange in 1886 quoted Archbishop Croke: “There is no man more contemptible than the Irishman who wishes to change his accent.” The American Exchange further argues an Irishman, who has any pride of manhood, or knowledge of the history of his race, who tries to ape the manners and accent or country’s oppressors, is too mean to be classed among the lowest elements of humanity… The evil influences of this class of people may be set down as not among the least of the curses under which Ireland suffers, and we trust that the system of Boycotting [sic] will be vigorously enforced against them in future, both in this country as well as in Ireland.

Though the editorial board of The Southern Cross itself did not use such strong language, by reprinting the article it tacitly approved the sentiments expressed, and agreed that Irish throughout the world should and must stay completely committed to their Irish identity, especially in the face of English influences.

Despite writing to an audience of immigrants who would likely never again see the country of their birth, the editors of The Southern Cross repeatedly printed articles about Irish religion, culture, history, morality, and legends from its inception in 1875 to the end of this study in 1889, when Irish immigration to Argentina effectively stopped. The language and sentiments impressed on Irish readers what it meant to be Irish: Catholic, a deep awareness of the past sufferings of the Irish people, and appreciation for Irish natural and cultural beauty and value. These elements of Irish identity, in addition to the conception of immigration as exile, were central to the identity of the global Irish diaspora. The Southern Cross worked both as a vehicle and a catalyst for communicating and creating Irish identity—the editors incorporated themes from the broader diaspora into their specific Argentine context, and then communicated this conception of Irishness-in-Argentina to readers. By pushing these ideas on their audience—successfully, as demonstrated by the responses of readers—the editors of The Southern Cross connected members of the Irish immigrant community not only to each other, but also to the entire Irish diaspora. This served the dual purpose of fostering support for charities for people in Ireland while also creating a uniform “Irish” identity among the Irish immigrants in Argentina, thus keeping them together as a group.

The history of the Irish in Argentina is relevant today, as many of their descendants recognize their Irish roots, and are recognized by their distant kin in Ireland. Their exclusion from Irish diaspora studies ignores a unique dimension of the Irish abroad and their place in popular historical memory of Irish immigration. The Southern Cross shows that, though small in number, the Irish who immigrated to Argentina in the nineteenth century did not quietly assimilate, but underwent their own process of creation and negotiation of identity that both engaged with the broader diasporic experience and their local context. The Southern Cross played a key role in that process. Furthermore, while the size of the community has led to the assumption that the Irish in Argentina were more or less in agreement on what it meant to be “Irish” in Argentina, the debates and shifts in opinion in The Southern Cross demonstrate both internal and external tensions of the Irish community.
Endnotes

[2] Also called the "camp" by Irish immigrants, the campo was the countryside (pampas) of Buenos Aires province where farmers and herders made their living.
[3] Buenos Aires Province was divided into partidos, or counties. These administrative units had a main town, usually the same name as the partido, and were surrounded by pampas and estancias. The partidos most inhabited by Irish immigrants were Carmen de Areco, San Antonio de Areco, Santa Fe, Esperanza, Chacabuco, Arrecifes, and Salto.
[4] The River Plate, or "el Rio de la Plata," was another name for the territory surrounding the River Plate in the Argentine Republic, including the city of Buenos Aires and parts of what is today Uruguay. See map of "Buenos Aires Province and Partidos, 1877," page 3; Edmundo Murray, *Becoming Iralandés: Private Narratives of the Irish Emigration to Argentina, 1844-1912* (Buenos Aires: Literature of Latin America, 2005), xv. This number is an estimate, and historians continue to debate its accuracy. About 50% of this population re-emigrated to North America or returned to Ireland, though this statistic is often questioned as well.
[5] The Dresden disaster of 1889 occurred when Irish immigrants gathered from lower socioeconomic classes of Dublin and Cork were left to languish in the harbor of Buenos Aires on the ship Dresden, unaided by both the Argentine government and the Irish community. Illness and dehydration resulted in numerous deaths of the newly-arrived immigrants, including many children. The highly-publicized reaction to this incident effectively stopped the already-decreasing numbers of Irish immigrants to Argentina. Patrick McKenna, "Nineteenth Century Irish Emigration To, and Settlement In, Argentina," MA Geography Thesis (St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, 1994), 279.
[9] Ibid.
[10] The "Celtic" past discussed by these newspapers revolved around historical events specific to Ireland that had been romanticized over the years, and was a slightly different image than what historians might think of being Celtic now. Technically, the Celts were a culture and civilization that was spread not only throughout Ireland and Britain, but also as far as France and Germany. In this paper, I refer specifically to the concept of the Celts being the ancient forerunners of the native Irish population.
[11] For discussions about the role of the exile trope and Irish worldview, see Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles*. For more about Catholic and not-English identity, see Coogan, Wherever the Green is Worn.
[14] Based on census data from 1841, Niall Ó Ciosáin estimates 50 to 70% of Counties Offaly, Dublin, and Wexford and 30-50% of Counties Cork, Longford, Westmeath, and Meath were literate, while less than 30% of County Waterford was able to read. Niall Ó Ciosáin, Print and Popular Culture in Ireland, 1750-1850 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), 35.
[23] Miller asserts, "for them [Irish emigrants], history was not something finished and unalterable; it lived in songs and stories and traditions which were remarkably archaic and which promised that someday, somehow, the seemingly brief interlude of 'Saxon domination' would end and that the mythical glories of the Gaelic past would return"; Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles*, 10.
[24] A number of articles in *The Southern Cross* were reprinted from newspapers that originated in Ireland, Britain, or the United States. Reprinted articles were usually scholarly or more factual in nature, or were the transcript of a speech from an individual in Ireland or the U.S. This practice might explain some of the similarities in the characteristics that defined U.S. and Argentine Irish nationalism, but the fact that the editors of *The Southern Cross* chose these particular pieces from an array of options should not be discounted. Articles concerning Argentina specifically or were opinion pieces about local issues either within the Irish immigrant community or the Argentine Republic more generally were nearly always by writers for *The Southern Cross*.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] In his analysis of Irish emigration to North America, Miller argues "both collectively and individually the Irish – particularly Irish Catholics – often regarded emigration as involuntary exile, although they expressed that attitude with varying degrees of consistency, intensity, and sincerity"; Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles*, 3.
[34] ""Shamrock Leaves," *The Southern Cross*, April 25, 1879.
[35] Ibid.
There is a long history of oral storytelling and bardic culture in Ireland. In the nineteenth century, a bard were often romanticized as a threadbare man who rambled along the roads and fields of Ireland, trading his fantastic tales and songs of ancient times for a bed and a hot meal. John O’Kane Murray, Lessons in English Literature (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co, 1887).

Miller, Emigrants and Exiles, 560.


“Irish Relief Fund,” The Southern Cross, February 18, 1880.

“St. Patrick Praying for Ireland,” The Southern Cross, April 1, 1875.

Ibid.

“General Items,” The Southern Cross, April 1, 1875.

Ussher, Los capellanes irlandeses, 163.

“Banagher Nowhere,” The Southern Cross, June 11, 1880.

Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland, 155.

“General Items,” The Southern Cross, April 8, 1875.

“St. Patrick’s Day,” The Southern Cross, March 17, 1887.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ardsallagh is a small townland in County Meath.


McKenna, Nineteenth Century Irish Emigration,” 237.

“Change of Accent,” The Southern Cross, July 9, 1886.

Ibid.
A MISTRESS’ VIRTUE

Women, Brutality, and Evangelicalism in the Slave South

On the eve of the American Civil War, evangelical religious fervor reestablished women as the moral center of the home, responsible for the virtue of their families. Until recent decades, historical scholarship and public opinion suggested that because of their religion and femininity, white women were largely innocent in the sins of their slaveholding husbands. In reality, the evangelical woman’s relationship with slavery was far more complicated. Plantation mistresses struggled to reconcile this new moral imperative with the violence and ethical problems of chattel slavery, although the system brought them great personal benefit. Unable to fully justify slavery in concert with their moral charter, some plantation mistresses challenged the brutality of slavery, but only when it most dramatically conflicted with their moral mission, and did not question the institution as a whole.

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Culturally defined by the horrors of racialized slavery, the antebellum South was also the backdrop to an effervescent rise of evangelical religious activity. Although the tune of saving souls, morality in the home, and Christian rebirth enchanted those living below the Mason-Dixon line, the sacred-minded insistence of their clergymen was confronted with a brutal economic practice. If at first evangelicals sought to ameliorate or even end slavery, they soon realized they would have to rationalize it and ethicize it if they were to keep their congregants. As evangelicalism acquiesced to slavery, it also reinterpreted familial roles for all those in the Abrahamic patriarchal structure. Evangelicals championed a new role for women in the home, one of moral caretaker, guardian, and proselytizer. In contrast to prevailing social norms that had discounted their value altogether, most evangelical Southern women latched onto a role that elevated their existence beyond their ability to provide aesthetic or reproductive benefit.

Yet, if mothers were entrusted with the moral status of the home, they would have to reckon with the sin of slavery. Few evangelicals fought the notion that slavery brutalized the white family, and so, when slavery attacked the sanctity of the family, women attacked it in return. But when slavery served the ideal of patriarchal order established by proslavery evangelicalism, women allowed it to continue unchallenged. Balancing a moral charter with the desire to maintain the benefits of slave society proved difficult for the women caught between the rise of evangelicalism and the increasingly brittle system of chattel slavery.
LIFE IN THE HOME: A WOMAN AND HER NEEDS
The antebellum period saw the rise of rhetoric valorizing the home as a place of particular moral, spiritual, and gendered significance in both the North and the South. Prominent Northern abolitionists like Harriet Beecher Stowe advocated for the sanctification of the home, as did proslavery Southerners, who saw the separate sphere as a tool of social control. Keen to improve the moral standing of its congregants, Southern evangelicalism appropriated the sanctification of the home as a religious task specific to women. This cult of domesticity intentionally reinforced ideals that tied Southern women to the home and kept them away from the public sphere. For example, in a response to a women’s rights advocate, prominent Southern essayist Louisa McCord penned “Woman and Her Needs” in 1852. In her view, women were not needed in, and were even a detriment to, the public sphere, for their role was “to be the soul of breath, the life, the love-law of that home; the mother, the wife, the sister, the daughter—such is woman’s holiest sphere, such her largest endowment...Such is woman’s noble task. Can any be nobler?” For many women, particularly those of the plantation class, the answer was no. In being commissioned to care for the home, women received a significant moral task; there would be no need for them to step outside the domestic sphere.

The home became a sacred place, and women’s virtuous love became analogous to God’s grace. A pious home would cultivate a pious family, and as guarantors of the domestic environment, women were chiefly responsible for this piety. Donald Mathews presents the ideal of “Evangelical Womanhood”; women “were endowed with a capacious piety—not that men were thought to be impious, but women were thought somehow to be more intensely and consistently pious because they were assumed to be more emotional and affectionate than men.” Elizabeth Fox-Genovese’s extensive research into the journals and diaries of Southern women, such as Eliza Carmichael, “a Presbyterian, [who] found that a journal helped her keep her pledge to God,” and Lucilla McCorkle, “[who]...dated all her journal entries by reference to the Sabbath and devoted long passages to...exhorting herself to greater efforts” regarding household chores and maintenance, demonstrates the vital importance of religion to the inner life of Southern women.

Other women, like Grace Latimer Whittle of Norfolk, Virginia, devoted much of their diaries to intense, emotive reflection on their spiritual state. Latimer considered the importance of religion in undated poems titled, “The Holy Spirit,” “A Prayer,” and “Faith,” which read, “Oh may it be my happy lot, / To have that faith and lose it not. / To know I have an heavenly charm/ To shield me from temptation harm, / and may I lose these human fears/ While I pass through this vale of tears.” Accomplished diarist Mary Chestnut relayed her fervor after leaving a sermon during the Civil War:

What a sermon! The preacher stirred my blood. My very flesh crept and tingled. A red-hot glow of patriotism passed over me. Such a sermon must strengthen the hearts and the hands of any people. There was more exhortation to fight and die à la Joshua than meek Christianity, however.
These evangelical women experienced religion viscerally, but the call to fight was an unusual one. Before the Civil War, evangelical womanhood presented a set of ideals that kept women away from worldly affairs. As “the home supplanted the church as the essential Christian community” and “the mother’s role in nurturing the family in Christian love [became] so important...women’s indispensable and unique contribution to religion and morality in the household, offered them honor and respect equal to that of men.” Thus, women exercised their evangelical duties inside the home, rather than by meddling in external affairs. Though the cult of domesticity lent respect to women, it also became a tool of gender segregation.

“Although women certainly were uncomfortable with certain corruptive elements of slavery, most saw little incongruence between their positions as slave mistresses and the ideal of evangelical womanhood.”

Although the moral power of women might have been used to critique slavery far more harshly, given all of its associated sins, Southern women had little interest in denouncing the totality of slavery. Instead, they argued that such a hierarchy was God’s will, and as the primary ambassadors of religion in the home, they were bound to uphold and support the inferior rank of both women and slaves.

Belief in divine ordination seemed to vindicate the slave society, rather than as a program for its reform.15 Fox-Genovee comments on this acceptance: “Southern ladies took their religious responsibilities seriously, but they were more likely to weave them into their ideals of rank than to draw upon them for criticism of society.”14 She quotes Virginia Cary, an American prescriptivist author,

[R]eligion, if not most manifest in female deportment, is at least most necessary to enable women to perform their allotted duties in life. The very nature of those duties demands the strength of Christian principle to ensure their correct and dignified performance... She seems to have been advocating religion as an aid for survival in slave society, rather than as a program for its reform.15

...
A Mistress’ Virtue

prophet”—not only mistaken in her beliefs, but heretical. Burge and McCord saw slavery as just and divinely ordained, and as such, saw slaveholding as an intentionally ameliorative process for those enslaved. This conditional improvement under slavery reified its position in the patriarchal order, and therefore maintaining slavery fell under women’s feminine duty in the evangelical household.

Not all women approved of slavery or all of its aspects, and when they did not do so, it was largely because of slavery’s challenge to the framework of the evangelical family. Mary Chestnut relayed the scene of a slave auction to explain her discontent with the system:

So I have seen a negro woman sold—up on the block—at auction. I was walking. The woman on the block overtopped the crowd. I felt faint—seasick. The creature looked so like my good little Nancy. She was a bright mulatto with a pleasant face. She was magnificently gotten up in silks and satins...I daresay the poor thing knew who would buy her...You know how women sell themselves and are sold in marriage, from queens downward, eh? You know what the Bible says about slavery—and marriage. Poor women. Poor slaves.

Chestnut saw little similarity between the slave being sold and her own relationship with Nancy; she was not sickened by the ownership of chattel property, but by the sale and sexual exploitation of slaves.

Similarly, Catherine Clinton claims that “the plantation mistress saw herself as the conscience of the slave South. Generally a mother herself, she opposed the breakup of families; mistresses often pleaded with planters to prevent slave sales that would destroy black families.” Women’s restriction to the domestic sphere meant they had little desire or ability to question the system in its entirety. Although Mary Chestnut was secretly opposed to slavery, most other women seemed content with the notion that slavery was God’s will. It was merely their duty to exercise moral guidance as they did elsewhere in the familial setting, leading them to oppose mixed-race sexual relationships and the breakup of families, but not slavery as a whole. Because women were unable to change either the slave system or their moral responsibilities, they “had to achieve a balance between these values and the deception, self-deception, and contradiction [of slavery].”

According to Clinton, women could only protect their conception of evangelical womanhood by lying to themselves and their communities about the realities of slavery.

A WRETCHED COUNTRY: SLAVERY AND THE WHITE FAMILY

This is not to say that women found it easy to live alongside slaves. Some were morally challenged by slavery and others detested the effects slavery had on the white family. Sarah Gayle, wife of an Alabama planter and politician, kept an extensive diary. She found herself to be in deep tension with the slaves she owned, particularly when her husband...
Many women believed that slavery polluted the souls of fathers just as it polluted those of boys. Wives’ fears of their husbands’ sexual relations with slaves ran the gamut from blaming the slave alone to recognizing the full moral culpability of their husbands as sexual predators. The empathetic fear of the exploitation of female slaves and disgust at racial mixing led Gertrude Clanton Thomas to condemn the actions of both her husband and her father, who had fathered children by slaves, in her private journal. She thought light-skinned female slaves were “subject to be bought by men, [sic] with natures but one degree removed from the brute creation and with no more control over their passions—subjected to such a lot are they not to be pitied… oh is it not enough to make us shudder at the standard of morality in our Southern homes?” Here, it was not slaves who are characterized by animalism, but white slaveholders.

However, as pitiable as the condition of “Fancy girls” was, white Southern women, according to Thomas, had it far worse: “Southern women are, I believe all at heart abolitionists [sic] but then I expect I have made a very broad assertion [sic] but I will stand to the opinion that it far worse: ‘Southern women are, I believe all at heart abolitionists [sic] but then I expect I have made a very broad assertion [sic] but I will stand to the opinion that abolitionists exhibits the degree to which women were abolitionists exhibits the degree to which women recognized slavery as harmful to the moral sanctuary of the home.

Mary Chestnut also based her judgment of slaveholders’ sexual relations with slaves on their effect on the white family. She critiqued Stowe’s despicable character of Simon Legree as a failure of didactic fiction, writing:

> a magnate who runs a hideous black harem with its consequences under the same roof with his lovely white wife, and his beautiful and accomplished daughters? He holds his head as high and poses as a model of all human virtues to these poor women whom God and laws have given him…you see, Mrs. Stowe did not hit the sorest spot. She makes Legree a bachelor.

The term used at the time was “licentiousness,” referring to these sexual relationships while euphemistically ignoring the violence inherent in them. For Chestnut, the sin of slavery was compounded when it occurred in the presence of the innocent white family, rather than among men alone. The disconnect between the reasons Southern women criticized slavery and the ones for which Northern women did was articulated in Chestnut’s comment; insofar as Southern women were willing to attack slavery, it was for their own sake and the sake of their families, not out of concern for the enslaved.
Slavery also allowed, and even glorified, male violence, to the horror of many evangelical women. Fox-Genovese claims that slavery shaped the Southern ideal of white masculinity through its “generalized ritualization of brutality, dominance over women, formal political democracy, celebration of the unbridled independence of free white men, and especially racism.”

Dominance was as inextricable from male duty as piety was from female, and men adapted as readily to this paradigm as women did to theirs. However, there were times when women believed their moral imperative superseded their husband’s right to paternal authority, and would intervene on behalf of slaves. Fanny Cassady, a house slave owned by Mistress Sally and Master Jordan, later told of her mistress’ revulsion at her husband’s actions. In Cassady’s words,

On another occasion, when Cassady’s mother made a mistake in the kitchen, Jordan ordered Sally to strike Cassady’s mother as punishment. Sally obliged, but did so half-heartedly, provoking Jordan to say, “Hit her, Sally, hit de black bitch like she ‘zerve to be hit.”

As these occasions illustrate, evangelical women were forced to balance their innate and religious horror at their husband’s violence, and the general brutality of slavery with their duty to obey their husbands. Actions by white women like Sally demonstrate both the risks and ineffectiveness of attempting to challenge the power dynamics of evangelical slave society. The inability to curb a husband’s violence must have been appalling to an evangelical woman, for “[e]vangelicals believed that even ‘men whose souls seem to be brutalized by long habits of cruelty and crime’ could be reformed ‘by pious women.”

The inability to shepherd a husband and children towards moral goodness was often a twofold failure for women; first, it represented their inability to create a moral standard in the home, and second, this tension revealed that not only men resorted to domestic violence to maintain household order. Although Lizzie Neblett was afraid to be violent toward her slaves, she was willing to do so toward her children because she did not fear their reprisal. As her children became more tyrannical—“Bob mistreated the horses; Walter used a cowhide to beat the cat; all the children’s faces bore the permanent scars of [her son] Billy’s fingernails”—so too did Lizzie. She threatened to “whip Billy every day if necessary,” and wrote to her husband that she “[had] whipped” her ten-month-old baby “several times.” She too expressed an agonizing desire to sell her slaves in her husband’s absence because of slavery’s effect on herself and her children. She saw herself transformed into a cruel mother, failing to rear virtuous children, and failing to be virtuous herself. She attributed these sins almost entirely to slavery. Because her husband was away fighting in the Civil War, she further condemned slavery for the disintegration of her family. Although she recognized her failure to live up to the ideal of evangelical womanhood, Neblett avoided placing blame on herself.

Women were responsible for the orderliness of slaves, particularly when their husbands were away, but were terrified of evoking the ire of slaves and provoking violence themselves. Ada Bacot described disciplining slaves as “a most unpleasant duty to perform.” She wrote, “I had to do this morning & see them punished. My very soul revolted at the idea, but I knew if I let it pass I would have more trouble so I thought the best way was to have a stop put to it at once. I hope I shall have nothing more of it.” Part of her moral duty was to maintain order, but her “soul revolted” at violence, forcing her to balance woman’s ideal nature with her responsibilities as a slaveholder. Women also resented their urges to discipline slaves, as Lucilla McCorkle did: “I find myself—and so does my dear husband find, that I am getting too hard in my manner toward her [Laura, a slave] foibles. God forgive me…I felt a good deal irritated at Laura’s disobedience…I often get out of patience but I know it is wrong.” If slavery could corrupt boys and transform them into miniature tyrants, it could also cause women to depart from ideals of gentleness and sympathy. When McCorkle’s husband became the softening influence in her life, she abdicated her feminine role.
As with all ideals, that of the demure, genteel evangelical woman had those who flouted its expectations. After exposure to years of brutality, some women no longer cared to curate an image of sympathy and morality. Clinton traces a slave mistress’ diary from 1815 to 1832. In 1815, the woman wrote that she was “[a]wakened this morning by the screeching of a female slave who was fleeing from the whip of her enraged master. I never witnessed such a scene…her neck torn and bloody, her eyes swollen…I live, it is said with one of the best masters.”47 Seventeen years later, the mistress described having a slave whipped in her diary. Recognizing her moral decline, she begged “Father of mercies, guard my heart and keep me from the seductions of evil. Oh how callous are the hearts of this people.”48 As the ideal of the evangelical woman developed in the slave South, the unnamed mistress above had inverse moral growth, changing from an empathetic and reluctant participant in slave society to one who engaged in its egregiousness. An uncharitable analysis of evangelical womanhood might argue that it encouraged women to turn a blind eye to the horrors of slavery to slaves, as long as their souls and the souls of their families were protected. The frame of feminine piety allowed the woman to conceive of slavery as a personal attack on her moral wellbeing, rather than a societal sin. As such, she was not responsible for slavery or its broader effects, but only for its influence on the home.

Most tales of women's harshness come from interviews with former slaves, and even then, only exceptionally brutal mistresses were seen worthy to mention, as often their violence paled in comparison to slaves’ treatment at the hands of their husbands. Only 40 percent of slaves in Works Progress Administration interviews mentioned mistresses, and of those, 35 percent were negative.50 Whether these women were always violent or if they bent to the pressures of the slave system is unclear in many cases, as they were unlikely to recount instances of their violence in private journals.

CONFRONTING GOD’S WILL AT HARPERS FERRY
While women were unlikely to discuss their violence, or tended to gloss over their husbands’ violence in their journals, many were quick to discuss the threat of slave violence in their private recollections, and nearly all considered these acts of violence to be against the will of God, as in their view, God had ordained slavery. The events of John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry forced Southern evangelical women to consider that perhaps slavery was not cohesive with evangelicalism. However, in the immediate aftermath of Harpers Ferry most were convinced that God’s righteousness had protected them. For example, Susan Bradford Eppes published her girlhood diaries from the antebellum and Civil War periods in Through Some Eventful Years. Supposedly written when Eppes was fourteen, the entry from two days after John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry reads as such:

October 18th, 1859—The horrible, horrible time that has come to us; our world seems turned topsy-turvy. We feel that we can trust none of the dear black folks who, before this, we had relied on at every turn. I am afraid to say a word for fear it will prove to be just what should have been left unsaid…What will become of us? Will our Father in Heaven let us be destroyed? Will the people we have always loved put torch to our homes and murder us when we seek to escape? That is what John Brown was urging them to do.51

Some days later, her slave Frances threatened that “you white folks will know a heap you ain’t never knowed before.”52 Perhaps Frances was referring to “the day appointed by the abolitionists for a general outbreak among the slaves of the South,” which the evangelical widower Elizabeth Lindsay Lomax also feared, until “their plan was defeated by the goodness of God.”53 Lomax’s Leaves from an Old Washington Diary seems to be a
more reliable source than Eppes’ “diary,” and is far more staid in its assessment of Harpers Ferry. The truthfulness of Eppes’ diaries is in question, as there is evidence to suggest that the diaries were fabricated or heavily altered before publication. Eppes’ husband was murdered by a former slave in 1904, perhaps explaining her fixation on the violence of slaves and complicating the narrative described in her diary.

Keziah Brevard was an unmarried, female slaveholder and thoroughly condemned Brown for what she viewed as immoral and a religious violence:

That wretch John Brown—if he had come as one of Christs [sic] Apostles & preached down sin he might have been the instrument of good. But he came down to cut our throats because we held property we would not do otherwise with, was preposterous. Did God set the children of Israel to cutting their Masters throats to free them from bondage—no—no—he brought them out of Egypt in his own peculiar way & he can send Africans [sic] sons & daughters back when he knows they are ready for their exode….But I do hope & pray that every one [sic] will be made to suffer here on earth who mars the peace of another.54

Brevard’s diary, while seemingly confident in the exaction of God’s justice, belied the Southern concern that perhaps evangelicals were on the wrong side of God. Brevard did not seem to disagree that Brown thought himself a prophet, but rather critiqued his methods by comparing them to Scripture. However, her analysis of Exodus forgets the death and violence that made the liberation of the Israelites possible.

In Mary Chestnut’s response to Harpers Ferry, she claimed, “Hitherto, I have never thought of being afraid of negroes. I had never injured any of them; why should they want to hurt me? Two-thirds of my religion consists in trying to be good to Negroes.”55 Even when personally affected by violence, after a slave killed her cousin, Chestnut claimed that “nobody is afraid of their own negroes. These are horrid brutes—savages, monsters—but I find everyone, like myself, ready to trust their own yard. I would go down to the plantation tomorrow and stay there even if there were no white person in twenty miles.”56 Chestnut, like many evangelicals, believed that God protected her from slave violence. For a devout evangelical and slaveholder, a revolt was unthinkable because it would mean God was no longer on the side of white slaveholders.

Each of these four women were keen to address the impossibility of a successful slave revolt. Some, like Lomax and Brevard, were confident an insurrection could not possibly be God’s will. Eppes and Chestnut were sure they had treated their slaves quite well, and therefore had nothing to fear. In various ways, all of these women attempted to assimilate the events of Harpers Ferry into worldviews shaped by evangelicalism. Eppes and Lomax prayed for the souls of John Brown and his conspirators. As Brevard bucked the image of the ideal evangelical woman due to her unmarried and slave-owning status, she reckoned with her moral culpability for being in the position of the Egyptians. Chestnut claimed that taking care of slaves was an intrinsic part of her evangelicalism—two-thirds, in fact.57 These reactions to Harpers Ferry also call into question Frances Kemble’s argument that women were more afraid of slavery than their husbands, as most incendiary responses to John Brown were male.58 Women were concerned with the threat of insurrection because of the simple fear of violence, but also because they were wary of disruption of the society that had granted them such an immense moral task. By threatening to destroy slavery, Brown threatened the place evangelical women had made for themselves in Southern society. Because women’s roles, ability to save their souls, and source of social identity were so linked to the patriarchal family order, a challenge to slavery, an intrinsic part of that order in slave society, was a challenge to an evangelical woman’s entire being.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the threat of slave insurrection and impending civil war should have concerned Southern women more than it did. Many of the formally published diaries examined in this article were heavily edited after the Civil War, but few removed the author’s assurances of God’s grace. However Southerners at the time interpreted God’s will, the balance between slavery and morality soon proved untenable for the rest of the nation. Southern evangelical women might have come to realize that their moral calling was at odds with their husbands’ economic desires if given more time and latitude to experiment with anti-slavery thought. Yet, Lizzie Neblett’s lament during the Civil War, in which she characterized herself as “a poor contemptible piece of multiplying human beings” illustrates the striking lack of awareness Southern women had to the parallels between their condition and that of their slaves.59 They may have never truly challenged slavery, despite its tensions with their religious commission. And as much as Southern women tried to forestall violence and the collapse of patriarchal order with genteel moralism, within decades of the rise of evangelical womanhood, women and evangelicals would have to reframe a woman’s duty in a now utterly foreign post-slavery society. }
Endnotes


[22] Chestnut, 15.


[27] Fox-Genovese, 365.

[28] Clinton, 190.

[29] Clinton, 95-96.


[31] Clinton 198.


[33] Weiner, 76.

[34] Fox-Genovese, 313.


[38] Faust, 190.


[40] Clinton, 87.


[45] Clinton, 185.

[46] Clinton, 185.

[47] See *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*.


[50] Clinton, 188.


[52] Eppes, 119.


[56] Clinton, 195.

[57] Clinton, 195.


[59] Faust, 189.
The period of socialist rule in Vienna, Austria, in the 1920s has been dubbed “Red Vienna.” The socialist city government’s longest-lasting legacy in the Austrian capital is the gemeindebauten, or large public housing projects built to house refugees flowing into the city following Austria-Hungary’s loss in World War I. The gemeindebauten were more than a quick solution to the city’s housing shortage: their design and the social programs they housed were meant to indoctrinate their residents in socialist values and pave the way for socialist dominance over all of Austria.

Vienna was a city in crisis. Following the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s defeat in World War I, the city, once the cosmopolitan center of a multi-ethnic world power, had deteriorated into an impoverished, starving, and disease-stricken capital of a small rump state. Competing conservative and liberal factions struggled for control of the national government, as the threat of civil war or a workers’ revolution loomed.¹ A flood of German-speaking refugees increasingly strained the city’s already overcrowded housing as they fled the former provinces of the Empire. Amidst this tension and disorder, a short-lived coalition of conservative parties and the socialist Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs (SDAPÖ) managed to bring stability to the fledgling republic and stave off civil unrest and international intervention.² Though its national prominence ended after the collapse of the coalition in 1920, the SDAPÖ’s support among the urban working class kept it in control of Vienna through the next decade. The era of SDAPÖ dominance in the city, characterized by the implementation of the party’s socialist ideology, has been dubbed “Red Vienna.”

Amartya Sen’s “capability approach” provides a useful framework for understanding the intentions of the SDAPÖ and the purpose of the gemeindebauten. Believing that the only path to socialist ascendency in Austria was a “slow revolution,” or gradual change within the existing state apparatus, SDAPÖ leaders worked to educate workers on the benefits of socialism, and lead them to value socialist principles.³ Red Vienna’s leaders wanted new housing to provide more than just an adequate roof over their citizens’ heads; it was constructed to give them the tools to better themselves and live an ideal socialist lifestyle. Because socialism was new to Austrians, SDAPÖ had to instill its ideas about the proper role of the citizenry and the proper socialist way of life in the Viennese. The gemeindebauten served the dual purpose of providing housing for the Viennese while also indoctrinating them with socialist values and giving them the foundation needed to thrive under the new political leadership.

BACKGROUND

All of Austria faced profound challenges and changes following Austria-Hungary’s defeat in World War I. Once the heartland and power center of a large and multi-ethnic empire, the newly-declared Austrian Republic was formed from only the German-speaking territories of the old monarchy. Deprived of its former imperial territories, the rump state faced an economic crisis from a lack of the natural resources that had once driven the imperial economy.⁴ As economic opportunities in the countryside shrank, the population of Vienna swelled. German speakers from the former imperial provinces fled the newly created ethnostates of Eastern Europe and flooded into the capital of the new republic, straining already scarce resources and overwhelming the limited housing stock of the capital city.⁵

The centerpiece of SDAPÖ municipal policy in Vienna, and the party’s most lasting impact on the city, was the series of public housing complexes, or gemeindebauten, constructed during the party’s fifteen year reign. These ambitious projects dwarfed contemporaneous efforts by other European cities to construct cheap and efficient housing for workers in both their scale and ideological ambition. In a city with little more than two million inhabitants, the SDAPÖ constructed 64,125 housing units, which housed as much as one-eighth of the city’s population before the party’s banishment by the fascists in 1934.³ For the leaders of Red Vienna, these municipal housing projects were more than just a humanitarian necessity for their people; they were an important component of the SDAPÖ’s strategy for gaining socialist control of the entirety of Austria.

The Good Life

Reshaping Society and Social Values through Public Housing in Red Vienna

By Mason J. Herleth
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Liberals faced the threat of attack from conservative economic elites, the powerful Catholic Church, and the traditionally-minded Austrian provinces, while conservatives faced the real possibility of a Bolshevik-style revolt by urban workers inspired by contemporaneous events in Bavaria and Hungary. To maintain stability in the fledgling Republic, the conservative Christlichsoziale Partei and liberal SDAPÖ formed a coalition government that resolved the worst of the immediate crises facing the nation. The SDAPÖ only remained powerful at the national level for a few years, losing its place in the coalition government by the end of 1920, but it held power in the city and province of Vienna throughout the decade and up to its disbandment by Austrian fascist forces in 1934.

The SDAPÖ managed to deftly balance the interests of laborers and the urban bourgeoisie in the administration of Vienna. While it believed that the socialist movement would grow and ultimately gain control of the country, it hoped to bring about this socialist victory through a “slow revolution” that worked within the existing state to foster socialist orthodoxy among the workers, not in a dramatic and violent revolution to overthrow the existing state apparatus. SDAPÖ leaders realized conservative forces in the country were too strong to be ousted by a socialist revolution, and any conflict would drag the nation into civil war, which would ultimately be decided by the intervention of the victorious nations of World War I, who, fearing the spread of socialism further into Western Europe, would no doubt favor the nation’s conservatives.

This recognition that a social and cultural, not political, revolution was the best means to socialist ascendancy in Austria was a central tenet of the political philosophy of the SDAPÖ, a set of beliefs historians have dubbed “Austromarxism.” This philosophy governed the policies of the SDAPÖ, including its response to the housing shortage plaguing the city of Vienna. The writings of Viennese political thinkers in the decades leading to World War I developed the core principles of Austromarxism. The four men with the strongest influence over the movement—Otto Bauer, Max
Adler, Karl Renner, and Victor Adler—all lived, studied, and wrote in Vienna in the waning days of the Empire. Their professors at the University of Vienna and the cultural milieu of the city inspired their beliefs. The grandeur and elegance of the city’s cosmopolitan center under Imperial control contrasted sharply with the expanding industrial suburbs crowded with factories and dank tenements.

Otto Bauer and his counterparts were also profoundly impacted by the cultural heritage that surrounded them in Vienna. As one of the leading centers of culture and learning in the German-speaking world, nineteenth-century Vienna was a source of pride for German intellectuals. Removed from the Western centers of Paris and London, Bauer and other Austromarxists were uninspired by the enlightenment ideals that had spurred revolution and social and political change in their western neighbors. They looked to their Germanic cultural heritage for inspiration. The paternalistic and controlling role they envisioned for the state when formulating their policies for the city of Vienna stemmed from this reliance on Germanic, not Western, teachings.

Otto Bauer became the leading voice of Austromarxism following the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and his writings overshadowed other voices in defining the movement and its central beliefs. Bauer was a proponent of what he called the “third way,” a political philosophy that sought a compromise between the radical Marxism of Bolshevik communism and the more conservative movement of social democracy. His path towards socialist dominance of the Austrian state called for an initial compromise between workers and the bourgeoisie who economically dominated Vienna, while also fostering socialist and cultural education of the laborers before the eventual socialist dominance of the Austrian state. Bauer was a key player in the SDAPÖ policy of tempering and outmaneuvering radical leftist movements and demonstrations, relying instead on public programs that both engendered loyalty to the SDAPÖ-dominated city government and educated Viennese workers on their Austrian heritage and socialist philosophy.

The most pressing issue facing the Austrian state and the city of Vienna in the years following World War I was a drastic housing shortage. Vienna had industrialized and grown rapidly before the war, expanding to over two million inhabitants by 1910. Housing construction failed to keep pace with the ever-growing need, and informal tent camps of urban migrants formed on the city’s periphery. The shortage was exacerbated by the war, as raw materials were diverted to the war effort and nearly all construction was halted in the capital. The situation only worsened after the war’s end, as German speaking refugees flooded the city. Rent control measures implemented during the war to curb rapid inflation meant those with housing no longer needed to take on boarders to afford rent.

What little housing was available for the city’s working class was overcrowded and outdated. The tenements that proliferated in the decades before the war in the new industrial suburbs on the city’s edge were considered some of the worst in Europe. Erected as quickly and cheaply as possible by bourgeois landlords, they crowded large, multi-generational families into the small apartments with little access to natural light or fresh air. Tenement apartments were not much more than one long narrow room perpendicular to a central hallway that ran the length of the building. Most of these tenement apartments had no plumbing, electricity, or gas, and all the units in a hallway shared communal toilets.

This unique approach to gaining national power through the slow reeducation of the SDAPÖ’s working-class supporters has been dubbed *hineinwachsen*, or “growth from within.” Implicit in this policy is the belief that cultural values and beliefs are malleable and can be reshaped through policy. The SDAPÖ’s goal was not only to provide better living conditions for its followers, but also to redefine their values and priorities. For the socialist party to reach political ascendancy, it would need broad support from a dedicated populace. Its public housing initiatives served the dual purpose of providing for the basic needs of Vienna’s citizens, while also instilling them with socialist principles and high German culture. It also aimed to promote loyalty to the party and its philosophies, with the ultimate intention of ushering in a socialist rise to national political dominance.
The socialist leaders of Red Vienna recognized the drastic need for new housing in the city. Most immediately, new housing would pacify restive radical leftist groups who wanted more dramatic social change than the SDAPÖ. More importantly, though, it would give SDAPÖ leaders the means to indoctrinate workers with socialist beliefs and engender loyalty to the party and its ultimate dream of political supremacy within Austria. While the SDAPÖ recognized the humanitarian necessity of providing housing for the city’s poor and working class, it did not discuss its plans using the language of human rights. Thus, a human rights discourse is not the correct lens through which to analyze its actions and motivations.

Is there, then, a different way to understand the SDAPÖ’s dual desire to provide for the basic needs of the city’s disadvantaged residents while also educating them in socialist values and their cultural heritage? The philosopher and economist Amartya Sen provides a useful framework for analyzing the SDAPÖ’s motivations for constructing the gemeindebauten with his “capability approach.” Developed by Sen and expanded on by others, the capability approach offers an alternative structure for understanding the importance of social and economic development to human rights. The capability approach suggests that economic development and opportunity can be measured in terms of “capabilities.” Capabilities are described as a person’s “freedoms or opportunities to achieve ‘functionings,’” which Sen characterizes as “various states of human beings and doing that a person can undertake.” Most simply, the capability approach measures a person’s social, political, and economic opportunity through his or her ability to attain basic human needs and achieve a lifestyle that is deemed culturally valuable.
Red Vienna's *gemeindebauten* were an attempt by SDAPÖ leaders to provide capabilities for the city's working-class laborers. Though they did not use the anachronistic language of the capability approach, the goals of the socialist municipal leaders mesh well with Sen's theory. The city housing projects provided for the basic needs of their residents, while giving citizens the tools to better themselves and achieve an ideal lifestyle. The *gemeindebauten* not only provided the means for cultural and social betterment, but were meant to redefine the culturally ideal lifestyle. If Viennese workers were going to lead the socialists to national dominance, they had to understand the values of socialism and be made to live in a socialist way. The municipal housing projects performed the dual role of providing for and reshaping the cultural ideals of the Viennese working class.

**THE GEMEINDEBAUTEN**

The most radical features of the *gemeindebauten* were the communal facilities and amenities they offered their residents. While all apartments had kitchens, housing complexes also provided common dining halls where residents could congregate and join in group meals. These halls could be used for festivals and celebrations during national holidays and served as gathering places. In the hours between meals, dining rooms were transformed into cafes modeled after Vienna's famous coffee houses, furnished with a wide array of SDAPÖ-approved newspapers and publications. Many of the housing blocks included concert and lecture halls, where leftist intellectuals spoke on the benefits of a socialism and ensembles performed pieces from the city's illustrious musical history.

These communal spaces were the hallmark of the *gemeindebauten* and were featured heavily in advertisements and newspaper articles touting the new facilities. Advertisements and propaganda surrounding the new municipal housing blocks proliferated. Newspapers and other publications disseminated by the SDAPÖ touted the benefits of living in the new municipally-built and administered projects, and demonized the old tenements of the prewar city. The images of these new housing projects promoted a vision of modernity, progress, and communal harmony. Common social spaces and amenities, not private domestic spaces, were the predominant themes of these advertisements, propagating the socialist ideals of a communally-centered life, one spent among other socialist citizens in common spaces, not alone or with family in private quarters. Communal spaces were the centers of daily life in the *gemeindebauten*, and were meant to foster socialization among neighbors, all under the watchful eye of the party.

The *gemeindebauten* provided more than just opportunities for communal leisure and learning, they offered residents a wide range of services within the same complex. They contained communal laundry facilities, with state-of-the-art equipment. Beyond the communal kitchens, laundries, and bathing facilities, the municipal housing complexes offered a myriad of other necessities to their residents, ranging from childcare facilities and clinics to libraries. These facilities provided invaluable services to the residents of the *gemeindebauten*, while providing SDAPÖ leaders with opportunities to influence citizens and instruct them in the socialist principles crucial to the party’s ultimate goal of regaining national dominance. By providing these services to municipal apartment residents, SDAPÖ leaders hoped to engender loyalty to the party and gain support for their broader reforms.

Communal facilities and in-house services were one facet of socialist leaders’ goal of transforming Austrian society and radically departing from centuries of tradition. This included altering the role of women in the home. Tasked with cleaning, cooking, and doing laundry, lower-class women had little opportunity to take part in the cultural or political life of the city. Many of the innovative features included in plans for the *gemeindebauten* aimed to free women from the “tyranny of domestic labor,” and allow them to become more active in city life.

The earliest public housing projects in Red Vienna called for professionalized housework. In these early units, women employed by the city cooked daily communal meals for the facility, collected and cleaned laundry, and even cleaned individual apartments. The party intended for women to spend their newfound leisure in the learning and social spaces programmed into the housing blocks. These early attempts at totally freeing working-class women from domestic chores through professionalized housework proved too expensive to be viable on a large scale, but the aim of lessening women’s domestic burden and bringing them into the public sphere was realized in later housing schemes. Though they could not abolish the domestic chores of the working class, later *gemeindebauten* did literally transform the visibility of household labor and importance of women in everyday life. In pre-war tenements, long, narrow apartments were lined along a central hallway that ran through the building. Kitchens were typically the room nearest to the central hallway, while the bedrooms lined the outside walls. Because they were in the center of the building, kitchens had no windows and were typically dark and cut off from the outside street life. The women relegated to these spaces had little access to the city outside their apartments and their plight was easily hidden from the view of the passing public. In contrast, new housing had windows in every room, and often had balconies on or near the kitchen. This drew women’s domestic work into public view so that they could socialize with those outside their window and observe the life of the surrounding city.
Historians continue to debate the benefit of the housing reforms for working-class women. Despite good intentions and progressive rhetoric, their roles as mothers and wives continued to define life for women in the Gemeindebauten. Amenities meant to relieve women in the housing blocks proved to be restrictive and made engagement in public and city life difficult.

Child-care facilities were closed on holidays, and time in the communal laundries was limited to one day a week, curtailing women's leisure time for political or cultural pursuits. Historians like Helmut Gruber argue that resettlement in city housing projects destroyed the tight-knit communal bonds that had existed among women in the tenements. Though their work was confined to the inner recesses of tenement apartments, women socialized in the central corridor that ran through the building and formed bonds that alleviated some of the burdens of daily chores. Women might agree to watch their neighbors' children while they shopped or were ill.

Tenements, though overcrowded, might house large extended families who could share the responsibilities for household chores. Gruber argues that the SDAPÖ Gemeindebauten refocused this reliance on others within the community towards reliance on the socialist party and its city government. By providing only small apartments that could house no more than a single nuclear family, the new housing project broke up the large extended families found in the tenements. By replacing long central corridors with landings that served only three or four flats, SDAPÖ designers lessened opportunity for informal socialization with close neighbors.

Others counter that this argument romanticizes the appalling conditions of life in the tenements and that the Gemeindebauten reshaped the lives of Viennese working-class women for the better. Tenements rarely had running water or electricity, while new city-built units had plumbing, electricity, and gas appliances. Tenements had been dark, and women had been relegated to the interior spaces of the building, away from public life. In the Gemeindebauten, every room had a window, so units were filled with light; even while doing household chores, women could interact with their neighbors and be a part of city life.

Laundry facilities were new and equipped with the latest appliances and housed in large, well-ventilated, brightly lit rooms. Though they may not have been completely freed from household tasks, women still enjoyed more leisure time, opportunities for education, and cultural and political engagement in the new housing projects.

While socialist leaders aimed for a radical departure from traditional roles for women and old-fashioned lower-class housing, the Gemeindebauten designs were rooted in the past and in the architectural heritage of the city. SDAPÖ policy, which included the dissemination of high culture among the working class, led the designers and leaders of Vienna's socialist government to appropriate forms and styles from the city's wealthy neighborhoods for use in the municipal housing projects. The apartments and townhomes of the urban elite were concentrated in the city center and had developed into a distinct typology in the century of urban growth preceding World War I.

Gemeindebauten planners looked to the layout and forms of these middle and upper-class apartment complexes in part because of their efficiency and healthfulness, but also to allow working-class Viennese to connect with the cultural heritage of their nation's upper class. This inspiration manifested itself in the Gemeindebauten's courtyards, which had been a hallmark of the city center apartments of the urban elite. In contrast to the dark and stuffy interiors of the prewar tenements, which possessed only a few windows in the rooms along the buildings' outer edges, bourgeois apartments were well lit and ventilated. However, the courtyards that allowed light into interior rooms were impractical and uneconomical in the prewar tenements because they reduced the amount of buildable land available for apartments. This was of little consequence to socialist municipal leaders when designing the Gemeindebauten. The city-administered housing projects were heavily subsidized, with no intention of generating income for the city. The economic pressures that precluded courtyards from earlier tenements were non-issues for SDAPÖ leaders, who readily incorporated courtyards into nearly all of their public housing designs.

The central courtyards of the Gemeindebauten provided more than just air and light for residents; they acted as a communal gathering space and “public living room” for the housing complex. While they may have been inspired by the apartment houses of the city’s elite, they radically differed from earlier projects in their public nature. Courtyards in the prewar apartments of the city's well-to-do were almost always private, accessible to only the lucky residents of the expensive ground floor apartments. They were the exclusive domain of the building's owner, who typically occupied an apartment on the ground floor. But in the Gemeindebauten, courtyards were accessible to all the building's residents as well as the public. Except for a few early iterations, most of the apartments in the SDAPÖ's public housing complexes were accessed through the communal courtyard, and the ground floors of the buildings facing the courtyards were home to the complexes' communal facilities like cafes, lecture and music halls, libraries, childcare facilities, and clinics. Socialization was encouraged in this space, which was always under the watchful eye of the municipal government through concierges and building managers. Courtyards were opened to the public, with large archways leading from the surrounding streets into the parklike space within the complex. This melding of public and private space reinforced SDAPÖ control of the city by encouraging socialization within spaces administered by the city.
“Residents of the neighborhoods surrounding the new housing projects could not fail to notice the paternal gaze of the city’s socialist leaders, as manifested in the new massive structures.”

The inclusion of courtyards allowed light and air to penetrate interior units, and provided all residents with access to activity outside the apartment, whether that be on the surrounding streets or the bustling communal courtyards. While tenements had effectively given higher status to street-facing units, designers of the gemeindebauten democratized the units within the housing complex by not prioritizing one side over the other. One resident characterized the new design by saying “the units no longer had a back, but two fronts.” This design feature reflected the socialist emphasis on commonality among the working classes.

Tenement apartment blocks had been nearly universally organized along a long, central corridor with communal toilet facilities along each end. Breaking with this tradition, socialist designers did away with the central corridor and replaced it with several common stairwells that led to landings on each floor shared by only three or four apartments. Each unit contained a private toilet room, though bathing facilities were usually communal. These stairwells were entered through the complex’s courtyard. By eliminating long central corridors, the municipal housing projects discouraged informal socialization in spaces not easily controlled by the party, and moved nearly all group activity to party-policed areas like courtyards and dining halls.

While the layout of Red Vienna’s municipal housing projects may have drawn inspiration from the city’s past, their monumental scale was unprecedented. Encompassing multiple city blocks, they dwarfed the surrounding earlier developments of private investors and speculators. The immensity of these projects was economical; larger buildings housed more units and more residents, but it also served as a reminder to Viennese residents of the power and authority of the SDAPÖ municipal government and its oversized influence on the city. Deemed “islands of socialism,” the gemeindebauten acted as socialist强holds and power centers throughout the city. Often these projects spanned several city blocks, even crossing busy streets and enveloping them into the complex. Residents of the neighborhoods surrounding the new housing projects could not fail to notice the paternal gaze of the city’s socialist leaders, as manifested in the new massive structures. The act of building itself symbolized the socialists’ control of the city. In the postwar years as Austria’s economy struggled to stabilize and building materials were in short supply, the government was one of the few entities with the financial means to construct anything, much less something as large as the gemeindebauten.

Pervasive in all aspects of the gemeindebauten design was the ability of city leaders and the housing project managers to heavily monitor and regiment the activity of residents. While the communal amenities and gathering spaces within the municipal housing facilities aimed to better the lives of the Viennese and engender loyalty towards the SDAPÖ, they also acted as mechanisms of control and paternalistic guidance. Building concierges monitored gathering spaces like courtyards and dining halls and reported back to their SDAPÖ superiors on residents who failed to follow rules or actively participate in the communal life of the complex. Children who played on courtyard lawns without permission and women who used laundry facilities on the wrong day...
could be cited for their infractions and disciplined. Some residents even faced eviction if they continued to disobey complex rules, an alarming threat in a city facing a drastic housing shortage. The SDAPÖ not only provided ample opportunities and resources for the residents of its municipal housing projects to better themselves and become loyal supporters of the socialist regime, but actively policed their lives to ensure they were cooperating.

The ideological impact of socialist leaders and their principles on the design of the gemeindebauten is clear when contrasted with the other public housing schemes developed in Europe during the same period. As all of Europe continued to industrialize, urbanize, and recover from the devastation of World War I, cities across the continent grappled with the same housing shortages as Vienna. These projects, less ambitious in scope than the gemeindebauten, lacked the ideological underpinnings that characterized public housing developments in Red Vienna. In Frankfurt, architect Ernst May spearheaded the construction of over 12,000 new affordable apartments for the city's working-class residents, but these units emphasized efficiency and economics above any ideology. In fact, most of the housing projects developed in Germany, France, and England during the interwar years were designed with affordability and mass production in mind. These units were much cheaper on average than the housing constructed in Vienna, relying on mass-produced components that could be easily installed by small teams of workers. Their designs were inspired by leading modern architects like Peter Behrens and Mies van der Rohe of the Bauhaus school in Dessau. They sought to break with Europe's building traditions by incorporating new forms and building suburban style developments of one or two floor apartments and standalone homes in suburban park-like settings. These movements contrast heavily with the monumental, urban, and labor-intensive construction of the gemeindebauten. While Vienna could have more economically followed the example set by other European public housing initiatives, the ideological mission of Red Vienna's explains the designs the SDAPÖ favored.

Acknowledging that the buildings were not meant to be profitable, the higher cost of construction and labor was of little consequence to SDAPÖ leaders, and in fact worked in their favor to gain support among Vienna's working class. The gemeindebauten demanded many laborers to complete the massive structures, providing jobs in an era of high unemployment and economic depression. Red Vienna's leaders favored large, multi-block housing complexes over the suburban developments of their European peers because it allowed for access to the communal facilities and amenities that were the centerpieces of the Viennese leaders' strategy for educating and bettering the city's residents. And while the large housing blocks may not have adopted the baroque ornamentation of the city's old, upper-class apartments, they did allow for an appropriation of these bourgeois apartments' forms and spatial organizations, connecting working-class citizens with their city's cultural heritage, another key facet of the party's bildung policy. These differences between the Viennese and other European responses to housing shortages are explained by the SDAPÖ's policy of using public housing to reshape Austrian society.

CONCLUSION

"To give the impression of grandeur without being brutal; to be simple without appearing impoverished; to be rigorous without becoming severe or austere" is how architectural critic Joseph Lux described the challenges facing Red Vienna's leaders as they crafted the city's plan for public housing. He also noted the structures must "give visible expression to the social ideas that such a building should embody." The SDAPÖ's answers to this lofty goal were the gemeindebauten, massive municipally-built and administered apartment blocks that would eventually house close to thirteen percent of the city's population. Though their design was rooted in the illustrious homes of the Empire's old elite, their size, amenities, and focus on communal living and reliance on the state was unprecedented in Vienna, and indeed in all of Europe. Socialist leaders designed these housing projects not only to provide adequate shelter for the city's citizens, but also to garner support for their cause and better residents intellectually and socially. Beyond providing the means for residents to improve their lives and their understanding of socialist goals, gemeindebauten managers and staff actively policed those who refused to take part in the communal life of the complexes. The gemeindebauten played an important role in SDAPÖ's ultimate goal of achieving national dominance. Though this plan would never reach fruition, the gemeindebauten's lasting legacy can be appreciated in the many surviving, monumental housing blocks that still grace Vienna's city streets.
Endnotes

[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid, 32.
[10] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, 40.
[19] Ibid, 41.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid, 43.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[34] Ibid, 81.
[36] Ibid, 75.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid, 77.
[39] Ibid, 78.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid, 81.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid, 82.
[46] Ibid.
[48] Ibid, 126.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid, 52.
[54] Ibid, 55.
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[59] Ibid, 55.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid, 57.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[66] Ibid, 145.
[68] Ibid, 213.
[69] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid, 166.
[73] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid, 52.
[78] Ibid, 53.
[79] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid, 36.
[84] Ibid.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the United States experienced a massive influx of immigrants from Eastern European countries. In order to combat growing tensions and xenophobia in communities, some women reformers decided to open settlement houses, or community centers, to provide resources to aid immigrant families in their transition to American life. While the bustling, urban cities of Chicago and New York are often thought of as the location of most of these settlement houses, some may be surprised to learn that the Midwestern city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, proudly hosted its own settlement organization under the guidance of a local public figure, Elizabeth “Lizzie” Black Kander. This study sheds light on Kander’s work with Milwaukee’s growing Russian-Jewish population and asserts that she operated in neither the public nor the private sphere, but in a third space, one of her own creation in which her embrace of domesticity ultimately yielded public action. Using contemporary newspaper articles, inventory lists, meeting minutes, as well as Kander’s personal and professional correspondence letters, diary entries, and papers, this article examines Kander’s impact on both the Jewish and impoverished communities in Milwaukee, and the influence of her Jewish and female identities on her work during a rising tide of antisemitism. In telling Kander’s story, this project will contribute to the diversifying narrative of women’s experiences as social reformers and help to preserve Kander’s legacy in the Milwaukee community.

The front page of the Milwaukee Sentinel on July 25th, 1940, carried the headline “Civic Leader is Dead,” marking the passing of social reformer and Jewish activist Lizzie Black Kander. Kander had been a pioneer of the settlement house movement in the late nineteenth century and helped countless immigrant families acclimate to their new lives in Milwaukee. She often wrote of her love and passion for others and her interest in women and children, believing that their access to fundamental resources and education was integral to the betterment of American society. She was, as the article reads, the “guiding spirit for many civic enterprises.” The following day, the Milwaukee Jewish Chronicle reflected on her contributions to the local Jewish community, writing, “She didn’t regard the women and children of the immigrant families as just ‘poor folk.’ She knew that…the boys and girls would grow up and become self-sufficient and self-respecting members of the community.”

Despite widespread praise for Kander’s work, the effectiveness of the settlement movement at interrupting the cycle of poverty has historically been minimized. In his book Spearheads for Reform, Allen Davis diminishes the value of the work women reformers performed in the “Progressive Era,” asserting that they failed to permeate the public sphere and chose not to enter the political space. He adds that many female settlement workers were simply motivated by their disgust at the “wastefulness and disorderliness” in the homes of their immigrant neighbors, not by a sense of civic duty. Davis echoes the critique that women working in the settlement movement comfortably operated within the confines of the period’s gender norms and thus were not truly “progressives.” Although many women of the settlement house movement were not motivated by a desire to challenge traditional gender roles, this does not mean that they were inactive, nor their contributions inconsequential. Instead, Lizzie Black Kander, like many other female progressives, worked in a third space: one of her own creation that was in neither the public nor private sphere, but rather at the intersection of both. It was in this third space that a woman’s duty to her home included streets, schools, and parks of her surrounding community. It was where a housewife could impact a stranger’s life and where mothering could inspire public change.

INDUSTRY, CLASS, AND MUCK IN THE CITIES
The heavy industrialization of the Gilded Age drove a wedge between the rich and the poor in American society, one that particularly affected immigrant communities in urban areas. Initially, aid societies and women’s clubs tended to the needs of the immigrants, but as time faded, patience and benevolence wore thin. In contrast to this wider trend, Kander continued to work for the immigrants of Milwaukee in the face of criticism and doubt from the public. As she familiarized herself with their community, she came to believe that many of their problems could be solved by both education and more importantly, access to social and cultural capital. Kander devoted her life to creating a space to integrate immigrants into American cities by providing services to empower and enrich the lives of these men, women, and children as future citizens of the United States.
The decades following the Civil War unleashed an unprecedented economic boom. From 1865 to 1900, the United States experienced a 600 percent increase in exports (primarily manufactured goods) and the gross national product rose from $7.4 million to $18.7 million. The prosperity of the U.S. lured millions of immigrants, mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe, all hoping to build a better life for themselves and their families. During this era some of the first multimillionaires emerged from the budding industrial system, including steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie, who wrote in 1893, “it is probable that our successors in industrial system, including steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie, who wrote in 1893, “it is probable that our successors in many future decades are to look back to the past decade as the golden age of the Republic, as far as material prosperity is concerned.” Despite the opulence and remarkable profit margins attained by a select few, the Gilded Age, as this period came to be called, did indeed live up to its name—it was a layer of shimmering gold covering a dismal, murky foundation.

“As more people flocked to cities, the ills of industrialization began to reveal themselves.”

As more people flocked to cities, the ills of industrialization began to reveal themselves. In the 1880s, one percent of the population owned 51 percent of the nation’s real and personal property. In addition, multimillionaires, who made up 0.33 percent of the population, owned 17 percent of the country’s wealth. This unequal distribution of capital left an estimated one-third of Americans living in poverty and on the brink of starvation. Metropolitan areas particularly suffered. Many descriptions of urban areas published during this period candidly describe the smog, muck, and general decay of the inner cities. In hopes of exposing the stark economic and social inequalities the majority-immigrant urban poor faced, Gilded Age journalist Jacob Riis famously documented their deplorable living conditions with haunting photographs and detailed accounts of their grim reality. In one account, Riis noted that one tenement he visited was “much like the one in front we just left, only fouler, closer, darker—we will not say more cheerless. The word is a mockery.” His middle and upper-class audience found the realities of their fellow citizens’ living conditions egregious, and after the economic crises of 1873 and 1893, many Americans clamored for change.

The Progressive Era began in the 1890s and lasted until about 1920, and was largely a reaction to societal apathy to the perils of lower-class citizens and corruption during the Gilded Age. Progressive reformers sought to cleanse local and state governments of their endless web of trusts, corruption, and systematic inequalities upon which a small elite had built their wealth. Some Americans drew parallels between cleaning up the cities and tidying up a home, and referred to the movement as “municipal housekeeping.” More specifically, though, progressive women felt that male leaders had failed to properly care for their citizens and country. Those involved in this movement believed that it was precisely their perceived inherent traits as women that distinguished them as agents of social change. At the 1906 National American Women’s Suffrage Association Convention, activist Jane Addams expressed her grievances on the subject, saying, “[t]he men have been carelessly indifferent to much of this civic housekeeping, as they have always been indifferent to details of the household.” Many of these reformers, including Lizzie Black Kander, believed that the time had come for society to allow the traditional housekeepers—women—into the public arena to help get the nation back in order.
One of the earliest forms of women's civic involvement in the United States was participation in women's clubs. Protestant middle-class women traditionally joined such organizations to fill idle time, often to discuss literature or facilitate philanthropic events. As the harsh realities of the industrial system surfaced, however, clubwomen stepped outside of their doors, focused on aid and reform in their neighborhoods, and used these social organizations as leverage to join the progressive movement. In the early twentieth century, the president of the New Jersey Federation of Women's Clubs, Mrs. Frank A. Pattison, wrote, "The Relation of the Woman's [sic] Club to the American City," an article defending the necessity of reform-based, philanthropic, women organizations to the public. "[The woman's club] is an aid in bringing to light some of the wrongs to be righted... Is it not also a power in ushering in that ideal democracy for which we as a nation stand?" Pattison believed that by allowing women into the physical space of the public, they necessarily became active citizens in their communities. The wide scope of the social clubs included refining schools, improving municipal sanitation systems, reforming local governments, and even supporting immigrant families.

Jewish charitable organizations of the Progressive Era received far less attention than the predominantly Christian women's clubs. After a surge of Jewish immigration in the nineteenth century, many synagogues in metropolitan cities could no longer tend to the number of Jews in need. This deficit inspired Jewish men and women across the country, typically of the middle class, to work together in havarot, or charitable societies. However, the male-female unity of these clubs soon collapsed due to the increasing assimilation of Jewish members into American culture, which especially pressured them to subscribe to the Western concept of "public" and "private" spheres. Previously, American Jews had valued benevolence "as an expression of both men's and women's civic virtue," but now, according to Western gender roles, benevolence aligned most closely with women's perceived passivity and charity.

The consequences of this shift were twofold: not only did it lend itself to the moral inflation of men's acts of charity, but it also allowed Jewish men to question women's ability "to participate as civic equals in the philanthropic public sphere." In this way, many Jewish middle-class clubwomen in the Progressive Era faced adversity similar to their Protestant counterparts: neither were entirely welcome in the public sphere without the permission of men. Yet, their desire to work alongside the destitute in their communities prevented them from passively dwelling in the private sphere. Milwaukee native Lizzie Black Kander is an example of a woman who successfully navigated this vexatious divide.

**IMMIGRANTS IN MILWAUKEE**

Before the second wave of immigration in the late nineteenth century, Milwaukee's Jewish community was largely comprised of German immigrants. Fortunately, the wave of antisemitism that had swept imperial Germany did not materialize in Milwaukee. But as more refugees arrived from Russia, Poland, and other Eastern European countries, the established immigrants and the newcomers began to polarize. In 1873, the number of Jews in Milwaukee totaled about 1,800 people; in 1895, the number swelled to 7,000, with Russian Jews making up 39 percent of the city's Jewish population. Milwaukee became the destination for many families fleeing their war-torn homelands due to its established Jewish circles and comfortable distance from the overcrowded tenements of New York and Chicago. Upon receiving word of the impending arrival of Russian Jews, Jewish Milwaukee men anticipated the arrival of strong and highly-skilled boys who would contribute to the growing market. Although many fitting this profile did arrive, the community's enthusiasm subsided at the sight of women, children, and elderly refugees in tow, chilling the originally warm welcome.

When the first ten Russians arrived in Milwaukee in October of 1881, Jewish philanthropists formed temporary committees and relief societies in order to provide economic and social support; men filled every seat of the organizations. Two men of one such committee, Elias Friend and David Adler, composed a letter sent out to the local Jewish families for the purpose of raising funds, all addressed "Dear Sir," urging those who saw themselves as "friends of humanity" or "lovers of freedom" to donate to the cause. At first, Jewish men in Milwaukee dutifully took it upon themselves, as active citizens, to support those of their shared faith background in their time of need, but as time progressed, their compassion turned into apathy. In the winter of 1882, a local rabbi wrote a seething letter to the Jewish community, writing frankly, "[n]o one seems to be concerned with the immigrant, and the entire burden of caring for them and providing work for them rests literally on the shoulders of three or four gentlemen." Brief resurgences of interest and acts of charity soared after public outcries like these circulated, but they seldom lasted long.

Still, the Russian Jews continued to come. But instead of welcoming them with charity, male community leaders wrote to immigration organizers abroad, saying, "If you send many more Russians to Milwaukee... they will be shipped back to you without permitting them to leave the depot." In the summer, the city's chamber of commerce encouraged men of all religious denominations to support those of their shared faith background, but as time progressed, their compassion turned into apathy. In the winter of 1882, a local rabbi wrote a seething letter to the Jewish community, writing frankly, "[n]o one seems to be concerned with the immigrant, and the entire burden of caring for them and providing work for them rests literally on the shoulders of three or four gentlemen." Brief resurgences of interest and acts of charity soared after public outcries like these circulated, but they seldom lasted long.
and Eau Claire. The issue, however, was that many of the Russian families had no prior agricultural knowledge and had to again ask for the financial assistance of the Milwaukee Russian Relief Association for food and clothing while living in the countryside. A deep-seated antagonism quickly developed between the Russians and the native Milwaukee Jewish community, prompting a Milwaukee correspondent for an English Jewish research committee to say, "[t]he Russian Jewish Immigrants who have come to Milwaukee have been a class that reflects no credit upon their brethren." The collective rejection of the Russians quickly burgeoned into a palpable disaffection and evident ostracism. Many of the charitable committees dissolved as men abandoned their civic duty to the public.

Without the support of aid societies, the marginalization of the Russian refugee intensified. The Milwaukee Sentinel newspaper wrote an illustrative exposé on the living conditions of the Russian and Polish quarters in the city's center, titled "A Glimpse into City's Ghetto." The journalist begins the article by assuring his readers that American Jews are more relatable and less orthodox than Russians, before continuing to describe their kosher butcher shops as "uninviting places...to the point of offensiveness" and suggesting that "many do not know what sanitary is." Throughout the investigation, the journalist consistently refers to the Russians as "[t]hese people," confirming their ‘otherness’ within the community. No longer did the public welcome the newcomers with open arms; they had rejected them as strangers. Male leaders had not simply given up on aiding the Russian Jews, but had decidedly washed their hands of them. This exclusion of the refugees from the larger community paralleled that of all women during this time; perhaps it was precisely the resemblance of these two issues that prompted a young, middle-class Jewish woman named Lizzie Black Kander to resist the listlessness of the male public and take an interest in the plight of the refugees.

THE EMERGENCE OF A CIVIC LEADER
Born in Milwaukee on May 28, 1858, Elizabeth “Lizzie” Black Kander grew up on the city's south side and lived comfortably in a well-to-do German-Jewish neighborhood where her parents, John and Mary Black, owned a dry goods store. Kander’s family practiced Reform Judaism, and were founding members of the newest temple in Milwaukee, Congregation Emanu-El. Her parents taught Kander and her siblings the importance of “reconciling religion with the progressive ideas of the age,” as well as the equality of humanity, regardless of sex, from a young age. In Kander's household, nevertheless, a firm line remained between the duties of the wife and those of the husband; wives were to be the moral guides for the household, listen to God's calling for themselves, and raise strong children. Despite her parents’ firm belief in the obligations of women to their home and families, they still had high academic expectations for their daughter in public school. She did not disappoint; Milwaukee’s East Side High School named Lizzie Black the valedictorian of the class of 1878.

In addition to the rarity of a girl receiving such a title, the content of Kander’s valedictorian speech itself also pushed the limits of acceptability. The address, “When I Become President,” is the first piece of her prolific writing career. In it, her forward and witty voice foreshadows her future strength and independence as a progressive reformer. On her graduation day, Kander lamented the abhorrent conditions of the Gilded Age, critiquing President Rutherford B. Hayes for his inaction in the face of corruption. “The only way to settle the difficulty, ladies and gentlemen,” Kander announced, “is by ousting Hayes, barring the White House doors on Tilden, and by electing me to that position.” Her proposition, although satirical for its time, pierced the veil of her assigned private sphere; she was a young woman providing both political and social commentary on a public platform, in an academic setting, almost forty-two years before women achieved suffrage. Kander’s speech delineated her future views on gender relations, which fully aligned neither with traditional nor progressive ideas. Although she firmly believed in the strength and potential of women as reformers, she disavowed the initiatives of the suffragists, considering their efforts a diversion from the tangible, immediate work that should be done to improve women’s lives inside the home.

In 1878, Kander decided to take action and joined a local Jewish women’s benevolent organization, the Ladies Relief Sewing Society. It was in this organization that Kander began her career as an active agent in her community, as she and her fellow clubwomen sewed and collected clothing for over forty families during the harsh Milwaukee winters. A few years later, Lizzie Black met Simon Kander, a local businessman and Republican politician; the two married in 1881. After returning to Milwaukee from an extended vacation through the South with her husband, the newly-minted Lizzie Black Kander rejoined the Society, and the organization soon grew to one of the largest aid societies in the city in 1885. Also during this time, from 1890 to 1893, Kander worked as a truancy officer where she regularly 
Kander delivered the address at the January 1895 Annual Report Meeting of the Ladies Relief Sewing Society, where she opened by criticizing a public male figure, Professor Felix Adler, who complained about the lack of an ideal “State of Society [sic]” in Milwaukee.\textsuperscript{45} Kander exclaimed that he must have been “groping around in the dark, looking—in vain” for such a society, “[w]hen here we are…with hearts and souls and willing hands, ever ready to do Service for Humanity!! [sic]”\textsuperscript{46} In her address, Kander expressed her outrage that Adler had ignored her contributions to the city as well as those of her fellow clubwomen—she felt that her club had been unfairly excluded from the public narrative of citizenship and service. Despite her overall frustration with the society, she still admired the spirit of the women and saw in them a great potential. Kander encouraged her peers to tend to those who had to “start life anew in a strange land,” and reminded them that “possessing the proper qualifications, any one [sic] can occupy the loftiest positions in the government ranks.”\textsuperscript{47} She later insisted that her fellow clubwomen visit the homes of the people they served to fully encounter the Russian immigrants where they were, face-to-face with their grim reality, writing, “[l]et us enter its unique atmosphere, climb its rickety stairs” and ask the families, the women in particular, if they would like assistance with household duties.\textsuperscript{48} Kander firmly believed that she could positively change public opinion of the ‘static’ Russians by Americanizing the immigrant families through English and civic education, as well as cooking instruction.\textsuperscript{49} Not only would her plan benefit the lives of the immigrants, but she believed that it would also improve those of the German Jews, as revealed in a later letter, writing, “[w]e too do it for our own selfish motives…If we look out for our neighbor’s welfare, we look out for our own.”\textsuperscript{50} Afraid of the rising tide of antisemitism at the turn of the century, she believed that each Jewish community, no matter its nationality, represented all Jews, and thus paid special attention to normalizing the Russian refugees to help them gain acceptance within the larger Milwaukee community.\textsuperscript{51}

KANDER ENCOUNTERING THE POOR

This was the beginning of Lizzie Black Kander’s divergence from the period’s conventional gender roles. Previously, the caveat for allowing clubwomen, Jewish or Christian, to engage with the public had been to circumscribe their charity work as a supplementary action to that of men. When the Russian refugees began arriving in Milwaukee, men spearheaded temporary committees, allocated and distributed funds, and attempted to settle the families both within and outside of the city. It was only after the cries of the mayor and the state’s (all-male) chamber of commerce to support the incoming refugees that the Ladies Relief Sewing Society, as well as other female aid societies, donated money, food, and clothing.\textsuperscript{52} When the male leadership lost focus, the female aid societies’ participation in activities generally diminished, as women could temporarily enter the public sphere only if permitted by men. In the case of Milwaukee’s Russian
immigrants, the community’s originally altruistic vision for the newcomers had not simply blurred, but knowingly shut its eyes altogether to the sufferings of the immigrant families. Their living quarters had become “a closed book to most Milwaukeeans.”53 Mostly concerned for their well-being as fellow citizens, but also afraid that public disdain for the Jewish immigrants would develop into antisemitism, Lizzie Black Kander decided to act singlehandedly. By insisting that her aid society continue to serve this community, despite dwindling male interest, she went far beyond her prescribed duty as a wife and clubwoman and ultimately defied the spatial boundaries that confined women.

While some reformers, namely suffragettes, fought to minimize their differences from men, Kander welcomed them and believed that women should use their unique qualities to enact change. It was perhaps for this reason that she was initially drawn to the municipal housekeeping movement. In her eyes, women were indeed tender, loving, and domestic, and she sought to further empower them through these qualities, which “could remedy the problems arising from immigration, inadequate public services, and incompetent political leadership.”54 In her letter “Friendly Visiting Among the Poor,” she encouraged her fellow clubwomen to work intensely with the women of the Russian refugee homes during the daytime as they were sure to be there, “cooking, baking, and cleaning,” later assuring her members that their interactions with immigrant wives would positively impact the whole home, ultimately improving the “self-reliance” of the community.55 In that same letter, she maintained a realistic perspective on her privilege as a middle-class woman, and challenged the dominating male-driven rhetoric that the Russian refugees were simply being doomed to destitution. Kander asserted, “[t]hey are, after all, only what circumstances have made them, what we ourselves might have been had we suffered the long oppressions and the bitter persecutions.”56 Kander directed a group of women out of the confines of their homes and into the dreary, overcrowded tenements on Water and Knapp Streets, equipping her clubwomen with perspective and meaningful experiences with the forgotten immigrants.

As the Progressive Era gained momentum, more Jewish women throughout the city grew discontent with the traditional, banal activities of women’s clubs and yearned for more active services for the poor. This dissatisfaction prompted a group of women, including Lizzie Black Kander, to found the Milwaukee Chapter of the National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW) in 1895.57 The NCJW offered sewing and cooking classes to children and hosted forums for adult women on how to weave their Jewish faith into their service.58 Inspired both by NCJW and her time as a truancy officer, Kander’s focus had slowly shifted from directly supporting the immigrant women to the future members of the Jewish community: the children.

Soon after joining the council, Kander changed the name of the “Ladies Relief Sewing Society” to the “Keep Clean Mission,” whose aim was to see that poor children “be kept clean and sent to school regularly” and offered a variety of classes in sewing, dancing, art history and “sermons on cleanliness” to an estimated one hundred attendees.59 Wanting to further expand the services of the organization to culinary arts, education, and general enrichment, Kander again renamed the organization, this time to the “Milwaukee Jewish Mission,” the following

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year.60 In 1900, she delivered her annual president’s report, celebrating the fourth anniversary of the mission’s founding and calling on the members to continue humbly working together for the future of the local Jewish community:

We, the Jewish people of Milwaukee must rise in a body, throw aside wealth and pride and station and bring about a better state of affairs. This can only be done through the children. We must extend to them the hand of good fellowship and teach them habits of cleanliness and industry.61

To Kander, a critical step in dismantling the systemic disadvantage immigrants faced was to educate and Americanize children through schooling, industrial training, and cultural enrichment, mirroring her work with immigrant women.

During the four years of its operation, the Mission met in rented rooms in the basement of the Temple Emanu-El, but with attendance swelling, the organization quickly outgrew its space.62 This need prompted Kander to reach out to a second “public-spirited” women’s club in Milwaukee, the “Sisterhood of Personal Service,” to ask if they had an interest in merging with the Mission to serve a larger population and “obtain larger quarters.”63 In March of 1900, the two bodies unified, forming a new organization known as the “Settlement,” which operated out of a rented house in the center of the Jewish immigrant district on Fifth Street.64 Kander’s titles were president, founder, teacher, and executive director.65
A COOKBOOK AND A GROWING SETTLEMENT
One of the first of its kind, the Settlement House was a space created entirely by women for all of those in need, regardless of age or gender. Not only did the house host public baths with the help of Schlitz Brewery, but also a library and a small bank.66 Upstairs, Kander and her associates transformed the living quarters into classrooms, which offered courses in sewing, history, Hebrew, English, dancing, choir, and, most popularly, cooking.67 As attendance continued to grow, the Settlement needed more money to expand its operations. A year after its founding, Kander appointed male colleagues of her husband—investors—to sit on the financial board, but their monetary contributions had been dismal.68 When she presented her idea of composing and selling a cookbook as a fundraiser for the Settlement at a meeting of the Board of Directors, the women nodded in agreement while the men mocked her, calling her idea an “extravagance.”69 Unshaken by their low expectations, Kander approached local publisher Merton Yewdale, who worked with the women of the Settlement to publish Kander’s two hundred page cookbook in 1901, The Way to a Man’s Heart: The Settlement Cookbook.70 The project was much more successful than the male board members anticipated; Kander sold one thousand copies in the first year for fifty cents apiece, making $500.71 The cookbook achieved local, and later, national fame as a ‘bible’ for Jewish cuisine and provided steady funding for the Settlement for the following nine years.

Attendance at the Settlement House continued to soar. By 1910, it had outgrown its space on Fifth Street and Kander again had to find a new home for her organization.72 Using the growing profits from her cookbook as well as separate fundraising campaigns, she soon raised the necessary $18,000 to construct a new building, subsequently named the Abraham Lincoln House.73 Though Kander and the Settlement’s Board of Directors could have easily broken ground in a more middle-class neighborhood of Milwaukee, they stayed true to their original mission to serve the Russian immigrants and decided to remain in the heart of the immigrant quarters on Ninth Street. At the ceremonial laying of the new building’s cornerstone, a newspaper reported that a local man, “Mr. Mack,” spoke of Kander’s civic contribution to the public, proclaiming that “the great elements of the American form of government—liberty and equality of opportunity for all may be cultivated with profit at an institution like the Settlement.”74 He continued to describe how Kander had helped immigrants and existing Milwaukeeans alike “to be better, more helpful, more noble Americans.”75 In the final print of the newspaper article, a picture of Kander sits below the title, “Prominent Figures at Laying of Corner Stone [sic] of Kander House,” demonstrating that she had transformed from just another “domestic clubwoman” to a public figure by virtue of her dedication to the needs of the community.76

The popularity of the Abraham Lincoln House dwarfed that of the original Settlement. By 1912, of the 2,000 weekly attendees, twenty-five percent were non-Jewish and many more were neither immigrants nor those in need of aid.77 New clubs and organizations used the house as a meeting center, including the Girl Scouts, the Boy Scouts, military drill classes for boys, and an increased number of domestic science classes for girls.78 The Abraham Lincoln House quickly became a new space where the ideal American society existed; here, the struggling immigrant and the middle-class citizen met in the spirit of “friendship and fellowship,” and boys and girls met “on the basis of independence and development of character through contact with each other.”79 In 1918, at age sixty, Kander retired from her position at the Abraham Lincoln House, but she continued to work diligently with the immigrant community and write a weekly column for the Milwaukee Telegram on the art of entertaining.80

KANDER AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION: GIVE OUR GIRLS A “SQUARE DEAL”
There was, however, another sector of the city in which Kander was active: the Milwaukee School Board. In her essay, “The Problem of the Child that Leaves School at Fourteen,” she admits that her Settlement was “limited” in how much change it could enact through its enrichment programs, since many children, namely girls, did not receive adequate educational instruction in schools.81 She did not believe that girls were given a “square deal” and lamented the amount of
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classroom equipment and vocational training boys received relative to girls. As the popularity of the Settlement and the Abraham Lincoln House grew, so did the interest of many public school principals in Kander’s work. This interest manifested in the Woman’s School Alliance’s nomination of Lizzie Black Kander for the 1907 Milwaukee School Board elections. Upon receiving news of her nomination, a friend of Kander’s promptly wrote to her urging her to accept and join the other women running. The friend asserted that one woman on the board would be too few as the male members would inevitably condescend to her instead of working alongside her, “because she is a woman instead of an equal member.”

The public announcement of her nomination sparked sexist headlines, such as “Another Woman Running for School Board” and “Women Should Not Run Yet,” that stressed that the “time was not yet auspicious” for public women leaders, and suggesting that women were not “organized” enough to keep track of a whole day’s work. Yet, despite public rhetoric, Kander won the election. In August of 1907, “twelve dignified men and three timid women,” herself included, sat down at the first meeting of the newly-elected board. Frustrated with her fellow male board members’ disinterest in girls’ education, she suggested to the superintendent that establishing a trade school for girls was a necessity for the women of the city in order to equip them with skills perceived as necessary for their future as wives and mothers. “He seemed very much impressed and promised to do all he could to further the project,” Kander asserted. Just two years later, in 1909, the board reached a formal resolution establishing the first Milwaukee Trade School for Girls.

The founding of the school is a more tangible example of Lizzie Black Kander creating another space that navigated between the public and private spheres. Although the school, like the Settlement and Abraham Lincoln House, was innately a public space, its mission perpetuated the principles of the private sphere. Kander used her political presence to establish an institution that specialized in giving girls vocational skills, as well as instructed them “to become efficient and economical home makers and intelligent mothers.” Janna Wrench criticizes the mission of Kander’s trade school, arguing that Kander felt “disdain” for the lower classes and that the curriculum of the trade school “was not based on the needs of the marketplace; rather it was off a sense of woman’s duties to home and family based on middle-class principles.” Although Wrench provides critical insight into the school’s classist assumptions that many of the impoverished or immigrant attendees would have the option of being homemakers, her modern perspective mistakenly interprets the objective of the Milwaukee Trade School for Girls as patronizing. Having an institution dedicated to teaching ‘home economics’ transformed the skills of a homemaker from being merely an expectation of wives and mothers into a legitimate profession. Kander’s two-year fight to convince the male School Board members about the need for such a school further proves that it was in fact a break from tradition, even though the curriculum itself very much aligned with the domesticity of women. However, Kander always defended teaching young girls culinary and domestic arts by emphasizing the importance of creating something “useful and beautiful…[which] draws out her talents, leads her thoughts into healthy channels and influences her mental and moral character.” Even later in her life, Kander firmly believed that empowering women was best done by reaching them where they were, in their roles as wives and mothers, and that investing in their domestic lives would positively reverberate throughout the entire community.

KANDER’S MEMORY AND LEGACY

Throughout her career, Kander received public recognition for her service to Milwaukee as well as a wealth of gratitude. She accepted the most prestigious of her accolades in 1939, when the New York World’s Fair invited Lizzie Black Kander to represent Wisconsin in their program recognizing the nation’s most outstanding women. Just prior to her death in 1940, she received a letter from a former newspaper boy thanking her for her many words of inspiration during his childhood, adding, "what you’ve done for me, you and Mr. Kander have done for thousands of Milwaukeeans….You have done an invaluable service for Milwaukee which will be a perpetual influence.”

After her death, words of condolence flooded in from newspapers, colleagues, and family friends. The Settlement Cookbook Company lauded her foresight and her “deeply rooted interest in her fellow man.” The Jewish Center of Milwaukee credited its founding to her pioneering social work, as she concerned herself with “every phase of civic betterment.” Contrary to what some historians may conclude, Kander was not simply “disgusted” by the disorderliness and waste of poor immigrant communities; she was undoubtedly invested in restoring the humanity that the systematic inequalities of the Gilded Age had denied them. Although Kander will more than likely remain an obscure historical figure, her passion and resolute dedication to her growing community were noteworthy. Her relentless effort to legitimize the domestic work of homemakers and improve the lives of immigrants pushed the boundaries of acceptability despite some of her philosophies being antiquated today. Beginning with her service to the neglected Russian refugees, Kander dedicated her life to creating a space that countered the norm—one which sat in between the sheltered domestic and the dominating public spheres. Indeed, her spaces were ones in which men, women, and children of varying backgrounds were welcome to grow, learn, and regain their footing as new Americans. What shall never be forgotten is that in the face of extreme hostility and xenophobia, Kander opened her doors and invited her new neighbors inside.
Endnotes

[8] Ibid.
[12] Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al., History of Woman Suffrage, 190, 178.
[14] Ibid., 154
[18] Ibid., 35
[21] Ibid., 71
[22] Ibid., 71
[23] Ibid., 73
[24] Ibid., 78
[25] Ibid., 79
[26] Ibid., 84-85.
[27] Ibid., 85
[30] Ibid.
[34] Although Kander's maiden name was Black until her marriage in 1881, for consistency, she will be referred to as Kander during this section.
[35] Ibid., 38
[36] Ibid., 38
[37] Fritz, 40.
[38] Swichkow et al., The History of Jews in Milwaukee, 22.
[42] “Why Should a Man or a Woman Insure?”, LBK Papers.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[46] Ibid
[47] Ibid
[49] Seth Korelitz, "A Magnificent Piece of Work": The Americanization Work of the National Council of Jewish Women.” 180-182. Kander’s approach to Jewish Americanization strongly resembled, and was perhaps influenced by, that of the National Council of Jewish Women. During this time period, the NCJW focused on supporting Jewish immigrant women in their adjustment to American life. Council members assisted women with their employment search, encouraged them to join social clubs, and facilitated educational opportunities. They were also particularly keen on providing religious education for the women, focusing on developing the immigrants' identity of being a budding American and a Jewish woman.
Useful and Beautiful Things

Restriction League, founded in 1894, believed that immigrants from the Jewish-majority, Eastern European nations were "politically incompetent" and "atavistic". It was due to the lobbying efforts of this group, as well as many others, that Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924, which restricted the number of Eastern Europeans allowed to enter the country, targeting majority-Jewish nations.

[55] "Friendly Visiting Among the Poor," Lizzie Black Kander Digital Collection
[56] Ibid
[58] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, 1940.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Janna Wrench, "Uplift the Downtrodden Multitude: Lizzie Black Kander and the Purpose of the Milwaukee School of Trades for Girls", 1, 2.
[93] Although a woman's thanks would have indeed been more meaningful to the theme of the paper, such correspondence proved difficult to find. In any case, McKillop's letter to Kander highlights her broad influence on the greater Milwaukee community. "McKillop to Mrs. Kander," December 31, 1937. Lizzie Black Kander Papers, Lizzie Black Kander Digital Collection. Wisconsin Historical Society.
[95] The Jewish Center of Milwaukee, August 7, 1940. Lizzie Black Kander Digital Collection.
[96] Allan Davis, 46.
Late in November of 1585, Joaquín Matlalaca of Culhuacan sent for the authorities.1 He was dying, and he had quite a bit to do. Although he did not belong to the nobility of his community kingdom, Joaquín lived more prosperously than most Nahua commoners, tending to a modest but ample lot near Lake Xochimilco that included ten richly fertile farms on lake beds and three sizable tracts of land on which he likely grew maize, beans, or squash. When the notary employed by the local government arrived to administer Joaquin’s last rites, he would also record the invalid’s bequest of his property as part of a practice that emerged both out of custom and convenience in the sixteenth-century Nahua world. Hoping to leave his only child well looked after, Joaquín had decided to bestow the bulk of the land to his sick son Sebastián. The question of inheritance certainly carried great weight in the process of drawing up wills, determining which relatives received a valuable source of sustenance; nevertheless, when the notary arrived, the dying man gave the issue secondary importance. He wanted to discuss debt first, declaring that a man named Gerónimo from a neighboring town owed him four pesos. Joaquín never specified what type of credit he offered the culprit. He might have loaned Gerónimo cash, or given him something with the expectation of future payment. But Joaquín stressed that recovering the pesos proved a treacherous task. “Many times I asked for them, but he almost killed me over them,” Joaquín said.2 “If God had given me health, I would have complained [in court]. But I leave it to the executors to ask for [the money]” in order that “masses be said for me.”3

No Spaniards participated in the proceedings, but Joaquín’s story of debt is also one about colonialism, an account of how indigenous socioeconomic networks contort and adapt in the face of alien political rule. Spanish influence on the exchange was pervasive. The conflict took place between two Nahua commoners over Spanish currency; Joaquín could have pressed the case in an indigenous court reformed by Spanish officials; he demanded that the outstanding debt be used for Catholic masses; and though the scribe was also indigenous to Culhuacan, Spanish religious officials trained notaries prolifically, resulting in the rapid diffusion of the profession across central Mexico. In short, the cultural intersection of Nahua and Spanish traditions framed how Joaquín valued the debt and how he thought the obligation ought to be enforced. Joaquin’s trials also colorfully exemplify how debt is embedded in a network of legal, moral, and cultural customs. These structures determine how people borrow, from whom they borrow, and how they establish trust with creditors. Just as social mores vary widely in different cultures, so do practices of credit and debt. The manner of exchange depends on the participants’ social standing, gender, personal relationships, and trustworthiness. More than just informants of economic exchange, debt relationships are social indices.

Though many scholars have explored the political, religious, and economic dimensions of Nahua life in the sixteenth century, researchers have only touched on credit in passing, making it a promising area of inquiry. This study addresses that gap by tracing the interpersonal debt relationships of Nahua communities in the wake of the Spanish conquest of Mexico. Systems of credit existed prior to colonial rule as a byproduct of the Aztec political economy, which was rooted in the intersection of agricultural production and tribute burdens. But the assimilation of Spanish coin as a unit of exchange and the introduction of heavy tribute obligations to the Spanish Crown wove increasingly intricate networks of debt in which families and friends, merchants and consumers, and municipalities and citizens found themselves both lending and borrowing. This study begins by situating...
debts within the political and economic transformations of the period, before explaining how those conditions led to the emergence of credit. Next, it differentiates practices of lending among different social groups, highlighting how merchants sometimes demanded interest on loans to hedge against the possibility that their debtors would default. It then outlines how legal authorities—primarily alcaldes and notaries—enforced debt obligations and concludes by situating those methods within the Nahua integration of Catholic practices. All told, this study demonstrates that Joaquín’s story was not an anomaly.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MEXICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

In central Mexico, the structure of discrete community kingdoms, called altepemeh, preceded the rise of the Aztec Empire and transcended its fall. Local governments maintained their central functions after Spanish conquest in 1521, continuing to exact taxes on their subunits, allocate labor tributes, and enforce laws. Though the Crown awarded Spaniards who participated in the conquest the right to assume the political responsibilities of dynastic leaders in 1521, continuing to exact taxes on their subunits, allocate labor tributes, and enforce laws. Moreover, many altepemeh—who had chafed under the Aztec Empire’s excessive tribute burdens—assisted the Crown in defeating the Triple Alliance, and expected greater latitude from any central authority in return. The delicate balance of power among these kingdoms and the Spanish colonial bureaucracy preserved a degree of indigenous political sovereignty.

Rather than futilely attempting to sweep indigenous institutions aside, the Spanish sought to negotiate authority incrementally. Practically, this strategy entailed superimposing imperial structures over indigenous ones. Mimicking the design of Spanish provincial governments, colonial authorities formed municipal councils composed of Nahua elites. These councils, known as cabildos, gradually assumed the political responsibilities of dynastic leaders who previously headed the altepemeh. To ensure that localities complied with imperial objectives, the Spanish charged administrators, or corregidores, with overseeing them. Corregidores discussed legislation with the cabildos, communicated the Crown’s preferences, and reported local operations to higher Spanish authorities, who might reward cooperative altepemeh with legal and economic privileges. However, a cabildo could request that an inept corregidor be removed, a check that initially produced balanced deliberations between municipalities and their administrators. Thus, even in their dealings with colonial agents, indigenous officials retained power until late in the sixteenth century.

Throughout this period, land use remained the basis of production across disparate environments. Farmers produced fresh vegetables on shallow lake beds, maguey on dry upland soils, and maize and wheat almost anywhere. Under the encomienda system established immediately after conquest, localities and encomenderos organized peasant labor and collected tribute in the form of maize, cotton cloth, or chilis, with the Spanish garnering the surplus production. Amid these continuities, the assimilation of Spanish coin into daily Nahua life marked a radical change in economic transactions. This concept of currency was not entirely unfamiliar to Indians in central Mexico. Though traders usually bartered goods, the early Tlaxcala market lists referred to an item’s price in terms of cacao beans. Indians exchanged products that did not correspond exactly in value, and covered the difference in change. In other words, cacao beans served primarily as money of account, denoting the value of goods without serving as the instrument of purchase. Though cacao beans continued to serve as change in transactions, the peso, tomin, and medio partially displaced the old currency’s role, as testators began to indicate the value of quotidian items—such as food, tools, and furniture—in terms of their worth in pesos. More significantly, Spanish coin also operated as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. The widespread acceptance of the peso allowed buyers to purchase goods using only the currency and sellers to use their cash profit in many future transactions. This quality proved exceedingly popular at the Culhuacan market, where thrifty salespeople pawned trinkets in exchange for coins. But the swiftest instance of currency integration might have occurred in Tlaxcala. The use of Spanish coins became so prevalent in the city that the cabildo began imposing monetary taxes on both nobles and commoners a mere thirty years after conquest.

As currency became increasingly popular, wage labor came to supplement the encomienda as the means of organizing peasant production. Cities might allocate commoners to private projects, but altepemeh charged landowners with paying their salaries. No employer exemplified this shift better than the Coyoacan audiencia judge Lorenzo de Tejada, who hired thousands of peasants to construct an aqueduct in the 1540s. By 1554, 350,000 men toiled on the canal, which brought water to Tejada’s properties from the hills of Quauhximalpan. Because commoners faced manifold challenges to sustain their livelihood, the character of peasant work in central Mexico proved conducive to the use of credit. To start, wages sometimes failed to satisfy the basic needs of commoners. Tejada’s contracts indicate that peasants in his employ earned well under the town’s official rate for a workday. Even still, Indians angrily testified that Tejada regularly revised employment documentation to avoid paying promised wages. The practice of gouging workers of their earnings doubtlessly extended beyond Tejada’s malpractice. In the
16th Century Nahua codex, ca. 1531
Source: Wikimedia Commons

case that bad weather or pestilence yielded a sparse harvest, landowners likely skimped on peasants’ wages before tightening their own belts. Some commoners worked as tenants to supplement their income, but these renters had to acquire the requisite equipment for farming, which in most cases they did not own themselves. Benevolent employers and abundant crop growth did not entirely ease peasants’ difficulties either. Even if commoners reaped ample profits and conserved them frugally, the concentrated time period of harvests forced them to endure long spans of scarcity. In essence, economic and environmental factors rendered peasants’ income and livelihood volatile and precarious.

Altepemeh often exacerbated commoners’ financial strain. In Tlaxcala, though cabildo members recognized that their constituents ought to “contribute modestly in proportion to their economic resources,” local authorities consistently pressured commoners for tribute. When the erection of a hospital struck the fancy of council members, or when missionaries lobbied colonial officials to build a church, local authorities sometimes imposed unexpected taxes on commoners. Economic pressures intensified at the turn of the seventeenth century as Spanish immigration rose steeply and epidemics crippled the Nahua population. Spaniards consolidated their holdings by winning land grants. Yet decimated populations failed to satisfy the settlers’ concurrent demand for peasant labor on their estates. As a result, Spanish officials imposed increasingly onerous tribute burdens—which could be satisfied via labor—through cabildos whose influence was waning. Additionally, commoners sometimes needed money to secure a family member’s release from jail. Officials incarcerated people for a wide range of offenses, including public drunkenness, the unauthorized sale of goods, and general transgressions against the statutes of the altepetl. Release was frequently contingent on the payment of a fine that varied depending on the gravity of the crime. Even if it only totaled a couple tomines, the unplanned cost could be prohibitively expensive for commoners without a loan. For instance, María, a woman from Culhuacan, acknowledged in her testament that she had borrowed four tomines from the ward heads in order to be freed from jail.
These intersecting networks of obligations undoubtedly forced Nahua to request support from those in a more stable financial position. Indeed, credit in the form of delayed payment for goods and services was ubiquitous in Nahua communities. Landowners and merchants might offer credit if a peasant suffered an especially meager harvest, wanted to purchase household tools, or could not afford a land lease. After all, landowners and merchants needed workers and clients, and it was preferable for them to extend credit rather than forgo business altogether. In turn, peasants could stabilize their fluctuating income stream. But indebtedness was by no means limited to commoners; nobles and traders often purchased animals on credit, hoping they would be useful enough to eventually turn a profit. Mules and horses served a necessary function for Nahua who sold anything of considerable mass. They could be harnessed to transport pigs, turkeys, and large quantities of wheat, thereby allowing their owners to sell more goods at local markets. If at any point traders had no immediate need for the animals, they could lease them to people who did. This quality made merchants willing to assume debt if they did not have money on hand to pay for productive mules.

When Nahua borrowed, they sometimes dragged their families into the obligation. If a borrower failed to reimburse his or her creditor, the debt passed on to the next of kin irrespective of the relative's gender, a tradition that dated back at least to the years of the Aztec Empire. Spouses assumed responsibility first, followed by children and grandchildren. This principle also guided creditors, who often pursued outstanding loans that their parents had supplied long ago. Luis Tlauhpotonqui, a merchant from Culhuacan, was one of such children of creditors. In his testament, he enumerated no fewer than eleven people who owed him money. However, most of these debtors had borrowed from his father, who had proven a more capable trader. Though Tlauhpotonqui neglected to mention the reason many borrowed from his family, the credit likely covered diverse transactions. Don Miguel de Castañeda, for example, asked Tlauhpotonqui if he could compensate him for his livestock at a later date. In addition to accepting delayed payments, Tlauhpotonqui also extended credit in the form of cash, loaning three pesos to Miguel Huellihuitl, who had smashed in the head of the jail. Thus, though cash contributed to the circulation of these obligations, it did not revolutionize the Nahua understanding of debt.

Indeed, Nahua practices of credit likely diverged from Spanish custom in other respects. Though interest was by no means unheard of in Spain, the sixteenth-century Catholic Church maintained staunch opposition to any form of usury and attempted to stamp out its practice among both Spaniards and Nahua. These objections came to a head in 1555 during the Church’s Second Provincial Council of Mexico, a meeting assembled to affirm Catholic doctrine in the so-called New World. Archbishop Don Alonso Montúfar, who presided over the forum of ecclesiastical authorities, passed a resolution that “no usury be made.” Defining the sin as the “sale of credit or installments at prices higher than the fair price,” he warned of merchants who formulated depraved contracts “with great offense to the whole Republic.” Montúfar’s moralizing either fell on deaf ears or was not heard at all: it was economic necessity for Nahua merchants to charge interest on loans. As Tlauhpotonqui’s hapless efforts to collect his outstanding debts demonstrate, traders ran the risk that poor debtors would never repay them. Merchants could only assess the creditworthiness of clients they knew, and had limited means of discovering whether strangers were trustworthy. For merchants, demanding a financial advantage from a loan hedged against the possibility that other debtors would default. It is unclear whether political authorities ignored the Church’s ire, or avoided enforcing anti-usury regulation, but the practice persisted among merchants who dealt in risky business.

Although businesspeople might charge interest, the Nahua public resented excessive profiteering. From discussions with indigenous informants, Franciscan missionary Bernardino de Sahagún discerned that Nahua believed the “bad merchant” to be a “usurer, a thief” and a “good merchant” to be one who “sets correct prices.” Some Indian literature drew on these stereotypes. A dramatic play presented in Nahua around 1627 depicted a money-grubbing merchant who charged exceedingly high interest rates of 50 percent over two weeks. Although the authors likely exaggerated the exact number, the work played on the audience’s understanding of and predisposition against usury. Profit figured into exchange, viewers might reason, but for it to become the regulating convention of transaction was immoral.
DEBT AS A FAMILY AFFAIR

The fact that a great deal of borrowing took place among family and friends likely molded these notions of fair exchange. Though some wills specified the familial relationship between the creditor and debtor, a number of testaments’ characteristics hinted more subtly at the social proximity between participating parties. Most creditors had no prior history of extending a loan, suggesting they might have only done so if approached by a friend or neighbor. Such creditors typically referred to their debtors informally, mentioning just their first name. Moreover, the vast majority of debts among commoners cost less than five pesos, falling below the more expensive category of loans doled out by merchants. Creditors probably did not charge interest on these exchanges, which were less formal and unmotivated by profit. Solidarity among these parties likely cultivated a sense of open-handed generosity. Neighbors might have been happy to support those about whom they cared. But benevolence need not have been formal and unmotivated by profit. Solidarity among these parties likely cultivated a sense of open-handed generosity. Neighbors might have been happy to support those about whom they cared. But benevolence need not have been

In these disputes, creditors often marshaled witnesses to affirm loan agreements before officials. Sometimes the witness occupied a municipal position, such as when alcalde Juan de San Miguel confirmed Tlauhpotonqui’s loan of eight pesos to Juan Tzapa. In disputes between employers and employees, laborers might turn to each other to protest miserly bosses. For example, Vicente Xochiamatl, a stonemason in San Francisco Tequixquipan, had been working on the construction of a church without pay and requested that his co-worker Fabián Jiménez confirm his story to officials. While creditors who were eager to claim their money clearly made use of witnesses frequently, borrowers also occasionally called upon them to clear their names of theft. A former notary who fastidiously

“...took place as people died, a responsibility that a professional class of notaries shouldered.”

recorded his debts, Miguel García felt especially determined to prove that he had lived up to his obligations, repeatedly emphasizing to officials that he had repaid several of his creditors “in full public view.” The witness’s role was thus to guarantee that agreements would be carried out impartially. Ideally, at least, witnesses could recall the original terms of a deal and confirm how the arrangement proceeded. If necessary, they could testify to these details to town officials. This feature assuaged creditors’ concerns of being cheated and debtors’ fears of unwarranted prosecution.

The bulk of loan agreement enforcement, however, took place as people died, a responsibility that a professional class of notaries shouldered. Though the function of the scribe had pre-conquest antecedents in record-keepers who painted histories of their altepemeh on broad panels of cotton cloth, the position in its sixteenth–century iteration sprung out of the proselytizing mission of Spanish religious officials and the Crown’s administrative need to communicate effectively with municipalities. These demands required a language written in Latin letters, which Franciscan missionaries developed and taught to indigenous administrators. In addition to transcribing cabildo minutes and presiding over commercial transactions, these notaries recorded the testaments of dying people. Wills typically followed a format similar to the testament of Joaquín Matlalaca: first the notary recorded the invalid’s last rites, then oversaw the division of property, and finally dealt with issues of credit. Notaries carried out the last responsibility in a meticulous fashion to ensure that the dying did not depart with outstanding debts. Not only did scribes record everything that testators loaned and owed, but they also questioned townspeople, officials, and even members of neighboring villages to ensure that they missed nothing. In some instances, like in their inventory of
Francisco Felipe’s estate, executors confirmed their diligence by requesting the signatures of the town’s lords and nobles. The inspection of prominent testators demanded special rigor. When the former fiscal don Juan Téllez passed away, Fray Juan Núñez stepped forward to enumerate the people to whom the deceased owed money. As a fiscal, Juan Téllez mixed church funds with his own, skimming cash that people had entrusted with the church. In order to rectify any impropriety, Núñez pledged that he himself would “distribute to each one of them their property so that our children [the parishioners to whom debts were owed] would be satisfied.”

To pay off debts, testators specified pieces of property the officials should sell. Though they occasionally relinquished their houses, testators usually sold plots of land since estates fetched high returns. The sale of land was also convenient: Nahua usually owned separate and far-flung fields, making it easy for them to sell one and pass down the others to individual relatives. Less frequently, some merchants or high-ranking officials owned portable goods they deemed sufficiently valuable for sale. Miguel García, for example, wrote that two hoes, a closable chest with a lock, and three painted canteens should all be sold. After the notaries had compiled the list of goods for sale, executors put the items up for auction and compensated creditors with the revenue. Not shy about defending their interests, testators also badgered executors to hold their own borrowers accountable. For instance, Don Juan de Guzmán of Coyoacan asserted that a silversmith owed him fifty pesos, demanding that the silversmith “is to pay it all back and my executors are to demand it from him; I charge them with it.”

But borrowers often went to great lengths to wriggle their way out of repaying their debts. Some testators emphasized their penury at the beginning of wills as a strategy to dissuade executors from confiscating the property of the needy. The indebted employed this strategy even if their wealth and rank clearly contradicted the appeal. Melchor de Santiago Ecatl, a former mayordomo for the Culhuacan church, entreated the executor to “let all my close relatives who see this document in which I order my testament...know that I keep nothing at all for God our Lord (I have no possessions).” Ecatl then proceeded to outline a quite extravagant list of property that included twelve chinampas, two large fields, and a handful of construction tools. The motivation behind the discrepancy became clear a few paragraphs later: Ecatl was trying to convince executors he owed nothing to the church from his time as mayordomo. The money, he insisted, “had not yet disappeared” when he left office. Nevertheless, by appealing to the executor, Ecatl affirmed his legal authority in recognition that the executor determined the success of his appeal. Even when debtors attempted to avoid repayment, the authority of officials in enforcing the deal loomed in the background.

The reason municipalities enforced debt agreements near the end of a person’s life extended beyond logistical convenience. The process of writing testaments was first and foremost a religious obligation. Catholicism had spread rapidly through the urban areas of central Mexico after Spanish conquest. Missionaries built churches, held services, and taught classes to spread the word of God. Fortuitously for the missionaries, the Catholic emphasis on imagery paralleled the concrete manifestation of native deities, facilitating the foreign religion’s smooth integration into Nahua life. Though the intensity and sincerity of their piety varied considerably, Nahua incorporated many outward expressions of Catholicism into daily practice. One such expression was a final declaration of loyalty to God in preparation for death. Following the notary’s formula, nearly all testators began by claiming that despite their illness their “spirit and soul” were “tranquil and healthy.” They affirmed their belief “in the Most Holy Trinity, Father, Son, and God the Holy Spirit,” before straightening out their personal affairs. Testators only infrequently apportioned loan revenue to their children explicitly, and cash served little material purpose for people ready to die. But dying creditors demanded that executors collect even small value loans with which they could arrange masses at their local church. The provision for masses would secure the testator’s passage to heaven through a final act of worship. In this context, calling in debts assumed a greater degree of urgency. Testators thus pursued varying amounts—four tomines, nine tomines, two pesos, three pesos—“in order for masses to be said” for them. In short, credit’s value was contextual, uniquely valuable at a point when the creditor’s soul hung in the balance.

CONCLUSION
This study has outlined practices of borrowing in Nahua communities and the effects of Spanish conquest on these practices. Though currency altered the terms of exchanges, the concept of debt preceded Spanish arrival. The nature of farming and trade in central Mexico required that peasants and merchants seek credit for equipment and land. Creditors sometimes called upon alcaldes to enforce exchanges, but indigenous notaries served as the primary venue of recourse when they came to write dying people’s testaments. The adoption of outward expressions of Catholicism by many Nahua instilled greater urgency to recoup their loans, as they could spend that money on masses to secure a passage to heaven. More generally, this study underscores the Nahua peoples’ persistent negotiation of colonial authority and their assimilation of Spanish practices on their own terms. It thus buttresses the argument that academics should situate indigenous actors at the center of their own histories. As this study makes clear, in the immediate period after conquest, the Nahua, not the Spanish, were the primary architects of the economic structures of central Mexico.
Endnotes


[2] Ibid., 104.

[3] Ibid., 104.


[9] Ibid., 132.


[14] Ibid., 93-94.

[15] Ibid., 94.

[16] Ibid., 94.


[19] Ibid., 51.


[22] Baskes, Indians, Merchants, and Markets, 68.

[23] Cline, Colonial Culhuaucan, 135.


[26] Luis Tlahuhtotonqui’s Will, 12 February 1581, in The Testaments of Culhuaucan ed. by Cline and León-Portilla, 58.

[27] Ibid., 58.


[31] Ibid., 1104.


[33] Lockhart, The Nahuas after the Conquest, 186.

[34] For an instances specifying intra-family debts, see the debt of Diego Francisco of San Mateo Huiztilopochco to his father-in-law Juan Fabián.


[37] Luis Tlahuhtotonqui’s Will, 12 February 1581, in The Testaments of Culhuaucan ed. by Cline and León-Portilla, 58.

[38] Luis Tlahuhtotonqui’s Will, 12 February 1581, in The Testaments of Culhuaucan ed. by Cline and León-Portilla, 58.

[39] Vicente Xochiamatl’s Will, 27 November 1579, in ibid., 47.

[40] Miguel García’s Will, 20 December 1580, in ibid., 42.


[43] Auction of the estate of don Juan Téllez, n.d. in The Testaments of Culhuaucan ed. by Cline and León-Portilla, 12.

[44] See the testaments of Juan Bautista, Juana Tiapacan, María, Miguel García, and Don Pedro de Suero.


[48] Ibid., 49.


[50] Juan Tezca’s Will, 15 January 1580, in The Testaments of Culhuaucan ed. by Cline and León-Portilla, 8.

[51] Ibid., 8.

[52] Luis Tlahuhtotonqui’s Will, 12 February 1581, in ibid., 58.
Adopting a largely unexplored perspective, this article attempts to understand the processes and explanations for naval emancipation during the American Civil War. The Union Navy accepted and enlisted runaway slaves earlier and in greater relative proportions than the Union Army, even though the latter receives greater attention among proponents of the “self-emancipation thesis.” This article offers three related explanations for why the Navy was more likely to accept runaway slaves. First, a host of practical and legal factors gave the Navy a significant manpower deficiency. Second, the institutional history of the Navy facilitated emancipation. Third, the diaries of officers and sailors suggest that the experience of being on blockade significantly affected white sailors and persuaded them to endorse naval emancipation. More broadly, this study has implications for students of the American Civil War. It shows that slaves had been liberating themselves long before government officials had approved it and were being used directly to fuel the war effort, providing much needed manpower to sustain the ships serving on blockade duty. This article thus calls attention to a long-overlooked element of self-emancipation during the American Civil War.

On January 1, 1863, Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, a document now enshrined in American history. Lincoln declared that “all persons held as slaves within said designated States [in rebellion]…are, and henceforward shall be, free.”¹ He invoked the moral authority of the “judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God” and his constitutional authority “as Commander-In-Chief of the Army and Navy” to justify the measure.² While often receiving less emphasis, Lincoln also directed the “military and naval authority” of the country to “recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons” while prohibiting attempts at “repress[ing]…any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.”³ Furthermore, he instructed that “persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States,” allowing the freed slaves to enlist in the Union’s armed forces.⁴

However, the process of emancipation is often mischaracterized in two fundamental ways. First, it is often claimed that President Lincoln, with the stroke of his pen, established a policy to free Southern slaves through the Emancipation Proclamation.⁵ In fact, Union military officers had already been receiving and, in effect, freeing slaves for nearly two years. Runaway slaves, officially called ‘contrabands,’ had been fleeing to Union lines since shots were first fired at Fort Sumter. Second, historians who study this early emancipation often emphasize the operations conducted by the Union Army as the focal point of a “military emancipation” that predated the Emancipation Proclamation.⁶ Dudley Cornish has called the reception of contrabands and their enlistment in the armed forces part of a broader effort to “free the slaves and let them fight to preserve the Union.”⁷ James Oakes also emphasizes military emancipation as the beginning of an undertaking in which “180,000 black men” would be recruited over the course of the war, proving “indispensable to northern victory” and “slavery’s destruction.”⁸ For historians like Oakes, the importance of the Emancipation Proclamation is not its language of freedom, but rather its instruction that Union soldiers entice slaves to escape, accelerating the enlistment of black troops.⁹

However, a closer examination of the Emancipation Proclamation also hints at the underemphasized emancipatory role of the Union Navy. President Lincoln specifically mentioned that the emancipated slaves would be able to “man vessels of all sorts.”¹⁰ Historian William Fowler once lamented that “the nation remembered the Federal soldiers, [but] it did not remember its sailors” when celebrating the Union’s victory.¹¹ In much the same way, the Navy’s role in emancipatory efforts between 1861 and 1863 has largely been forgotten. In fact, naval emancipation represented a distinctly aggressive form of military emancipation, with the Navy accepting and enlisting contrabands earlier and in greater relative proportions than the Army. Naval emancipation, and the riddle of its interpretation, is certainly worthy of further exploration in the broader study of emancipation.
Though relatively few sources directly address the Navy's process of formulating a contraband policy, they span a wide array of perspectives. For example, contemporary newspapers provide commentary on the flight of slaves from their masters. Other valuable resources such as Acts of Congress, Executive Orders, and General Orders mark key moments in the development of the Navy's policy. Elsewhere, a closer examination of official and personal correspondence provides important context for understanding these attempts to articulate a cohesive policy. Letters between Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and naval officers reveal the motives behind the Navy's policies. Similarly, other documents contained within the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion are invaluable in tracking the historical trajectory of the Navy's policies. Other documents provide insights into the motives of specific actors and individuals. Andrew Hull Foote's Africa and the American Flag demonstrates the abolitionist sentiment that resulted from the Navy's activity in preventing the transatlantic slave trade via the Africa Squadron. Similarly, diaries provide personal insight into the mechanics and effects of naval emancipation. The diary and letters of Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, most known for his failed assault on Charleston in 1863, illustrate the growth of abolitionist sentiment among naval officers that resulted directly from the war itself. Together, these sources help to explain the important role of the Navy in the reception of runaway slaves prior to the Emancipation Proclamation.

The development of the Navy's policy towards contrabands before the Emancipation Proclamation must be juxtaposed with the progress of the Army's policies during the same period. Thus far, many historians have described the respective evolutions of these policies in complementary terms. For instance, Barbara Brooks Tomblin links the respective evolutions of these policies in complementary terms. For instance, Barbara Brooks Tomblin links the Army receiving “thousands of black fugitives” with naval officers' surprise that “African Americans also began to seek freedom and sanctuary on board federal vessels.” William Gould IV pairs the two branches when he argues that slaves prompted policy decisions “by enlisting, first in the U.S. Navy and later in the U.S. Army.” Gould notes other similarities between the branches, such as the dependence of both policies on the compliance of local officers. Often, the emancipation of slaves was effected by joint operations between the branches. Tomblin notes that, though naval vessels encountered many slaves themselves, the “vast majority of slaves liberated along the southern coast were freed as a result of Union military operations and expeditions” that were jointly conducted by the Army and the Navy. Furthermore, contrabands accepted aboard naval vessels were occasionally sent to Army officers. In one early instance, Flag-Officer Louis Goldsborough forwarded “44 negro men and 1 negro woman...received on board” to General John Wool. In this sense, there was a general similarity between the contraband policies of the Army and the Navy.

Nonetheless, comparing these two sets of policies brings their differences into stark relief. In reality, while the two branches' responses to increasing numbers of fugitive slaves may seem quite similar, the Navy was actually accepting and enlisting runaway slaves much earlier and in greater relative proportions than the Army. In this sense, James McPherson rightly emphasizes “the [specific] role of the Navy in freeing slaves” and the “vital contributions of black sailors” while pointing out that “the Navy was a year ahead of the Army in recruiting contrabands.” Not only was the Navy recruiting contrabands earlier than the Army, but it was also doing so in far greater proportions. Over the course of the war, up to twenty percent of the Navy's sailors were black, nearly twice the equivalent proportion in the Army. However, there has been no comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon and the factors that motivated this form of early naval emancipation.

I will propose three categories of explanations for the eager incorporation of a doctrine of naval emancipation that consisted of the acceptance and enlistment of fugitive slaves. These categories are complementary and intended to organize the many components that drove naval emancipation. First, many practical concerns and needs forced the Navy to recruit slaves far more intensively than the Army did. Chronic manpower shortages coupled with the rapid growth of the Navy during the early phase of the war forced officials to look for alternative methods of recruitment, thus facilitating naval emancipation. At the same time, contrabands possessed useful experience that would lead them to serve as sailors, stewards, engineers, and pilots while denying these same resources to the Confederacy. Second, for institutional reasons, the Navy was more receptive to the notion of accepting and incorporating contrabands into its ranks. Due to historical, political, and social precedents, it was easier for the Navy to enlist contrabands early in the war. For example, the Navy had a pre-existing tradition of allowing blacks into the service. This practice lowered both the legal and social barriers to accepting contrabands aboard ships. Furthermore, the Navy's experience in stopping the transatlantic slave trade with the Africa Squadron gave the branch a prior firsthand encounter with slavery, affecting its senior officers and causing some, such as Andrew Hull Foote, to embrace plans for emancipation. Third, wartime experiences would drastically affect many officers in the Navy, such as Samuel Francis Du Pont, leading them to agitate for abolition. Though this final category does not necessarily distinguish the Navy from the Army, it represents another important factor in the evolution of the Navy's contraband policy. In summary, compared to the Army, the Navy accepted and enlisted contrabands earlier and in greater proportions on account of its practical concerns, its institutional arrangement, and the experiences of naval officers in facing and confronting the reality of slavery.
Before delving into the factors that drove naval emancipation, it is important to first summarize the relevant legislative and political developments. Several acts passed by Congress represent an attempt to create laws that clarified the expectations for the armed forces with respect to fugitive slaves.23 In early 1861, the only such law was the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. This act was the successor to prior legal efforts to prevent the flight of slaves, namely Article 4, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.24 Passed at a time of escalating sectional tensions, the Fugitive Slave Act dictated that “any person…[who] shall rescue…such fugitive…[shall] be subject to…imprisonment.”25 In the first months of the war, this provision would obfuscate whether military officials were legally required to return escaped slaves.26 In an attempt to clarify this ambiguity, Congress passed the First Confiscation Act on August 6, 1861. This act allowed for the confiscation of any property used to support the rebellion, including slaves. It even explicitly stated that slaves who were “employed in…any military or naval service whatsoever, against the Government” could be confiscated by Federal officers, thereby partially clarifying the matter.27 However, the law was ambiguous when it came to fugitives who were not connected to the war effort. In theory, it might have required that these slaves be returned under the Fugitive Slave Act.28 Within a year, on July 17, 1862, Congress would pass the Second Confiscation Act. This act allowed for the confiscation of all property, including slaves, which belonged to supporters of the Confederacy.29 Much like before, ambiguity still remained in cases of allegedly pro-Union slave owners.30 Finally, Congress adopted the aptly-named Act Prohibiting the Return of Slaves later in 1862. Through this act, Congress officially prohibited military officials from returning runaway slaves, regardless of their owners’ allegiance. In fact, the act mandated that any officer who returned slaves be “dismissed from the service” with a dishonorable discharge.31 Together, these legislative
efforts attempted to address the growing need for a comprehensive policy for the thousands of slaves who were running to Union lines.

However, though congressional legislation was significant, the decisions of individual commanders on the front lines often determined the military’s policy regarding fugitive slaves in practice. In fact, these developments often preceded the laws described. Some historians, such as Oakes, claim that emancipation was always the intention of Republicans in Congress. The fact that military commanders preempted these legislative efforts does not contradict these claims, but rather, shows how the course of the war provided an opportunity for congressional legislation. Just weeks after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the issues presented by runaway slaves would become clear on the front lines. Long before the Confiscation Acts and the Emancipation Proclamation, military commanders were receiving slaves and refusing to return them to their owners, in apparent violation of the Fugitive Slave Act. At Fort Monroe, General Benjamin Butler formulated one of the earliest military contraband policies. On May 23, 1861, three slaves rowed to the Union lines and claimed they had been forced to work on the Confederate defenses. In a letter written to Winfield Scott the next day, Butler claimed that “the fugitive-slave act did not affect a foreign country, which Virginia claimed to be,” therefore allowing him to circumvent the law. Still, Butler felt bound by the law, admitting that if their owner “would take the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States [he] would deliver the men up to him.” Northern newspapers generally applauded Butler’s policy as one that hurt the rebellion without alienating those who were still hesitant about abolition. One writer noted that the policy even appealed to those who are “reluctant to have slaves declared freemen.” Thus, by late May 1861, the emancipatory policies of Union military commanders were already being driven by developments on the front lines.

Shortly thereafter, an equivalent policy emerged in the Navy. In mid-July, Secretary Gideon Welles received reports from Flag-Officer Silas Stringham and Commander Oliver Glisson that Union ships had encountered fugitive slaves who were working on Confederate installations at Stingray Point, Virginia. Glisson claimed that the slaves fled in rowboats on the Rappahannock River in the hopes of “being picked up by some vessel passing in the bay” after being told they would be “plac[ed] in the front of the battle,” leading him to keep them aboard the USS Mount Vernon. Again, this episode demonstrates that military officials were accepting and utilizing fugitive slaves prior to the First Confiscation Act. Welles responded to these reports on July 22nd by imploring Flag-Officer Stringham that, though “it is not the policy of the Government to invite or encourage this class of desertions,” returning them would be “impolitic as well as cruel.” Therefore, he directed Stringham to make them “serviceable on board our storeships,” noting that the Flag-Officer would “do well to employ them.” In a letter sent on the same day to Flag-Officer William Mervine, Welles echoed the policy by telling the officer to “let [fugitives] stay on board and employ them as usefully as possible.” Shortly thereafter, Welles articulated an even more radical policy. In response to an inquiry from Stringham regarding the contrabands’ tattered clothing, Welles insisted that they were “employed” and therefore “entitled to compensation” from the Navy. This policy of paying contrabands for their labor foreshadowed Welles’ call for their enlistment in September 1861. These incidents illustrate how the Union Navy also preempted federal law by receiving and employing fugitive slaves.

Given this background, it is worth noting that, in many ways, the Army and the Navy acted quite similarly with respect to contrabands. For example, both the Army and Navy adopted policies that used contrabands to provide support services for Union forces in the field. Furthermore, both the Army and the Navy organized contraband camps for the vast numbers of black women and children who were seeking refuge behind Union lines. Of course, there were slight differences between the two types of contraband camps. Steven Ramold points out that while Army contraband camps were often placed in the North, in order to “supervise better their African American charges,” the Navy kept their camps in the South in order to stay “close to the area where they would serve.” The Navy also made modifications to the contraband camps in order to create a nautical equivalent. For instance, barges were occasionally attached to ships on station in order to house hundreds of fugitives. Thomas Lyons, a steward on the USS Carondelet, recorded that these barges were so large that there was enough room for separate wedding, prayer, and baptismal services to be held at the same time. Though slightly different, as early as May and July 1861, both branches were accepting slaves and largely skirting the legal problems posed by existing policies. In this way, both the Army and the Navy acted to accept slaves as part of an early policy of unofficial emancipation.

In the early stages of the war, these policies formulated in the field also faced similar problems in their universal enactment. By and large, enactment was left to individual commanders, both in the field and at sea. This led to many instances of local commanders returning slaves, regardless of the orders of superior officers. For example, Flag-Officer Garrett Pendergrast ordered that his “commanders are not to have anything to do with fugitive slaves” and that all fugitives would be “delivered to the bearers of the flag of truce” who demanded their return. Certain officers gained a reputation for being particularly aggressive in returning fugitives. For instance, Barbara Brooks Tomblin calls Captain Thomas Craven, who had been serving in the Western Gulf, one of “the most flagrant violators” of the Navy’s contraband policy. Contemporaries also acknowledged his vigor, as Commander Christopher Rodgers wrote to Samuel Francis
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Du Pont in the summer of 1862 that “Craven has been... giving up Negroes.” Apparently Craven had violated the contraband policy so egregiously in 1861 that Welles wrote him a letter on September 25th, in which he reminded the captain that the fugitive slaves were not to be “expelled from the service” under any circumstances. Similar problems existed within the Army. For instance, General Don Carlos Buell continued returning slaves to their owners long after policy was established to the contrary. Buell even returned slaves after the passage of the Act Prohibiting the Return of Slaves in 1862, thereby blatantly violating the law. Clearly, significant enforcement problems hampered the contraband policies of both branches.

The similarities in these policies and their difficulties in enforcement can be partially attributed to the close cooperation between the branches throughout the war. As Craig Symonds records, the branches were most effective militarily when they worked together. For example, in the beginnings of the struggle for control of the Mississippi River, maritime forces were often incorporated under Army command. This same principle of close-knit cooperation played a key role in numerous campaigns that led to the freeing of many slaves, helping to explain the coevolution of their similar policies. Furthermore, the Navy occasionally sent fugitive slaves to work in the Army. One instance of this phenomenon is found in correspondence between Commander S. C. Tiowan and Secretary Welles in September 1861. In it, Tiowan writes that he could not keep seven fugitives that were taken aboard the USS Pawnee, so he “forwarded” them “to be landed at Hampton Roads, supplying them with provisions to last them there,” implying their final destination would be Fort Monroe or Fort Calhoun in Virginia. In this case, the exchange of contrabands reflects the close ties between the Army and the Navy. The general cooperation between the branches helps to explain some of the overall similarities in their respective contraband policies.

However, further examining these policies reveals significant differences, both in form and in function. Though historians such as James Oakes discuss military emancipation as a unified phenomenon, a closer examination reveals distinctions between the branches. One of the clearest distinctions between the overall policies of the Army and the Navy can be found in the actual language used to articulate them. Textual differences show how the branches actually embraced slightly different forms of military emancipation. While the Army received contrabands and employed them, the Navy received contrabands and formally enlisted them into the armed forces. In this sense, the Navy’s version of emancipation was more aggressive than the Army’s. On October 11, 1861, Secretary of War Simon Cameron wrote explicit instructions for enacting the Army’s contraband policy. He specifically ordered that contrabands should be received and given tasks but that there was “not to be a general arming of them for military service” within the ranks of the Army. Just two weeks earlier, on September 25, 1861, Secretary of the Navy Welles had issued a far more radical order when he formalized the Navy’s contraband policy. He authorized the usage of contrabands to “render necessary and regular services” and mandated that they receive a “stated compensation” for their labor, much like Secretary Cameron dictated. However, Welles went much further than Cameron by ordering that the contrabands be enlisted into the rolls of the Navy, specifically “under the same forms and regulations as apply to other enlistments.” Unlike in the Army, the Navy endorsed a policy in which contrabands could enlist and receive a rank very early in the war.

An even broader, and more significant, difference between the policies of the two branches can be found on a larger scale. The Navy not only accepted and enlisted contrabands earlier, but also did so in greater proportions than the Army. Numerical studies are scattered throughout the secondary literature that attempt to pinpoint the percentage of free black and contraband soldiers and sailors in the Army and Navy during the Civil War; though their quantitative conclusions vary slightly due to their methodologies, nearly every study agrees that the Navy had a significantly higher black enlistment rate than the Army, particularly early in the war. Over the course of the war, ten percent of the Army’s recruits were black. In contrast, William Gould IV estimates that approximately 18,000 African Americans served in the Navy during the Civil War, constituting roughly twenty percent of its labor force. James McPherson has offered a more precise figure, claiming that about seventeen percent of enlistees were African American. In any event, the Navy seems to have used the enlistment of contraband and free black sailors to constitute a significant proportion of its ranks. These sources indicate that, though these processes of incorporation may seem superficially similar, the Navy embraced emancipation more readily and to a greater extent than the Army.

There are many possible reasons for the Navy’s early and aggressive use of emancipation relative to the Army. It is clear that the branches embraced the policy at differing paces and degrees such that naval emancipation deserves its own emphasis in the broader study of military emancipation. The explanation for this phenomenon has three major components that, though briefly mentioned before, warrant recapitulation. First, the Navy was constrained by a series of practicalities that necessitated its embrace of emancipation. As the Navy grew and reserves of available white sailors dwindled, contraband enlistment became an increasingly attractive alternative. Put simply, the Navy required manpower and services that contraband enlistees could provide as stewards, sailors, engineers, and pilots. Second, a host of factors related to the Navy’s institutional history facilitated the usage of black sailors without opposition from Northern society. For example, the historical presence of black sailors in the Navy and the cultural comparisons between sailors and slaves
established a low barrier to contraband enlistment. Third, experiences of the war itself seem to have converted many officers into staunch abolitionists, explaining the eventual embrace of the policy amongst many naval officers. As sailors came into close contact with Southern chattel slavery, they began to embrace naval emancipation as a result of their experiences. For these reasons, which will be explored in further detail, the Navy acted to enlist fugitive slaves long before the Army followed suit.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY AND EMANCIPATION

Perhaps the central reason that the Navy received and enlisted contrabands so eagerly was that this solved a number of practical problems that bore heavily on the rapidly escalating needs of the service. Over the course of the war, the Navy’s sources of manpower drew thin as many of the nation’s able-bodied and skilled sailors were already engaged in the fighting. At the same time, the number of ships in the Navy grew significantly, from 42 ships in 1861 to 671 ships in 1865. Gould claims that the policy of enlisting contrabands “was established out of purely practical considerations.” In a sense, he correctly identifies the needs of the service as a central factor in the enlistment of contrabands. Of course, other factors also facilitated the Navy’s rapid utilization of this particular source of labor. Still, the Navy experienced a serious need to find fresh sources of recruits.

Furthermore, while fugitive slaves supplemented lagging sources of enlistees, their enlistment also denied a key strategic resource to Confederate forces. Of course, a similar logic applied to the Army’s acceptance and employment of contrabands. For example, Lincoln wrote to General Grant that enlisting former slaves “works doubly” by simultaneously “weakening the enemy and strengthening us.” While this added incentive does not quite explain why naval emancipation was unique, it is an important consideration among the factors that encouraged the policy. As Tomblin notes, while the “Union Navy was hard-pressed to find new enlistees,” it was also “anxious to deprive southern slave owners of their labor force.” Indeed, several developments suggest that naval officers were concerned about the usage of slaves in the Confederate war effort. Steven Ramold notes that Union naval officers were particularly alarmed when they found out that the Tennessee State Militia had approved the arming of free blacks. Early in the war, naval officers feared that Confederates might use slaves to fight. For example, in July 1861, O.S. Glisson wrote (mistakenly) that Confederate troops were “arming the negroes” and that

“Furthermore, while fugitive slaves supplemented lagging sources of enlistees, their enlistment also denied a key strategic resource to Confederate forces.”

There were two main causes for this necessity. As Matthew Karp traces, the antebellum Navy had a “leadership that was predominantly southern,” even at the highest levels. In the aftermath of Lincoln’s election, Southern naval figures ranging from high-ranking officials to common sailors resigned in droves, leaving a vacuum that could be filled by the enlistment of black contrabands. As the war dragged on, manpower pools continued to shrink. As Gould argues, the rise in black enlistments correlates with the fact that “white enlistments became increasingly problematic” since the number of potential recruits steadily decreased. Additionally, there was a legislative cause for the Navy’s increasing hardships. The Militia Act of 1862 was primarily intended to authorize the enlistment of African Americans as laborers and soldiers, even though they had been serving as sailors for almost a year. More importantly, the Act established a draft system. In order to incentivize volunteers for the armed forces, the Act offered “twenty-five dollars as bounty.” However, the bounty only applied to enlistments in the Army and not the Navy. This legal quirk meant that at the very moment that the manpower pool was shrinking, fewer potential recruits were joining the Navy. Both of these circumstances depleted the pool of potential sailors, thereby motivating the enlistment of contrabands to counteract this drain.

It is worth noting that the Navy’s manpower problem was acutely recognized by both officers and sailors. Even at the time, officials were aware of the logistical problems posed by the resignations of Southerners. Gideon Welles wrote at length in his diary about “the faithless naval officers who abandoned the Government and took up arms against it,” suggesting that he struggled to recoup the losses incurred by
the Navy as a result of these resignations. More generally, naval officers noted the growing strains on recruitment, which would account for the push towards increased enlistment of blacks. Samuel F. Du Pont specifically highlighted the fact that “there is difficulty in obtaining men in the Northern ports” and called his black sailors “very useful” replacements for white recruits. Sailors also recorded the strains experienced as a result of decreasing white enlistment that counteracted their own deep-seated racial prejudices. As Jeffrey Bolster points out, the antebellum Navy was already a racially mixed institution, but “maritime culture never completely overcame the fissures of race.” Therefore, it speaks volumes about the Navy’s desperation in the early phases of the war that white sailors offered relatively little opposition to the enlistment of black contrabands aboard their ships. Some officers noted the general harmony between the Navy’s white sailors and its contrabands. Admiral Oliver S. Glisson once wrote that his white sailors accepted the contrabands simply because they were “short of hands” and appreciated the added manpower provided by the fugitives. Union sailors expressed similar sentiments. For example, one sailor wrote that he would “just as leaf [sic] have a little white jack as I would black,” justifying their presence with the appropriately nautical sentiment that “any port in a storm” would help with the ship’s operations. The difficulties of recruitment in the wartime atmosphere were widespread throughout the Navy, meaning that the enlistment of contrabands provided an attractive opportunity for officers to supplement their depleted crews.

Another factor that motivated contraband enlistment was that these black enlistees provided useful types of labor, particularly in positions that served other sailors. While the Army could employ women and miscellaneous camp followers to serve as servants, stewards, and laundresses, the Navy had no similar resource. Thus, naval officers and sailors were often willing to accept these enlistees within their ranks because of the services they could provide. In one instance, an officer from the USS Union eagerly asked permission from
Thomas Craven to “ship” a black contraband because he was “a good cook,” evidently possessing a talent that was lacking amongst the ship’s own cooks. In another instance, Ensign William Grattan recorded how black stewards, despite their mistreatment in these positions, were important to ships such as the USS Minnesota. Naval officers frequently received fugitives and enlisted them as recruits specifically because of the skills they offered in these non-combat services.

Of course, these recruits also served many other roles within the Navy. As Steven Ramold notes, the lines between the sailors’ ranks would blur when ships ultimately engaged in combat, since all sailors contributed to the fight in their own designated roles. In this sense, black enlistees in the Navy offered an even greater practical utility than in the Army, where blacks were prohibited from combat roles until much later in the war. Even in other ways, black enlistees performed important services. For example, several black sailors were promoted as non-commissioned engineers on account of their special qualifications for this position. Many of these engineers were able to leverage the practical skills learned during their enslavement to operate the machinery aboard ships at sea. Their officership was partly socially acceptable because engineers were still seen as inferior officers, allowing blacks to attain these promotions. Nonetheless, the ascent of black enlistees to these ranks indicates the valuable services that they could provide. In other ways, contrabands were absolutely vital to the Navy’s efforts in the South. Specifically, contrabands were retained by the Navy to serve as pilots in southern waters. These fugitives, who had often sailed these waters before the war, proved essential to keeping Union ships from hitting shoals and staying beyond the range of Confederate guns. Many officers referenced their reliance on black pilots. In one instance, when seven fugitives were forwarded to Hampton Roads, one was specifically “retained to act as pilot in these waters.” Similarly, this essential service was recognized at the highest levels. Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont wrote in 1863 that he had made use of “certain contraband pilots” who were “skillful and competent” and deserving of pay as high as thirty or even forty dollars per month, which was more than triple the rate for other contraband enlistees. In addition to their knowledge of southern waters, black enlistees were also important sources of information for the Navy. Black runaways could provide the Navy with information regarding Confederate positions and movements, including the status of Confederate forts that guarded southern waterways. These runaway slaves also gave Union naval officers advice on uncharted river routes and creeks that could be used to transport materiel.

One example of the types of information provided by black enlistees comes from possibly the most famous instance of naval emancipation, that of Robert Smalls. Smalls, who had taken the Planter out of Charleston Harbor on May 13, 1862, was shortly thereafter employed by the Navy as a pilot. What is often forgotten is that after being received aboard the USS Onward, Smalls promptly informed Samuel Francis Du Pont that only a few thousand Confederate troops had been left to defend Charleston and that the fortifications on Coles Island were being abandoned. Though this anecdote represents only a single example, it is indicative of the broader practical importance of the services and information offered by black enlistees. These practical services, on the whole, largely explain why the Navy was so eager to use naval emancipation as a means of enlisting contrabands.

**INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR NAVAL EMANCIPATION**

However, practical concerns alone cannot fully explain why the Navy endorsed the reception and enlistment of contrabands so much earlier than the Army. Rather, two other factors—the Navy’s institutional history and the personal experiences of its officers during the war—also facilitated the enlistment of contrabands. On account of these factors, the Navy was able to overcome political and social barriers to the enlistment of contrabands much more easily than the Army. Within the category of institutional factors, there are two reasons that the Navy was predisposed to receive and enlist contrabands. First, the Navy had an established tradition of black sailors serving on board ships, stretching through each of the nation’s major conflicts back to the Revolutionary War. Furthermore, sailors were subject to a number of degrading social perceptions that actually facilitated the enlistment of black contrabands. Since the social standards for sailors were already so low, it was feasible for the Navy to receive and enlist slaves. The other main institutional reason for the Navy’s ease in receiving and enlisting contrabands relates to the branch’s operational history. Starting in 1819, the Africa Squadron worked to prevent the shipment of slaves from West Africa. This experience, in turn, would provide the Navy and its officers with a firsthand experience of the brutality of slavery, shaping the branch’s policies and the personal beliefs of its officers. This institutional history, then, constitutes another factor that facilitated the early adoption of naval emancipation.

Institutionally, the historical presence of black sailors in the Navy facilitated the rapid progress of naval emancipation. In fact, the Navy had been enlisting black sailors, albeit mostly free blacks, since the American Revolution. Black sailors fought alongside white comrades in every conflict fought by the United States Navy between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. In fact, even slaves had occasionally served aboard Navy ships, such as when John Paul Jones brought his slaves, Cato and Scipio, aboard the Continental Ship Ranger during its cruise in 1778. In any event, the traditional presence of black sailors aboard warships certainly facilitated the change in policy that allowed contraband enlistment. In earlier eras, quotas that had limited the rates of black enlistment also indicate the general ubiquity of black sailors. In 1839, for example, the Navy issued an order establishing a quota that no more than five percent of sailors could be African American in response to “frequent complaint[s]
having been made of the number of Blacks…entered at some of the recruiting stations.”100 In comparison, the Army remained subject to the Second Militia Act of 1792, which dictated that only “able-bodied white male citizen[s]” could be “enrolled in the militia.”101 Therefore, the Navy was able to enlist and utilize black sailors in a way that the Army legally could not until the Militia Act of 1862. As Steven Ramold notes, the Navy “quietly added more than nine hundred African American crewmen” in the early phases of the Civil War because it was allowed under the existing regulations.102 It was explicitly possible for Secretary Welles to enlist black sailors because, according to Ramold, it “did not violate existing law or represent a change in federal policy.”103 The historical precedent of black sailors serving in the Navy allowed Secretary Welles to offer enlistment to contrabands during the Civil War with relative ease.

Furthermore, the general denigration of sailors in American society also allowed for the recruitment of contrabands during the early phases of the Civil War. The low status of sailors in American culture facilitated Welles’ recruitment of slaves by not arousing much opposition within Northern society. As Michael J. Bennett argues, there was a strong antebellum perception that “sailors were, in fact, not much better off than slaves.”104 In fact, many parallels were drawn in popular culture between the lives of slaves and sailors. Herman Melville’s 1850 novel Whitejacket, which was based on his own service aboard the USS United States, may be the most famous depiction of sailors’ implicit servitude. In Melville’s critique of flogging, he frequently references how the practice “convert[s] into slaves some of the citizens of a nation of freemen.”105 Melville was not the only author to compare sailors and slaves. Written in 1840, Richard Henry Dana Jr’s Two Years Before the Mast also includes a section in which a captain describes himself as a “slave driver” for his sailors, whom he compares to a group of “negro slaves.”106 The contemporary comparisons between sailors and slaves have long been the subject of scrutiny among historians. Harold Langley, in his study of social reform in the Navy, points to several areas in which sailors may have been treated even more harshly than slaves, such as flogging. He specifically refers to the experience of diplomat John Randolph, who saw “more flogging in three weeks on board the Concord than in seven years on [his] plantation.”107 Langley surmises that the condition of slaves seemed “better by comparison” in cultural perceptions of early nineteenth-century American sailors, particularly with respect to depictions of corporal punishment.108 By the time of the Civil War, this general denigration of sailors likely facilitated the Navy’s policy of enlisting contrabands into the service by equating sailors with slaves in the eyes of the public. While the integration of contrabands into the Army provoked a controversy that would only be settled by the 1862 Militia Act, sailors and slaves had already been equated for so long that it was possible for them to serve aboard Union warships.

Aside from recruitment and perceptions, the Navy also had a history of preventing the proliferation of slavery via the transatlantic slave trade. The Africa Squadron and its longstanding involvement in the prevention of the slave trade evince a historical connection between the Navy and abolitionist causes that simply did not exist in the Army. In 1819, Congress empowered President Monroe to direct “armed vessels of the United States” to make cruises “on… the coast of Africa” in order to prevent “attempts…to carry on the slave trade” by Americans.109 As Donald Canney traces, this law directly led to the formation of the Navy’s Africa Squadron, which took the Navy’s “limited, almost casual” presence in stopping the slave trade and created a “formalized systematic unit specifically directed to suppress [it].”110 Though the squadron grew considerably between the signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842 and its withdrawal from the African coast in the summer of 1861, it seized only fifty-one slavers during this period.111 Canney calls their failure to capture more slavers “inexcusable,” but there were mitigating factors.112 After all, at the start of the Civil War, the Navy only had forty-two commissioned ships in all.113 Rather than fixating on the numerical failures of the Africa Squadron, though, it is important to consider how this focus on halting the slave trade affected the Navy’s institutional memory. The decades spent by the Navy in pursuit of slavers added a complementary role to its other major peacetime task of protecting American commerce.114 The Navy’s Africa Squadron is a factor that uniquely tied the Navy together with slavery for several decades, affecting the opinions and sentiments of naval officers up until the outbreak of war in 1861.

The operations of the Africa Squadron had serious ramifications for the Navy’s stance towards slavery by inspiring officers to advocate for abolitionist schemes, seen most clearly in the case of Andrew Hull Foote. His life and career demonstrate how the operations of the Africa Squadron inspired a broader abolitionist attitude within the Navy.115 Though Foote would prove an imperfect example, his overall abolitionist sentiments show how American officers and sailors were affected by decades of close proximity with the harsh realities of the transatlantic slave trade. Foote spent the majority of the 1850s in the Africa Squadron, where he would write a work entitled “Africa and the American Flag” that called for the abolition of slavery and advocated for colonization. Within the book, he decried that the “slave-trade became increasingly cruelly and murderously systematic.”116 Foote further claimed that “wherever the slave-trade or its effects penetrated,” violence grew among the populace and “prosperity became impossible.”117 In his arguments against the slave trade, Foote went so far as to suggest that there is “a high superiority in these schemes of African colonization” as true “efforts of Christianity.”118 These experiences would affect his later career. During the war, Foote is perhaps most famous for his conduct on the Mississippi River, where he was instrumental in helping General Grant take Forts
119 During his time on the Mississippi River, Foote wrote that since there are “objections...in the Southern country about colored people, we do not want any of that class shipped,” expressing skepticism about the feasibility of Welles’ orders regarding contrabands. Though Foote was hesitant to enlist contrabands due to concerns of racial conflict, he still expressed a desire for emancipation that was informed by his experiences in the Africa Squadron. In his journal, Foote wrote of a moral duty to “let the oppressed go free” and make “free soil and free-soilers.” Though Foote used more veiled language in public, he still appealed to “the justice of the cause of the Union,” implicitly using the moralistic language of abolitionists. Foote’s experience serves as an example of how the Navy’s experience with the Africa Squadron shaped its institutional memory in a way that was uniquely predisposed towards abolitionism. This experience, among other institutional elements, provides a partial explanation for why the Navy was able to enlist contrabands at the outbreak of the Civil War.

Influences of Wartime Experiences on American Naval Officers

A final factor also helps explain why the Navy was able to use contraband enlistees so easily to overcome its manpower shortages. Over the course of the war, the close contact with the realities of slavery that was experienced by officers and sailors led them to accept contrabands aboard their ships when they otherwise might not have. Like the Navy’s institutional advantages, this reasoning also helps to explain the progress of naval emancipation. However, in this case, the experiences of the Navy’s white officers and sailors do not provide much of an explanation as to why naval emancipation proceeded so much faster than in the Army. Rather, it works in tandem with the practical needs of the Navy and its unique history to explain the acceptance and enlistment of contrabands. After all, the acceptance of runaway slaves was not necessarily inevitable. As documented in Under the Blue Pennant, white Union sailors were often virulently racist. Robert Schneller argues that “the Union navy treated African Americans as second-class sailors” and, despite their reception of contrabands, white sailors often “continued to regard the blacks themselves as inferior human beings.” For example, in one incident aboard the USS Minnesota, Ensign William Grattan noted that a black waiter was forced by the officer corps to dance around the deck. The prejudice of the Union’s white sailors might have posed a stumbling block to the process of naval emancipation. As Bennett suggests, Union sailors could have “refused to recognize their boats, sounded their arrival as a threat to ship security, or returned them to the water,” which would have seriously impeded the emancipatory efforts of superiors like Welles. However, the firsthand experience witnessing the struggles of slaves seeking freedom led some white sailors to respect them. After all, slaves travelled as many as 200 miles to reach Union ships, hoping to find freedom. This experience with the struggles of runaway slaves seems to have made Union sailors sympathetic to the plight of contrabands.

Perhaps the most striking example of the effects of close contact with slavery can be found in the personal transformation of Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont. As with Andrew Hull Foote, the example of Samuel F. Du Pont provides an individual example of a broader factor that facilitated naval emancipation. Like Foote, Du Pont was a career naval officer. After gaining his commission in 1815, Du Pont spent decades in the service, notably fighting in California during the Mexican-American War. During the Civil War, Du Pont’s most significant victory came in his attack on Port Royal, South Carolina. Throughout the war, Du Pont’s views on slavery and abolition were clearly affected by his experiences in the South. To borrow from McPherson, though Du Pont had never owned slaves, he was an adamant “defender of slavery” in the antebellum period. However, his experiences with the realities of slavery changed his opinions. As with other Union sailors, Du Pont was deeply moved by the efforts of runaway slaves...
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to reach freedom. He once wrote that “no danger deters them” and he was impressed that “they encounter[ed] shooting with perfect composure” while running to freedom.  
His experiences led to a profound change in his philosophy. During the war, Du Pont admitted that he was wrong to have once “defended [slavery] all over the world” and that his newfound understanding of the “degradation, overwork, and ill treatment of the slaves in the cotton states” had changed his views.  
This realization led him to gain a greater respect for the efforts and achievements of black sailors, once calling them “very useful” sailors aboard the ships in his squadron. Du Pont even noted that he was not alone in his conversion. He wrote elsewhere that, though none of his officers would have voted for Lincoln in the 1860 election, there was “not a proslavery man among them” after their time in the South.  
In fact, James McPherson notes that “no comparable group of Union army officers at that stage of the war” had experienced slavery so closely and had their views changed so radically as the officers of Du Pont’s squadron. The example provided by Du Pont illustrates the significant role of personal experiences in facilitating naval emancipation.

CONCLUSION

In combination, these factors help to explain the rapid development of naval emancipation long before the Emancipation Proclamation. In many ways, the Navy’s usage of contrabands paralleled the Army’s. After all, a policy for contrabands was first developed by General Butler in May 1861 and would be used by both branches in the early years of the war. Furthermore, both branches used contrabands to provide wartime services such as manual labor for troops on the front lines. In this sense, Oakes correctly emphasizes the broad development of “military emancipation” and “gradual abolition” as “two different policies” in the years before the Emancipation Proclamation.  
Through the efforts of officers, soldiers, and sailors, thousands of slaves who ran to Union lines were unofficially freed well before Congress or President Lincoln made any official policy regarding the matter. However, as this article illustrates, the Navy’s version of this emancipation was both more aggressive and more extensive than the Army’s, with reception and recruitment of contrabands occurring very early in the conflict. Therefore, naval emancipation should be considered as a significant subcategory of military emancipation. In a sense, this newfound understanding extends Oakes’ conception of military emancipation to a maritime context. At the same time, this study reveals unique factors that shaped this phenomenon in a maritime context. While the Army and the Navy would receive thousands of runaway slaves between them, it was ultimately the Navy that took a leading role in this process.

The Navy embraced these developments and adopted the reception and enlistment of contrabands at a pace and scope far greater than the Army. Several factors help to explain why the Navy needed to receive and enlist contrabands and why it was possible to do so during the early stages of the war. At its core, practical necessity played a key role in driving naval emancipation. The Navy needed to bolster lagging enlistment as the war continued. In addition to denying Confederate forces a strategic asset, these contrabands offered valuable services by serving as sailors, stewards, engineers, and pilots. At the same time, the Navy, as an institution, had already been enlisting black sailors and preventing the slave trade, which facilitated naval emancipation. The precedent set by the historical presence of black sailors made the reception and enlistment of contrabands much easier, both legally and socially, in the early phases of the war. Furthermore, the writings of Andrew Hull Foote illustrate how the Navy’s experience in stopping the transatlantic slave trade created sympathy for abolition. Lastly, the personal experiences of sailors and officers in the South dramatically affected their perceptions of slavery. As Du Pont’s letters suggest, many officers were first exposed to the realities of chattel slavery upon reaching naval stations in the South, changing their personal beliefs and opinions. These factors help to explain the trajectory of naval emancipation as a unique component of military emancipation.

This newfound understanding of the phenomenon of naval emancipation has a number of consequences for the historiography of emancipation during the Civil War. It provides a key nuance to the discussion of military emancipation, bringing to light the active role of the Navy and its officers in driving the reception and enlistment of contrabands into the armed forces. This exploration of naval emancipation also yields other important considerations. If nothing else, it reveals the crucial involvement of many individuals, ranging from sailors and officers to squadron commanders and the Secretary of the Navy, in the process of emancipation. In fact, President Lincoln seems to have been notably absent in shaping the Navy’s policy. Craig Symonds even asserts that “there is no evidence that Welles checked first with the president before issuing his orders” that provided for the enlistment of contrabands. As this study demonstrates, barring Welles himself, the key actors in this drama were seldom in Washington and were often on the front lines, confronting the issues prompted by the arrival of contrabands. Lincoln had proclaimed on May 19, 1862 that it was only “competent for…[the] Commander-in-Chief…to declare the slaves of any state or States, free” and that it was not a decision that could be “justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field.” Of course, the great irony of Lincoln’s proclamation is that thousands of slaves were unofficially freed by commanders in the field, both on land and at sea.
There are also other important considerations prompted by the study of naval emancipation. Clearly, naval emancipation was driven by practical realities. Generally speaking, congressional legislation followed precedents that were being set by the Navy. For example, the First Confiscation Act was passed on August 6, 1861, to allow military officers to confiscate property (including slaves) being used in the rebellion. However, both Butler and Welles had already been keeping runaway slaves for months by that point. Similarly, the Militia Act of 1862, passed on July 17, 1862, was supposed to allow the military to enlist African Americans. While the Army did, in fact, wait for this law to begin enlisting runaway slaves, the Navy had been enlisting them since September 1861, nearly a full year earlier. These naval precedents should not disregard intentionalist arguments about emancipation by Republicans in Congress. Rather, they emphasize that naval officers were taking steps towards emancipation long before their actions were technically legal. In any event, the study of naval emancipation emphasizes that matters were often driven by realities on the ground, since officers were forced to react to the influx of runaway slaves throughout the beginning of the war. These considerations demonstrate the value of understanding naval emancipation as a distinct phenomenon, providing nuances to debates and discussions regarding emancipation during the Civil War.

President Lincoln once wrote a letter that extolled the bravery of the Union troops but explicitly paid homage to the invaluable role of “Uncle Sam’s Web-feet.” He noted that the Navy served admirably “on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river” while also performing vital services “up the narrow muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp.” Just as Lincoln made sure to remember the Navy’s role in fighting the war, so too it is important to remember its role in emancipating the slaves.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] This common refrain even finds itself in much of the secondary literature on the Emancipation Proclamation. Allen C. Guelzo, for example, writes that the Proclamation removed the "shackles from four million black slaves." However, such analyses overstate the Emancipation Proclamation's meaning. James Oakes argues that parts of the nation, particularly Republicans, had always insisted that "slavery was the cause of the rebellion and emancipation an appropriate… means of suppressing it." In fact, the path to abolition began long before Lincoln's proclamation. See Allen Guelzo, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 1; James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861-1865 (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), xxiii.
[6] This understanding of a "military emancipation" is most forcefully argued by James Oakes. As he understands it, military emancipation was justified by contemporary understandings of historical precedent and the rules of war. For more on the foundations of this type of emancipation, see Oakes, Freedom National, 37-42.
[7] Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York, NY: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1956), 1; Oakes also links abolition and the enlistment of black soldiers, noting that Lincoln also understood the "connection between emancipation and black troops." In many ways, Oakes' account of abolition is tied to the enlistment of black soldiers. See Oakes, Freedom National, 380.
[9] Ibid., 391; For the Confederate reaction to this policy, see James Oakes, The Scorpion's Sting: Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War (New York, NY: Norton, 2014), 160-162.
[12] For example, the New York Herald reported on General Benjamin Butler's decision in May 1861 to receive three runaway slaves as "contrabands of war" rather than freeing them. The conservative paper applauded his respect for property rights. See Adam Goodheart, 1861: The Civil War Awakening (New York, NY: Knopf, 2011), 322.
[18] In the early months of the war, due to racial prejudices and legal ambiguities, some officers in both branches returned runaway slaves to their owners. Gould, Diary of a Contraband, 67.
[19] Tomlin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 44.
[20] J.C. Chaplin to Louis Goldsborough, 27 October 1861, ORN, I, 6:363-364. Goldsborough's endorsement notes that there were insufficient rations for the contrabands. Other officers faced similar difficulties. For example, Captain John Marston wrote to Gideon Welles that he had no spare provisions for contrabands. Welles responded that contrabands could be "turned over to the Army for employment." For more, see Marston to Welles, 28 January 1862, ORN, I, 6:535-536.
[22] As will be seen later, this difference was partially tied to the historical enlistment of black sailors, as thoroughly documented in W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
[23] For an extended explanation of the legislative process that shaped these laws and their effects on the progress of military emancipation, see Steven Ramold, Slaves, Sailors, Citizens: African Americans in the Union Navy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 38-51.
[24] The United States Constitution dictates that "No Person held to Service or Labour in one State… [shall] be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim" (Article IV, Section 2). In turn, the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act established a legal mechanism to enforce the content of the Constitution.
[25] An Act to amend, and supplementary to, the Act entitled "An Act respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons escaping from the
Service of their Masters," approved February twelfth, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three (Fugitive Slave Act of 1850), U.S. Statutes at Large 9 (1850): p. 464, § 7.

[26] Tomblin writes that though some officers certainly returned fugitive slaves during this early period, it is unclear whether they were driven racial prejudice or a desire "to comply with federal laws, including the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850." See Tomblin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 11.


[28] In practice, this concern was already largely irrelevant. By the time of the passage of even the First Confiscation Act, slaves were already being accepted by officers in both the Army and the Navy, usually without much consideration of their prior role in the war effort.

[29] See An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes (Second Confiscation Act), U.S. Statutes at Large 12 (1863): pp. 589-592. It is worth paying special attention to Section 11, which allows the President "to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem necessary... and for this purpose he may organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best." In fact, the Navy had already been doing this since July 1861. This legislation serves as another example of the practical policy of military officers preceding the passage of relevant laws.

[30] As Tomblin notes, this feature posed a significant obstacle when naval officers could not determine the loyalty of an escaped slave’s master. Furthermore, the ambiguity might have given a pretext for naval officers to return slaves, either on account of racial qualms or limited shipboard resources. See Tomblin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 61.


[32] Oakes writes that Republicans in Congress "constructed their antislavery policies on [the expectation] that slaves would run for freedom when given the chance. However, as the timeline of naval emancipation shows, the sequence of events often went the other way, with slaves fleeing their masters prior to the formulation of congressional policy. For his understanding of Republican attempts at legislative abolition, see Oakes, Freedom National, xvii.


[35] Ibid.


[38] Glisson to Stringham, 15 July 1861, ORN, I, 6:9.


[40] Ibid.


[43] Tomblin briefly alludes to the compensation of contrabands as an important step towards their official enlistment. See Tomblin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 10, 28.


[48] For example, Welles ignored the law and appealed to "every principle of humanity" in his 22 July 1861 letter that authorized the reception of runaway slaves (See ORN, I, 6:10). As always, some cases show the limits of this claim. For example, Louis Goldsborough exercised a careful adherence to the law in the Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Goldsborough instructed his officers to be "very careful that none of the contrabands...come from the State of Maryland or any other State not in rebellion" after several were received aboard the USS Cambridge. See Goldsborough to Parker, 6 November 1861, ORN, I, 6:409.

[49] Presumably, these "bearers of the flags of truce" were either the owners of the fugitive slaves or their appointed representatives. See Commodore Garret J. Pendergrast (USN) to General Walter Gwynn (CSA), 11 May 1861, ORN, I, 4:388.


[51] Christopher Raymond Perry Rodgers to Samuel Francis Du Pont, 19 July 1862, Civil War Letters, 2:164.


[54] Craig Symonds, The Civil War At Sea (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 106.

[55] Ibid., 87.


[57] As a matter of fact, Oakes and other historians seldom mention the Navy when discussing military emancipation. Oakes only briefly mentions that Butler’s contraband policy was “soon expanded to the Navy” in the summer of 1861. See Oakes, Freedom National, 100-101.

[58] Simon Cameron to William Sherman, October 11, 1861, ORN, I, 12:221.

[59] Welles to Louis Goldsborough, 25 September 1861, ORN, I, 6:252. Herbert Aptheker points out that this letter was directed at the enlistment of contrabands, since free blacks were already allowed to serve in the Navy. See Aptheker, “The Negro in the Union Navy,” p. 175, fn. 21.
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[61] Although, at this point, Welles also mandated that such contraband enlistees could hold “no higher rating than boys.” Ibid; Surprisingly, the distinctions between the Welles’ order and Cameron’s are seldom, if ever, discussed in the secondary literature.
[63] Gould, Diary of a Contraband, XI.
[73] Tomblin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 27.
[75] Glisson to Stringham, 15 July 1861, ORN, I, 6:8-9; Glisson to Stringham, 22 August 1861, ORN, I, 6:107.
[76] Stringham to Welles, 18 July 1861, ORN, I, 6:8.
[79] As will be seen later, this long history of racial mixing in the Navy also facilitated naval emancipation. Bolster points out the contradictory effects of race in the antebellum Navy, with naval discipline often causing the “suppression of individual sentiments, including racist ones.” Nonetheless, such assumptions prevailed amongst white sailors. See Bolster, Black Jacks, 100.
[80] For a discussion of the reactions of white sailors to their black shipmates, see John W. Grattan, Under the Blue Pennant or Notes of a Naval Officer, ed. Robert Schneller (New York, NY: Wiley & Sons, 1999), 39-41.
[82] William Price to Friend, 8 October 1862, Price Papers as quoted in Bennett, Union Jacks, 162.
[84] A.D. Harrell to Thomas Craven, 21 November 1861, ORN, I, 4:756. For a discussion of the culinary services provided by contrabands, see Tomblin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 147-151.
[85] As Grattan records in his journal, black stewards aboard the Minnesota were often mocked and abused by the officers. Nonetheless, their service was vital to the operation of ships in the Union fleet. For more on the role of black stewards see Grattan, Under the Blue Pennant, 78.
[87] For more on black engineers during the Civil War, see ibid., 87-88.
[88] Other black engineers had gained experience aboard ships on the Mississippi River and the Atlantic seaboard. See ibid., 89.
[89] Ibid., 87-88.
[91] Du Pont to Welles, 10 June 1863, ORN, I, 14:251; Some of these black pilots lost their lives in guiding ships around Confederate positions. See Tomblin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 182-184.
[93] For a lengthier description of the events surrounding Smalls’ escape and his contributions to the Union war effort in Charleston, see Aptheker, “The Negro in the Union Navy,” 196-199.
[100] Isaac Chauncey to John Downs, 13 September 1839 as cited in Aptheker, “The Negro in the Union Navy,” 173. Though the enlistment of black sailors was limited in 1839, the Army largely prohibited the enlistment of black soldiers during this period. For a thorough discussion of this 1839 order, see Ramold, Slaves, Sailors, Citizens, 35.
[103] Ibid. Still, the Navy did break regulations regarding the enlistment of slaves when it issued orders that condomed the enlistment of contrabands. Therefore, the early enlistment of black contrabands cannot merely be attributed to a legal loophole.
[105] Herman Melville, Whitejacket (London: Richard Bentley, 1850), 144.
[107] Langley, Social Reform in the United States Navy, 149.
[108] Ibid., viii, 94.
[109] An Act in addition to the Acts prohibiting the slave trade (Act of March 3, 1819, Relative to the Slave Trade), U.S. Statutes at Large 3 (1824): p. 532, § 1. As early as 1807, Congress prohibited the “import” of any “negro, mulatto, or person of colour” as slaves, but the law lacked enforcement mechanisms for over a decade. See An Act to prohibit the importation of Slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eight (Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves), U.S. Statutes at Large 2 (1807), p. 426, § 1.

[110] Canney, Africa Squadron, 12. For a lengthier summary of the organization and activities of the Africa Squadron, which deserve study in their own right, refer to Canney, Africa Squadron, 1-12. Though the Africa Squadron represented an increasingly formal organization, its overall success is questionable.

[111] Ibid., 222. During this period, the squadron was given a wide array of ships to pursue its mission. For a list of the ships employed by the Africa Squadron, see ibid., 229-235.

[112] Ibid., 223.


[114] The limited peacetime Navy had few functions, mainly serving to protect American commerce. It also oversaw diplomatic missions. For a lengthier description of the antebellum Navy’s responsibilities and organization, see Canney, Africa Squadron, 36.


[117] Ibid., 90.

[118] Ibid., 104-105.

[119] For a tactical assessment of Foote’s role during these assaults, see Symonds, Civil War at Sea, 94-102.


[121] Andrew Hull Foote, Diary of Andrew Hull Foote as quoted in Hoppin, Life of Andrew Hull Foote, 84.

[122] Andrew Hull Foote, (Speech, New Haven, CT, 8 July 1862) as quoted in Ibid., 346.


[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid., 78.

[126] Bennett, Union Jacks, 159.


[128] Tomblin, Bluejackets & Contrabands, 55.


[130] For a description of the victory at Port Royal, see McPherson, War on the Waters, 37-42.

[131] Ibid., 137.


[133] Du Pont to J.S. Biddle, 17 December 1861 in Du Pont, Civil War Letters, 1:181; Du Pont to Titus Coan, 8 February 1863 in Du Pont, Civil War Letters, 2:422-423.


[135] Du Pont to Sophie Du Pont, 10 April 1862 in Civil War Letters, 1:413.


[137] Oakes, Freedom National, 42.


[140] In fact, some Senators thought the law would allow black enlistment in the Navy even though it was already happening. Senator Saulsbury denigrated the law as an “attempt… to elevate the miserable negro… [and] put him in the Army, and to put him in your Navy.” See Senator Saulsbury, speaking on Militia Act of 1862 (S. 384), on 9 July 1862, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Globe 32, p. 3198 (1862).


[142] Ibid.